College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

2005

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
Ira B. Shepard

Repository Citation
Shepard, Ira B., "Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation" (2005). William & Mary Annual Tax Conference. 129.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/129

Copyright c 2005 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
By
Ira B. Shepard
William & Mary Tax Conference
November 10, 2005
1. ACCOUNTING ........
A.
B.
C.
D.

................................................ 1

A ccounting M ethods .................................................................
I
Inven to ries .......................................................................
1
Installm ent M ethod .......................
.....
..................
...........................................
1
Y ear of R eceipt or D eduction ...........................................................
1

II,BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS .........................................
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

Income ......................................................
.......
........... 1
Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization ..................................................
3
Reasonable Compensation .............................................5
M iscellaneous Expenses ..............................................................
5
Depreciation & Amortization ...........................................................
7
Cred its ..........................................................................
7
Natural Resources Deductions & Credits ...................................................
8
Loss Transactions, Bad Debts and NOLs .....
........................................8
At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses ......................................................
8

III. INVESTMENT GAIN.........

.

.....................................................

8

A . C apital Gain and Loss ................................................................
9
B . S ection 103 1 ...............
.............................................................
.. 9
C . Section 1033 ......................................................................
9

IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES ..............................................................
10
A.
B.
C.
D.

Frin ge B enefits .....................................................................
10
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans ....................................................
11
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options .......................
12
Individual Retirement Accounts .........................................................
13

V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS ..................................................
13
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

R ates ............................................................................
13
M iscellaneous Incom e ...............................................................
14
Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions .....................................................
14
Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes ..................................
16
Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses ...............................................
16
Education ........................................................................
17

V I.C O R PO R A TIO N S .....................................................................
17
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Entity and Form ation ...............................................................
17
Distributions and Redemptions .........................................18
Liquidations.......................................................................
20
S C orp oration s .....................................................................
21
Affiliated C orporations ...............................................................
23
R eorganizations ....................................................................
..24
C orporate D ivisions .................................................................
27

This outline was prepared jointly with Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Clarence TeSelle Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida.

H. M iscellaneous Corporate Issues ...................................................................................
VII.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
VII.

29

PARTNERSHIPS ...........................................................................................................

29

Formation and Taxable Years ......................................................................................
Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis ....................
Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners ........................
Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers .........................
Inside Basis Adjustments ............................................................................................
Partnership Audit Rules ...............................................................................................
M iscellaneous .................................................................................................................

29
29
32
36
37
37
37

TAX SHELTERS ...........................................................................................................

37

A. Tax Shelter Cases ...........................................................................................................
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions . ....................................................................
C. Disclosure and Settlement ..........................................................................................
D . Tax Shelter Penalties, etc ............................................................................................
E. Tax Shelters M iscellaneous .........................................................................................

37
43
44
49
51

IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING ..................................... 51
A . Exempt Organizations ................................................................................................
B. Charitable Giving ...........................................................................................................

51
51

X . TAX PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................

53

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions ............................................................................
Discovery: Summonses and FOIA .......................................
Litigation Costs ...........................................................................................................
Statutory Notice ..............................................................................................................
Statute of Limitations ..................................................................................................
Liens and Collections ..................................................................................................
Innocent Spouse ...........................................................................................................
M iscellaneous .................................................................................................................

53
54
54
55
55
55
57
58

XI. WITHHOLDIN G AND EXCISE TAX ES ......................................................................

60

A. Employm ent Taxes .........................................................................................................
B. Self-employm ent .............................................................................................................
C. Excise Taxes ...................................................................................................................

60
61
61

XII. TAX LEGISLATION ..........................................................................................................

62

A . En acted ...........................................................................................................................
B . P en d in g ..........................................................................................................................

ii

62
62

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
By
Ira B. Shepard*
Professor of Law
University of Houston Law Center
Houston, Texas 77204-6060
Tele: 713-743-2246
e-mail: ishepardguh.edu
William & Mary Tax Conference
November 10, 2005
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand, the significance of the
most importantjudicial decisions and administrativerulings and regulationspromulgatedby the Internal
Revenue Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or outrageous. Most Treasury
Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout
masochist would read them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to the extent
that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and regulations, (3)
they have affectedpreviously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they
provide my co-author the opportunity mock our elected representatives. The outline focuses primarily on
topics of broadgeneral interest [to the two of us, at least] - income tax accounting rules, determination
of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporateand partnership
taxation, exempt organizations, andprocedure andpenalties. It deals summarily with qualified pension
and profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with international taxation or specialized
industries,such as banking, insurance, andfinancial services. Please read this outline at your own risk;
my co-author and 1 take no responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our
advancing ages or our increasingindifference as to whether we get any particularitem right. See VIII. C.
for restrictionson your use of this Outline.

I.

ACCOUNTING
A.
Accounting Methods
B.
Inventories
C.
Installment Method
D.
Year of Receipt or Deduction
II.
BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Income
1.
This deduction should prove so effective that it will be extended to all
business income. Section 102 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 199 to provide a nine percent
deduction for U.S. manufacturing income, i.e., "income attributable to domestic production activities."
For corporations, the deduction allowed by § 199 is a percentage of the lesser of "qualified production
activities income" or taxable income. For individual taxpayers engaged in manufacturing, the taxable
income limitation is replaced by a limitation based on adjusted gross income, The deduction will be
phased in over six years, beginning with 2005. The percentage begins at three percent for 2005 and rises
to nine percent after 2009, but in no event can the deduction exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages paid by
the taxpayer during the year for which the deduction is sought. § 199(a) and (b). Thus, the deduction is
unavailable to a sole proprietor or partnership with no employees. Although the deduction is available to
individuals, corporations, and pass through entities, only items attributable to the conduct of a trade or
business can be taken into account. § 199(d)(5).
. This outline was prepared jointly with Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Clarence TeSelle Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida.

0
Qualified production activities income is defined as the excess of
"domestic production gross receipts" over the sum of (1) the cost of goods sold allocable to domestic
production gross receipts, (2) other deductions, expenses, or losses directly allocable to domestic production
gross receipts, and (3) a ratable portion of other deductions, expenses, and losses not directly allocable to
domestic production gross receipts or to any other class of income. § 199(c)(1). Domestic production gross
receipts are gross receipts derived from (1) the lease, rental, license, or sale, exchange, or other disposition of
(a) "qualifying production property", defined as tangible personal property, computer software, and sound
recordings, produced (in whole or in significant part) by the taxpayer in the United States, (b) a "qualified
film" produced by the taxpayer, or (c) electricity, natural gas, or potable water produced by the taxpayer in the
United States; (2) construction performed within the United States, or (3) architectural or engineering services
performed in the United States for United States construction projects. Section 199(c)(4)(B) excludes from the
definition of domestic production gross receipts any receipts from (1) the sale of food and beverages prepared
by the taxpayer at a retail establishment, or (2) the transmission or distribution (as contrasted with the
production) of electricity, natural gas, or potable water.
a
Because the deduction is a percentage of a specified type of net
income, rather than an allowance for actual expenses incurred by the taxpayer, its effect can be viewed as
reducing the effective tax rate on qualified production activities income. (Indeed, it originated in a proposal to
reduce the corporate tax rate generally, but through the legislative process metamorphosed into its current
structure.) Suppose a taxpayer has $100,000 of qualified production activities income and sufficient income
from other sources to be subject to a marginal rate of 35 percent (the highest statutory rate for both individuals
and corporations). The § 199 deduction reduces the taxpayer's taxable income derived from qualified
production activities from $100,000 to $91,000. At 35 percent, the tax on $91,000 is $31,850, which is an
effective tax rate of only 31.85 percent on the $100,000 of qualified production activities income.
0
Section 199 is unique in allowing a deduction equal to a portion of
net income generated by a general type of business activity. Most tax expenditures for businesses accelerate
deductions, provide deductions for amounts not otherwise deductible, allow a deduction related to gross
income from a specified activity, or take the form of a credit. Most tax experts believe the provision to be so
complex, and the distinctions and pigeon-holing of sources of income and the purpose for which deductible
expenditures were incurred that are required to calculate the amount of the deduction to be so difficult to
ascertain, that the provision cannot be reasonably and consistently administered. A footnote in the conference
committee report on the 2004 Jobs Act unintentionally illustrates the problem even in a simple context.
The conferees intend that food processing, which generally is a qualified production
activity under the conference agreement, does not include activities carried out at [a]
retail establishment. Thus, under the conference agreement while the gross receipts of a
meat packing establishment are qualified domestic production gross receipts, the
activities of a master chef who creates a venison sausage for his or her restaurant menu
cannot be construed as a qualified production activity.
2.
The conferees recognize that some taxpayers may own facilities at which the
predominant activity is domestic production as defined in the conference agreement and other facilities at
which they engage in the retail sale of the taxpayer's produced goods and also sell food and beverages.
For example, assume that the taxpayer buys coffee beans and roasts those beans at a facility, the primary
activity of which is the roasting and packaging of roasted coffee. The taxpayer sells the roasted coffee
through a variety of unrelated third-party vendors and also sells roasted coffee at the taxpayer's own retail
establishments. In addition, at the taxpayer's retail establishments, the taxpayer prepares brewed coffee
and other foods. The conferees intend that to the extent that the gross receipts of the taxpayer's retail
establishment represent receipts from the sale of its roasted coffee beans to customers, the receipts are
qualified domestic production gross receipts, but to the extent that the gross receipts of the taxpayer's
retail establishment represent receipts from the sale of brewed coffee or food prepared at the retail
establishment, the receipts are not qualified domestic production gross receipts. However, the conferees
intend that, in this case, the taxpayer may allocate part of the receipts from the sale of the brewed coffee
as qualified domestic production gross receipts to the extent of the value of the roasted coffee beans used
to brew the coffee. The conferees intend that the Secretary provide guidance drawing on the principles of
section 482 by which such a taxpayer can allocate gross receipts between qualified and nonqualified gross
receipts. The conferees observe that in this example, the taxpayer's sales of roasted coffee beans to
unrelated third parties would provide a value for the beans used in brewing a cup of coffee for retail sale.
(H. Rep. No. 108-755, at 13, note 27 (2004))

*
One is left to wondering whether Starbucks is pleased that its
lobbyists did such a good job in obtaining as much of a benefit as Starbucks gets from this obvious direction
to the Treasury Department regarding what the to-be-promulgated regulations will provide for Starbucks or
whether Starbucks is displeased that it did not get even more advantageous treatment.
*
This provision resulted from efforts to retain some of the tax
expenditure benefits provided to exporters by the extraterritorial income ("ETI") regime that, like the domestic
international sales corporation ("DISC") and the foreign sales corporation ("FSC") regimes before it, were
found to violate U.S. obligations under international trade agreements. Because the objectionable feature of
the ETI, FSC, and DISC regimes was that they provided tax benefits only for certain export activity and were
thus found by the World Trade Organization to provide for prohibited export subsidies, the new deduction
applies regardless of whether the manufactured goods are exported. The deduction of extraterritorial income
(ETI), will be eliminated in 2007 after being phased out in 2005 [80 percent deduction] and 2006 [60 percent
deduction]. A WTO panel has found the phase-out to be itself in violation of international trade agreements.
a.
If the statute appears to have a short shelf-life, the guidance under it
should be even more ephemeral. Notice 2005-14, 2005-7 I.R.B. 498 (1/19/05). Lengthy guidance on the
new manufacturing deduction. Pending promulgation of what surely will be voluminous regulations
governing the allocation of deductions, expenses, and losses for the purpose of calculating qualified
production activities income, Notice 2005-14 provides interim guidance.
3.
The IRS changes position on the tax treatment of rebates. Rev. Rul. 2005-28,
2005-19 I.R.B. 997 (4/25/05). Medicaid rebates incurred by a pharmaceutical manufacturer are purchase
price adjustments that are subtracted from gross receipts in determining gross income. Rev. Rul 76-96,
1976-1 C.B. 23, which held that an automobile manufacturer's rebates paid to retail customers are
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162, is suspended in part because the
issue is being reconsidered by the IRS.
If he didn't destroy the daily cash register tapes, it would have been much
4.
harder for him to skim. Kikalos v. United States, 408 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 5/24/05). Taxpayer owned
three liquor stores that did not accept credit cards, and most of his sales were cash sales. The problem as
put by Judge Posner is "Kikalos's stubborn refusal to retain the [daily cash register] tapes has precipitated
a protracted [since at least 1998] struggle with the Internal Revenue Service." What taxpayer does daily is
to manually record the total receipts from each store in a log book, and then destroys the tape. The
government used the "percentage markup" method to estimate his income based on taxpayer's purchase
invoices.
•
Taxpayer sought to use expert testimony as to his income based
upon both the "bank deposits" method and the "increase in net worth" method but the district court ruled that
once the government chose the method to base income upon, taxpayer could not introduce evidence of another
method.
*
The Seventh Circuit reversed and held that taxpayer could
introduce expert testimony as to his income based upon a method other than the one selected by the
government. Judge Posner's opinion also stated that taxpayer could also introduce his log books into evidence.
Additionally, Judge Posner found fault with the jury instructions:
These instructions were incorrect (as well as confusing -- what would a term like
"without any rational basis" mean to the average juror?) *** The judge was telling the
jury that it was not enough for the plaintiffs to prove that the government's estimate of
their tax deficiencies was incorrect. They had to prove that it was irrational. In so ruling,
the judge added an element to the statutory entitlement to a refund. All the statute
requires is that the taxpayer prove that he overpaid his taxes. It doesn't require him to
prove that the government's assessment was not only inaccurate but irrational. Suppose
Nick Kikalos was a highly credible witness and the jury believed he'd been scrupulous
about transferring the data in the Z tapes to his log book, a belief the jury might find
corroborated by the results of the alternative indirect methods used by the plaintiffs'
expert. We do not see on what basis a jury would be required to disbelieve Kikalos's
testimony in favor of a rough method of estimation, just because the estimation could not
be deemed irrational. There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or its implementing
regulations to suggest the imposition of so insuperable a burden on a refund plaintiff.
B.

Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization

INDOPCO aftermath: " . . deductions are exceptions to the norm of
capitalization.... INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner,503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (Blackmun, J.)
1.
How to change accounting methods for the 2003 year to comply with the
final regulations. Rev Proc 2004-23, 2004-16 I.R.B. 303. Provides an exclusive administrative procedure
for taxpayers to obtain automatic consent to change to a method of accounting pursuant to Reg.
§§ 1.263(a)-4, 1.263(a)-5, and 1.167(a)-3(b), the final capitalization of intangible regulations for the 2003
tax year.
a.
Changing accounting methods for years after 2003 to comply with
the final regulations. Rev. Proc. 2005-9, 2005-2 I..R.B. 605 (12/13/04). This procedure is similar to, but
not identical with, Rev. Proc. 2004-23.
b.
Rev. Proc. 2005-17, 2005-13 I.R.B. 797 (3/8/05). Modifies Rev. Proc.
2005-9 to provide guidance for a taxpayer's second year ending on or after 12/31/03 [for a calendar year
taxpayer, the 2005 year]. This makes the 5-year prior change scope limitation inapplicable to that year.
2.
IRS identifies issues to be addressed in forthcoming proposed regulations on
tangible property costs. Notice 2004-6, 2004-3 I.R.B. 308 (12/22/03). These issues include [using the
numbering from the Notice]: (1) What general principles of capitalization should be applied? (2) What is
the appropriate "unit of property"? (3) What is the starting point for determining whether property value
is increased or useful life is prolonged? (11) Should the regulations provide "repair allowance" type
rules? (12) Should the regulations provide a de minimis rule? (13) When should the "plan of
rehabilitation" doctrine be applied? (15) Are there circumstances where tax treatment should follow
financial or regulatory accounting treatment?
3.
Would you like to fly on a jet without its engines? FedEx Corporation v.
United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1940 (W.D. Tenn. 4/8/03). The district court denied the taxpayer's
motion for summary judgment that expenditures for its off-wing engine maintenance program were
deductible repairs under Reg. § 1,162-4. The court found that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding
whether the appropriate unit of property for measuring whether the expenditures added value or
materially prolonged life was (1) the entire aircraft, as argued by FedEx, or (2) the jet engines and
auxiliary power units, as argued by the government. The court concluded that there is no 'entire vehicle'
rule of law requiring that repairs be measured against the entire vehicle rather than against components.
a.
You don't have to, at least in Memphis. FedEx Corp. v. United States,
2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,397 (W.D. Tenn. 8/27/03). Taxpayer was permitted to deduct the costs of engine
shop visits for jet aircraft engine inspection, heavy maintenance and repair because the relevant unit of
property was held to be the entire aircraft, not the engine.
b.
Affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in an unpublished opinion, which
holds that engines are part of a jet plane even when they are "off wing." 2005 TNT 40-19, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2834 (2/16/05). The opinion was subsequently published at 412 F.3d 617. The $70 million
in taxes and accrued interest determined by the IRS having capitalized the costs incurred for "off-wing
maintenance" of its jet aircraft engines and auxiliary power units in 1993 and 1994 were improperly
collected because FedEx was entitled to deduct "such maintenance costs" as incidental repairs that did not
appreciably prolong the life of the aircraft.
4.
Just when you thought you were safe from capitalization under § 263(a),
§ 263A rears its ugly head. Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-8 I.R.B. 509 (2/6/04). Costs incurred to clean up
land that a taxpayer contaminated with hazardous waste by the operation of its manufacturing plant must
be capitalized under § 263A and included in inventory costs. Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 998, and Rev.
Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, are clarified by providing that the otherwise deductible amounts at issue are
subject to capitalization to inventory under § 263A.
*
Not applicable to years ending on or before 2/6/04.
*
Presumably the costs would be currently deductible if they were
covered by § 198.
a.
See also, Rev. Rul. 2004-17, 2004-8 I.R.B. 516 (2/6/04) (costs paid or
incurred in the taxable year to remediate environmental contamination that occurred in prior taxable years
do not qualify for treatment under § 1341).
b.
Section 308 of the Working Families Act of 2004 extends the deduction
of environmental remediation costs under § 198 for two years through 12/31/05.
c.
Allocating environmental remediation costs of a manufacturer. It's
easy - just allocate them to inventory produced during the year in which the costs are incurred.
Rev. Rul. 2005-42, 2005-28 IR.B. 67 (6/20/05). Extends Rev. Rul. 2004-18 and sets forth five situations

of groundwater cleanup costs which it finds to be allocable under § 263A to the inventory produced
during the taxable year the costs are incurred. The ruling also provides for an automatic change of method
of accounting.
C.
Reasonable Compensation
1.
Tax Court distinguishes Exacto Spring in case appealable to Seventh Circuit.
Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-207 (9/16/04), reconsiderationdenied, T.C. Memo.
2005-3 (1/6/05). In this decision, appealable to the Seventh Circuit and presumably governed by the
"hypothetical independent investor" test of Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (1999),
the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) nevertheless applied the traditional factor of compensation for CEOs of
comparable publicly-traded corporations to disallow deduction of $13 million of the $20 million of
compensation (which included 5 percent of pre-tax profits) paid to the John R. Menard, the CEO and
owner of 89 percent of taxpayer's stock rather than applying solely the hypothetical independent investor
test. The court focused on language in Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-7(b)(3), which was not discussed in Exacto
Spring, and which provides as follows:
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable
under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to assume that reasonable and true
compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like
enterprises under like circumstances.
a.
On reconsideration, makes clear that two prongs are required, i.e.,
(1) that the amounts paid be intended as compensation and (2) that they be reasonable in amount.
T.C. Memo. 2005-3 (1/6/05). In denying taxpayer's motion for reconsideration, Judge Marvel reiterated as an alternative ground for her decision - that the taxpayer did not intend that its payment be for services
in light of (1) it never having paid dividends, (2) the CEO's contractual obligation to repay any portion of
the compensation found to be excessive, and (3) the failure of the board of directors to make any effort to
evaluate whether the compensation was excessive.
2.
Taxpayers who receive W-2 forms that do not correctly reflect income will
be penalized for filing returns that reflect the W-2 amounts. Williams v. Commissioner 120 Fed.
Appx. 289; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1279 (10th Cir. 1/26/05). Taxpayer was employed as a staff radiation
therapist for a medical corporation owned by two physicians who were married to one another. Taxpayer
and her husband became close friends with the physicians. The corporation expanded and opened cancer
treatment centers in multiple geographical locations, and taxpayer supervised all of the corporation's
radiation therapists. For the years 1993, 1994 and 1995, taxpayer received payments of $25,000, $35,000
and $35,000 respectively that were not included on her W-2 forms. Taxpayer left her employment in
1996, following the firing of her sister. In early 1997, taxpayer was furnished with corrected W-2 forms
that included the payments. Held, the payments were not "gifts" because § 102(c) precludes such
treatment and the imposition of the § 6662 negligence penalty was upheld.
D.
Miscellaneous Expenses
1.
The IRS never seems able to catch up with the movements in the price of
gasoline, and more tinkering is in store for 2005. Rev. Proc. 2004-64, 2004-49 I.R.B. 898 (11/17/04),
superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-76, 2003-43 I.R.B. 924. The optional standard mileage rate for business use
of automobiles will increase on 1/1/05 from 37.5 cents per mile to 40.5 cents per mile; the mileage rate
for medical and moving will increase from 14 cents per mile to 15 cents per mile; and the mileage rate for
giving services to a charitable organization will remain at 14 cents per mile.
a
Query whether increasing the deduction for driving to the doctor so
it is now greater than the deduction for driving to the charitable board meeting - in 2003, the deduction for
medical mileage was less than charitable mileage - is because many more taxpayers deduct charitable miles
than medical miles?
a.
The IRS noticed that fuel prices went up recently, so a 9/1/05
increase in mileage rates is announced. Announcement 2005- , 2005-41 I.R.B. (9/9/05). On 9/1/05,
the optional standard mileage rate for business use of automobiles will increase to 48.5 cents per mile,
and the standard mileage rate for medical and moving expenses will increase to 22 cents per mile. The
rate for charitable miles remains at the statutory [§ 170(i)] 14 cents per mile.
b.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, the charitable standard mileage rate would
be 70% of the standard mileage rate for businesses if the use of the vehicle is for the purpose of providing

relief related to Hurricane Katrina. Effective for the use of a passenger automobile between 8/25/05 and
12/31/06.
2.
"It's a bird, it's a plane ... " What is a credit default swap? Notice 2004-52,
2004-32 I.R.B. 168 (7/19/04). The IRS has requested information on credit default swaps in connection
with requests for further guidance. Possible analogues include contingent options, financial guarantees,
standby letters of credit and insurance contracts. Suggestions also include sui generis classification.
a.
NYSBA report on credit default swaps, 9/9/05. Recommendations
include; "Any guidance that is issued should either directly or by analogy characterize a conventional
CDS for U.S. federal income tax purposes as a type of financial instrument for which there is a welldeveloped body of law, such as a notional principal contract, or indicate that a conventional CDS will be
taxed under the rules applicable to such an instrument absent further guidance," and that guidance should
provide a safe harbor under which a conventional single-name or portfolio CDS is treated as a derivative
financial instrument - rather than as an insurance policy, guarantee, letter of credit or similar contract.
3.
Section 307 of the Working Families Act of 2004 extends the above-the-line
$250 deduction for K-12 teachers' supplies through 12/31/05. As before, no deductions for books or
cucumbers by PE and health education teachers.
4.
Section 201 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 179 to extend the $100,000
amount for expensing for small businesses through years beginning before 2008.
*
The amount is indexed for inflation, and for 2004 the maximum
deduction is $102,000 and the phase-out begins at $410,000 of § 179 property placed in service. For 2005, the
indexed amounts are $105,000 and $420,000, respectively. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71; 2004-50 I.R.B. 970.
*
Final § 179 regulations. T D. 9209, Section 179 Elections, 70 F.R.
40189 (7/13/05). Modified to take into account the increased limits of the Jobs Act.
5.
Section 907 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 274(e) to limit the deduction in
regard to expenses incurred with respect to personal use by "specified individuals" of corporate aircraft or
other corporate facilities to the amount treated as compensation and included in the individual's income
as wages. Specified individuals are those who are subject to the requirements of § 16(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or would be subject to such requirements if the taxpayer were subject to the Act,
which generally means they are officers, directors or own 10 percent or more of the corporation's stock.
This reverses the holding to the contrary in Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 197 (2000), aff'd, 255 F.3d 495 (8th Cir. 2001).
a
The amendment is applicable to expenses incurred after the date of
enactment (10/22/04).
a.
Implementing the limitation on deduction of airplane costs. Notice
2005-45, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1228 (6/13/05). This notice provides interim guidance to taxpayers on the
limitation under § 274(e) on the deductible amount of trade or business expenses for use of a business
aircraft for entertainment, i.e., personal use, and provides methodology and examples as to how expenses
are to be allocated to flights. Applicable to expenses incurred after 6/30/05.
6.
The IRS attempts to define "insurance" in terms of risk shifting and risk
distribution, which means that the insurance company must insure more than one person. Note how
12 single-member LLCs may or may not be more than one person. Rev. Rul. 2005-40, 2005-27 I.R.B.
4 (6/17/05). Guidance to clarify that the elements of risk shifting and risk distribution must be present for
an arrangement to be considered insurance for federal income tax purposes, citing Helvering v. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941). Four situations are set forth. The first three situations are held to be "not insurance"
and they involve an unrelated person receiving premiums to insure the risk of a single taxpayer that
operates a large fleet of automotive vehicles in the courier transport business, including (in Situation 3) 12
single-member LLCs of approximately equal size owned by the same person which are classified as
disregarded entities. In situation 4, each of those LLCs elects to be classified as an association, and the
arrangement is held considered to be "insurance."
*
Compare the different view of insurance in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Commissioner,972 F.2d 858 (1992), where Judge Easterbrook stated:
What is "insurance" for tax purposes? The Code lacks a definition. Le Gierse mentions
the combination of riskshifting and risk distribution, but it is a blunder to treat a phrase in
an opinion as if it were statutory language ....
Corporations accordingly do not insure to
protect their wealth and future income, as natural persons do, or to provide income
replacement or a substitute for bequests to their heirs (which is why natural persons buy
life insurance). Investors can "insure" against large risks in one line of business more

cheaply than do corporations, without the moral hazard and adverse selection and loading
costs: they diversify their portfolios of stock. Instead corporations insure to spread the
costs of casualties over time. (972 F.2d at 861-62)
Rev. Rul. 2005-52, 2005-35 I.R.B. (8/3/05). A tool allowance paid by an
7.
employer in the automobile repair and maintenance business to its service technicians based upon the
numbers of hours worked by each service technician is not an accountable plan such that the payments are
excluded from the employees' gross income and exempt from the withholding and payment of
employment taxes because it fails to meet both the "substantiation" and the "return of excess"
requirements (although it does meet the "business connection" requirement).
8.
Namyst v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-263 (11/17/04). Reg. § 1.62-2(f)
conditions application of the netting rule [permitting an above-the-line deduction of employee business
expenses pursuant to an accountable plan] on the employee being required to return excess advances to
the employer. The taxpayer, instead, was required to include expense reimbursements in gross income
because although he was required to [and did meticulously] account to the employer for his expenses, the
taxpayer was not obligated to return any excess advances to the employer.
E.
Depreciation & Amortization
1.
For depreciation of property received in a § 1031 exchange or § 1033
replacement, see III.B., below.
2.
Treasury makes life a little happier for SUV salesmen. T.D. 9133,
Depreciation of Vans and Light Trucks, 69 F.R. 35513 (6/25/04), making final T.D. 9069, 68 F.R. 40129
(7/7/03). Final and temporary regulations applicable to property placed in service on or after 7/7/03.
Provides that a truck or van is not subject to the § 280F(a) limits if it is a qualified nonpersonal use
vehicle as defined in Reg. § 1.274-5T(k). Effective 6/25/04.
a.
But not for salesmen of expensive SUVs. Section 910 of the Jobs Act
of 2004 added § 179(b)(6), limiting the § 179 deduction to $25,000 for the purchase of most sport utility
vehicles that have a "gross vehicle weight rating" of not more than 14,000 pounds. This limitation with
respect to sport utility vehicles was prompted by concern that vehicles that weigh more than 6,000
pounds, which describes most large sport utility vehicles (some of which appear to have been carefully
engineered to have a "gross vehicle weight rating" only slightly in excess of 6,000 pounds), are not
subject to the limitations on depreciation deductions provided by § 280F. Because property that is not
subject to the § 280F limitations is eligible for § 179 expensing, taxpayers could have reaped a significant
tax benefit by purchasing a large sport utility vehicle for business use and expensing up to $100,000 of
the cost (and applying accelerated depreciation to the remainder of the purchase price in the case of a
really expensive SUV, such as a Hummer). Although the 2004 Jobs Act did not change the applicability
of § 280F, by limiting the availability of § 179 expensing it reduces the tax advantage of purchasing such
a vehicle.
Effective for SUVs placed in service after 10/22/04..
3.
Section 211 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 168 to provide for a 15-year
recovery period for depreciation of qualified leasehold improvements and qualified restaurant property
placed in service between 10/23/04 and 12/31/05. Generally, the improvements and property must be in
buildings that are at least three years old.
4.
Fifteen-year amortization for pre-opening and organizational expenses,
except for deductibility of the first $5,000. Section 902 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends §§ 195, 248
and 709 to provide for a deduction of the first $5,000 of costs in each category in the year that
amortization would have begun. Amounts not deductible are to be amortized over 15 years. The
deduction is phased out dollar-for-dollar as the amount in each category exceeds $50,000.
5.
Maguire/Thomas Partners Fifth & Grand, Ltd. v. Commissioner T.C. Memo
2005-34 (2/28/05). the Tax Court (Judge colvin) held that the costs incurred to obtain a zoning change
with respect to land are not depreciable, but the costs to obtain a zoning variance relating to a specific
building to be constructed on a specific parcel of land are depreciable as part of the cost of the building.
F.
Credits
1..
Section 301 of the Working Families Act of 2004 extends the research credit for
18 months until 12/31/05.
2.
Arevalo v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 15 (5/18/05). Taxpayer's $10,000
investment in pay phones gave him merely legal title but did not give him the benefits and burdens of
ownership with respect to the pay phones; he was therefore not entitled either to depreciation or to the

§ 44 disabled access credit. In particular, he was not entitled to the credit because the investment in pay
phones was not an eligible access expenditure.
The Katrina Tax Act provides a "Work Opportunity Tax Credit" for Hurricane
3.
Katrina employee survivors and an "employee retention credit" for employers affected by Hurricane
Katrina.
Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
G.
Renewable Electricity Production Credit. As amended in 2004, § 45 allows a
1.
credit of 1.5 cents (adjusted for inflation) for every kilowatt hour of electricity produced from eight types
of qualified energy resources: (1) wind, (2) closed-loop bio-mass produced from plants that were planted
for the purpose of producing electricity and sold to an unrelated taxpayer, (3) open-loop biomass (which
includes agricultural livestock waste nutrients, including waste from cows, pigs, poultry and sheep, and
solid, nonhazardous cellulosic waste), (4) geothermal energy, (5) solar energy, (6) small irrigation power,
(7) municipal solid waste, and (8) refined coal. In any year in which the "reference price" for electricity,
as published by the Treasury Department, exceeds 8 cents per kilowatt hour, the amount of the credit is
reduced according to a statutory formula. A variety of effective dates and durations for the credit
attributable to each type of qualified energy resource, range from January 1, 2006 to January 1, 2009.
2.
Biodiesel Fuels Credit. The Jobs Act of 2004 added § 40A, which provides for
a biodiesel fuels credit, which is scheduled to expire at the end of 2006. The credit is the sum of two
separately computed credits: the biodiesel fuel mixture credit and the biodiesel credit. The biodiesel fuel
mixture credit is 50 cents for each gallon of biodiesel fuel used by the taxpayer in the production of a
qualified biodiesel mixture; a qualified biodiesel mixture is a mixture of biodiesel and diesel fuel that is
sold by the taxpayer for use as fuel or is used as fuel by the taxpayer in his trade or business. The
biodiesel credit is 50 cents for each gallon of biodiesel that is not in a mixture with diesel fuel and which
the taxpayer either uses as fuel in a trade or business or is sold at retail by the taxpayer to someone who
places it in the fuel tank of a vehicle (as would occur in a gas station). The credit is available only if the
taxpayer obtains a certificate from the producer or importer of the biodiesel fuel identifying the product
and the percentage of biodiesel or agri-biodiesel in the product. Unlike most other credits, the taxpayer's
deductions or basis with respect to the biodiesel or biodiesel mixture is unaffected by the credit, nor is it
included in the taxpayer's gross income.
3.
Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel Production Credit. The 2004 Jobs Act added § 45H,
which provides a credit of 5 cents for each gallon of low sulfur diesel fuel produced by small business
refiners. The credit is limited to 25 percent of the qualified capital costs incurred by the refiner with
respect the facility, reduced by the aggregate § 45H credits claimed in prior years with respect to that
facility. Amounts credited under this provision cannot increase the taxpayer's basis in the facility.
Qualified capital costs are those necessary to comply with certain EPA regulations after January 1, 2003
and before the earlier of 1 year after the date on which the taxpayer must be in compliance with the
regulations or December 31, 2009. In effect, the credit expires after 2009. Section 280C(d) disallows any
deduction with respect to the production of low sulphur diesel fuel in an amount equal o the credit.
Credit for Producing Oil and Gas from Marginal Wells. The 2004 Jobs Act
4.
added § 451, which provides a credit of $3 per barrel of qualified crude oil production and 50 cents per
1,000 cubic feet of qualified natural gas production. The credit amounts are reduced as oil and gas prices
increase and apply only to a certain amount of production from a domestic "qualified marginal well." If
the production also qualifies for the § 29 credit, the credit under § 451 is not allowed unless the taxpayer
waives the § 29 credit. Unlike most other credits, the taxpayer's deductions or basis with respect to the
production is unaffected by the credit, nor is it included in the taxpayer's gross income.
H.
Loss Transactions, Bad Debts and NOLs
South Carolina has a sharply defined public policy against gambling 1.
except, of course state sponsored gambling. Hackworth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-173
(7/22/04). The taxpayer operated an illegal gambling operation in South Carolina. After the local sheriff's
office seized cash proceeds of the gambling operation, which were forfeited under state law, the taxpayer
claimed a § 165 loss deduction. The Commissioner disallowed the loss on public policy grounds, and
Judge Cohen upheld the Commissioner's position because allowing the deduction would frustrate a
sharply defined policy of the state of South Carolina. [The opinion fails to note that the State of South
Carolina sponsors a state lottery. Perhaps the sharply defined public policy that was violated was a
restraint on competition.]
At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
I.
III.

INVESTMENT GAIN

Capital Gain and Loss
Section 1031
1.
No "parking" of your own property. Rev. Proc. 2004-51, 2004-33 I.R.B. 294
(7/20/04), modifying Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 1.R.B. 308. Provides that the safe harbor provision of
Rev. Proc. 2000-37 does not apply to reverse like-kind "parking" arrangements if the taxpayer owns the
property intended to qualify as replacement property within the 180-day period ending on the date of
transfer of qualified indicia of ownership of the property to an exchange accommodation titleholder.
2.
No gain exclusion if taxpayer exchanges investment property for a rent
house he later moves into and sells two years later - until five years have elapsed from the date of
the exchange. Section 839 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 121(d)(10) to make the § 121 exclusion
of gain on the sale of a principal residence inapplicable to any property acquired in a § 1031 exchange
within five years of the sale.
3.
Exclusion of gain under §§ 121 and 1031 when a single property is both a
personal residence and a business or investment property, either sequentially or simultaneously.
Rev. Proc. 2005-14, 2005-7 1.R.B. 528 (2/3/05) (as corrected). Provides guidance on how a homeowner
can exclude gain on the sale or exchange of a home under § 121 and also defer gain from a like-kind
exchange on the same property under § 1031. This guidance also clarifies that the property can be used
consecutively or concurrently as a home and a business, i.e., use as rental property or an office in the
home, respectively. Detailed examples are included.
Nonrecognition denied - Caught by a targeted anti-abuse rule. Rev. Rul.
4.
2002-83, 2002-49 I.R.B. 927 (12/9/02). Individual A owned highly appreciated real property held for
investment (Property 1) and individual B, related to individual A within the meaning in § 267(b), owned
real property (Property 2), which was not appreciated. In a multiparty like-kind exchange A and B each
transferred their properties to a qualified intermediary. C, an unrelated purchaser of Property 1,
transferred cash to the qualified intermediary, who transferred Property 2 to A, Property 1 to C, and the
cash to B. The IRS ruled that pursuant to § 1031(f), a taxpayer - A - who transfers relinquished property
to a qualified intermediary in exchange for replacement property formerly owned by a related party is not
entitled to nonrecognition treatment under § 1031(a) if, as part of the transaction, the related party
receives cash or other non-like-kind property for the replacement property. Based on the legislative
history [H.R. Rep. No. 101-247 at 1340 (1989)], the IRS reasoned that the purpose of §1031(f) is to deny
nonrecognition treatment for transactions in which related parties make like-kind exchanges of high basis
property for low basis property in anticipation of the sale of the low basis property. Accordingly, the IRS
applied § 1031(t)(4) because the multi-party exchange was "part of a transaction (or a series of
transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031 (f)(1)."
a.
Reality overtakes Rev. Rul. 2002-83. Teruya Brothers, Ltd. v.
Commissioner 124 T.C. No. 4 (2/9/05). Taxpayer transferred properties to a qualified intermediary, who
sold them to unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to purchase like-kind replacement property
from a related party. Judge Thornton held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct
exchanges between the taxpayer and related party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to
unrelated third parties, and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031(f). It further held
that taxpayer failed to prove that avoidance was not one of the principal purposes of the transactions
under the § 1031 (f)(4) exception because [even though more gain was recognized by the related party on
some of the properties, the only tax consequences of the gain recognition were reduction of the related
party's net operating loss - as opposed to current taxation for taxpayer].
New rules on like-kind personal property classes. T.D. 9202, Additional Rules
5.
for Exchanges of Personal Property Under Section 1031(a), 70 F.R. 28818 (5/19/05). Final regulations
that replace the use of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system with the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) for taxpayers that engage in like-kind exchanges of depreciable
tangible personal property to determine what properties are of a like class for purposes of § 1031.
The regulations are effective to transfers of property made on or
0
after 8/12/04, but may be elected for property transfers made on or after 1/1/97 (open years only).
Additionally, taxpayers may use the old SIC rules for property transfers made on or before 5/19/05.
C.
Section 1033
1.
Payments made by a state agency to reimburse losses that a "qualifying
business" incurred for damage or destruction of real and personal property on account of a
disaster. Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 120 (7/1/05). Disaster relief grants under a state
reimbursement program are not excludible from gross income under the general welfare exclusion, nor as
a gift, nor as a qualified disaster relief payment under § 139, nor as a contribution to the capital of a
A.
B.

corporation under § 118; instead, they may be deferred under § 1033. The payments are included in
amount realized on the involuntary conversion of the property destroyed and any gain is thus eligible for
§ 1033 treatment provided that qualified replacement property is acquired.
Amounts received from employer may be excluded as § 139 qualified
a.
disaster relief; amounts received from a state agency are excluded as gifts. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-3
I.R.B. 283 (1/21/03). Amounts received by an individual from an employer to reimburse the individual
for necessary medical, temporary housing, or transportation expenses incurred as a result of a flood are
not excludable as a gift under § 102, but are excluded from gross income as qualified disaster relief under
§ 139 if the flood was a Presidentially declared disaster. Similar amounts received from a state agency are
excludable under the administrative general welfare exclusion; and similar amounts received from a
charity are excluded under § 102.
COMPENSATION ISSUES
A.
Fringe Benefits
1.
Guidance on Health Savings Accounts. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269
(12/22/03). The IRS has issued guidance in Q&A form on Health Savings Accounts under new § 223
(added by § 1201 of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003).
This guidance provides basic information about HSAs. This new provision offers health spending
accounts without the "use it or lose it" requirement of health FSAs.
a.
Notice 2004-23, 2004-15 I.R.B, 725 (4/12/04). The notice provides a
safe harbor for preventive care benefits allowed to be provided by a high deductible health plan
("HDHP") without satisfying the § 223(c)(2) minimum deductible. Preventive care under the safe harbor
includes "annual physicals" (including tests and diagnostic procedures), routine prenatal and well-child
care, child and adult immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, obesity weight-loss programs and a long
list of "screening services" (for cancer; heart and vascular diseases; infectious diseases; mental health
conditions and substance abuse; metabolic, nutritional and endocrine conditions; musculoskeletal
disorders; obstetric and gynecologic conditions; pediatric conditions; and vision and hearing disorders);
however it does not generally include any service or benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury or
condition.
This notice also provides that the definition of "preventive care" is
a question of federal tax law, and not a question of state law. Therefore a service required by state law to be
provided on a first-dollar basis is not necessarily a "preventive service," and a plan that complies with state
law may well be disqualified from being an HDHP
(1)
Notice 2004-43, 2004-27 I.R.B. 10 (7/6/04). This notice provides
transition relief for plans that include state-mandated first-dollar coverage. These plans would not be
disqualified for that reason alone for months before 1/1/06, provided that the state law was in effect on
1/1/04.
(2)
Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196 (8/16/04). Provides that any
treatment that is incidental or ancillary to a preventive care service or screening described in Notice 200423 also falls within the safe harbor for preventive care.
b.
Notice 2004-25, 2004-15 I.R.B. 727 (4/12/04). This notice provides
general transition relief for 2004 from the requirement that medical expenses may be paid or reimbursed
by an HSA only if they were incurred after the HSA had been established for eligible individuals who
establish an HSA before 4/16/05.
c.
The inability to get general prescription drug coverage is the sticking
point for many potential users of HSAs. Rev. Rul. 2004-38, 2004-15 I.R.B. 717 (4/12/04). An
individual who had prescription drug coverage that was not subject to the annual deductible of the HDHP
is not eligible to make contributions to (or have his employer make contributions to) an HSA.
(1)
Rev. Proc. 2004-22, 2004-15 I.R.B. 727 (4/12/04). Provides
transition relief for the months before 2006 for an individual who is covered by both an HDHP and a
separate plan or rider that provides drug benefits on a co-pay basis or in some other manner before the
minimum annual deductible of the HDHP is met.
Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971 (6/1/04). This ruling provides
d.
guidance on the interactions of the HSA rules with the rules concerning health flexible spending
arrangements ("health FSA") (under Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1, Q&A 7) and health reimbursement
arrangements ("HRA") (under Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93). An individual can be eligible for making
HSA contributions while being covered by a limited-purpose health FSA or HRA, a suspended HRA, a
post-deductible health FSA or HRA, or a retirement HRA.
IV.

e.
Notice 2005-8, 2005-4 1.R.B. 368 (1/24/05). This notice provides
guidance regarding a partnership's contributions to a partner's HSA and an S corporation's contributions
to a 2-percent shareholder-employee's HSA. Generally, the contributions are included in the income of
the partner or shareholder-employee and are deductible by him or her as HSA contributions.
f.
Rev. Rul 2005-25, 2005-18 I.R.B. 971 (4/13/05). A married individual
who otherwise qualified as an eligible individual under § 223(c)(1)(A) can contribute to an HSA even if
his spouse has nonqualifying family coverage provided that he is not covered under the spouse's plan.
g.
REG-138647-04, Employer Comparable Contributions to Health Savings
Accounts Under Section 4980G, 70 F.R. 50233 (8/26/05). Proposed regulations to provide guidance on
employer comparable contribution to HSAs under § 4980G, which provides an excise tax on the failure of
an employer to make "comparable contributions" to the HSAs of all comparable participating employees
[employees in the same category of "self-only" or "family"] when it makes a contribution to any
employee's HSA.
2.
If the only thing the employee or his family could receive are medical
expense reimbursements, then reimbursements under the plan qualify for the § 105(b) exclusion.
Rev. Rul. 2005-24, 2005-16 I.R.B. 892 (4/3/05). Reimbursements under an employer-sponsored § 125
salary-reduction medical reimbursement arrangement are not excludable from the employee's gross
income under § 105(b) where unused benefits could be paid to the employee in cash or other benefits.
However, reimbursements do qualify for the § 105(b) exclusion where they are made under a plan where
unused benefits are made available for future medical care expenses of the employee [both before and
after retirement] as well as those of the employee's spouse and dependents.
3.
In the future, employees may be able to avoid the late December rush at the
optometrist's office and have until March 15th to buy eyeglasses. Notice 2005-42, 2005-23 I.R.B.
1024 (5/18/05). Extends the "use it or lose it" rules for flexible spending arrangements by allowing
employers to extend the headline for reimbursement of health and dependent care expenses up to 2-1/2
months after the end of a cafeteria plan year.
4.
Rev. Rul. 2005-60, 2005-37 I.R.B. (8/25/05). The employer subsidy for
maintaining prescription drug coverage is not considered in computing the applicable employer cost when
determining whether the minimum cost requirement of § 420(c)(3) is met with respect to transfer of the
excess pension assets of a defined benefit plan to a health benefits account which is part of the plan.
B.
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1.
Cumulative list of changes in plan qualification requirements. Notice 200484, 2004-52 I.R.B. 1030 (12/14/04). Contains the 2004 Cumulative List of Changes in Plan Qualification
Requirements, which reflects changes to plan qualification requirements and remedial amendment
periods.
2.
Comprehensive final regulations on matching contributions and employee
contributions to 401(k) plans update the final regulations issued in 1991. T.D. 9169, Retirement
Plans; Cash or Deferred Arrangements Under Section 401(k) and Matching Contributions or Employee
Contributions Under Section 401(m) Regulations, 69 F.R. 78144 (12/29/04). These are comprehensive
final regulations that provide guidance on the requirements (including the nondiscrimination
requirements) for cash or deferred arrangements under § 401(k) and for matching contributions and
employee contributions under § 401 (m).
3.
"Mr. Gotbucks, meet Senator Roth." REG-152354-04, Designated Roth
Contributions to Cash or Deferred Arrangements Under Section 401(k), 70 F.R. 10062 (3/2/05). Proposed
regulations relating to an election under § 402A that will be available beginning in 2006 for employees to
designate contributions to a 401(k) plan made under a qualified cash-or-deferred arrangement as Roth
contributions. These contributions will be currently includible in gross income but qualified distributions
will be excludable from gross income.
4.
"Hercules! Hercules! Hercules!"' Stepnowski v. Commissioner 124 T.C. No.
12 (4/26/05). In this declaratory judgment case, Judge Cohen held that an amendment made by
petitioner's employer, Hercules Incorporated, to its pension plan's lump-sum option did not violate the
anti-cutback rule of § 41 1(d)(6). The amendment was made in 2001 during the GUST amendment period
and permitted the plan sponsor to use the higher 30-year Treasury bond discount rate permitted under
§ 417(e)(3)(A) in computing the lump sum, as opposed to the lower PBGC rate that was required by that
Code provision prior to its amendment by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465.
1"Show me muscle again, oh, Hercules! Hercules! Hercules!" Mama Klump in "The Nutty Professor" (1996).

5.
More work for benefits lawyers - this time under § 415. REG-130241-04, 70
F.R. 31214 (5/31/05). Proposed regulations providing comprehensive guidance on § 415 limitations on
benefits and contributions under qualified plans that are effective for plan years beginning in 2007. They
are long.
6.
Final regulations crack down on abusive § 412(i) plans that understate the
value of life insurance contracts distributed from a qualified retirement plan to employees, and
require that they be taxed at their full fair market value. T.D. 9223, Value of Life Insurance Contracts
When Distributed From a Qualified Retirement Plan, 70 F.R. 50967 (8/29/05), making final proposed
regulations published at 69 F.R. 7384 (February 2004). A tax-qualified retirement plan funded entirely by
a life insurance contract of an annuity is a "section 412(i) plan." Such plans permit employer
contributions to the plan to be deducted, with the contributions used to purchase a specially designed life
insurance contract, with the cash surrender value temporarily depressed well below the premiums paid at
the time the policy is distributed or sold to the employee for the amount of the temporarily depressed cash
surrender value. After the transfer, the cash surrender value then increases significantly.
7.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, withdrawals of up to $100,000 from retirement
plans made between 8/29/05 and 12/31/06 for relief relating to Hurricane Katrina would not be subject to
the 10-percent premature withdrawal tax under § 72(t). This exception applies to withdrawals from IRAs
as well.
a.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, recontributions of withdrawals for home
purchases cancelled due to Hurricane Katrina would be treated as rollovers if made before 3/1/06.
b.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, loans of up to $100,000 from qualified
plans made between 9/24/05 and 12/31/06 for relief relating to Hurricane Katrina will receive favorable
treatment.
C.
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1.
Section 885 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 409A which significantly
modifies the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation plans for amounts deferred after 2004 (a) by
requiring that deferred compensation may not be distributed earlier than separation from service,
disability, death, a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule), on change of control (to be defined in
regulations) or "the occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency"; (b) by requiring that the first deferral
election be made before the beginning of the year in which the services are performed (or, if contingent
compensation, at least six months before the end of the year in which the services are performed), and
(c) by prohibiting acceleration of benefits except as permitted by regulations. Changes in the time and
form of distribution, so-called "second [deferral] elections" will have to be made at least twelve months
before the payment was to have been made, and must postpone the payment for at least five years from
the date it otherwise would have been made. Additionally, offshore rabbi trusts are not permitted.
0
Violations of these rules would make immediately taxable all
amounts not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, plus interest at one percentage point above the
underpayment rate plus additional tax of 20 percent of the amount improperly deferred.
*
These rules apply to officers, directors and ten-percent shareholders
of publicly-held corporations and to persons holding the same positions in non-publicly held corporations.
*
These new rules do not apply to nonqualified stock options,
incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plans, but apparently do apply to stock appreciation
rights.
*
Benefits earned through the end of 2004 are grandfathered if the
plan complied with prior law and it was not materially modified after 10/3/04.
a.
Section 409A guidance provides transition rules and excludes stock
appreciation rights from the purview of that section. Notice 2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274 (12/20/24).
This notice provides in Q&A form the first part of what is intended to be a series of guidance with respect
to the application of § 409A. Significant is the exclusion of stock appreciation rights from coverage by
§ 409A where the SAR can only be satisfied with stock provided that the exercise price is not less than
the market price on the day the SAR was granted and the underlying stock is traded on an established
securities market. In addition, general transition rules and reporting requirements are provided in the
notice.
b.
Proposed regulations incorporate much of the guidance in Notice
2005-1. REG-158080-04, Application of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 70
F.R. 57930 (10/4/05). These proposed regulations incorporate much of the guidance provided in Notice
2005-1, as well as "substantial additional guidance." They identify the plans and arrangements covered by
§ 409A and describe the requirements for deferral elections and the permissible timing for deferred

compensation payments. They also extend the deadline for "documentary compliance" to 12/31/06, but
1/1/05 remains as the effective date for statutory compliance (although there are transition rules
applicable for 2005).
2.
Rev. Rul. 2005-39, 2005-27 1.R.B. 1 (6/16/05). Unvested shares of restricted
stock for which an election under § 83(b) has been made are treated as outstanding stock for purposes of
the change of control provisions of § 280G, the golden parachute provisions.
3.
Rev. Rul. 2005-48, 2005-32 I.R.B. (8/2/05). If an employee exercises a
nonstatutory stock option more than six months after grant, but it subject to restrictions on his ability to
sell the stock so obtained under rule lob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1984 and during a
contractual "lock-up period," then upon exercise of the option he is required under § 83 to include in his
compensation income an amount determined without regard to the share-transfer restrictions imposed
because these are "lapse restrictions" that are ignored under § 83(a) in valuing the shares.
D.
Individual Retirement Accounts
1.
The Supreme Court holds that IRAs are exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561 (4/4/05). Inasmuch as rights to the funds in an IRA are on account of
the holder's age and an IRA is similar to a other retirement plans, the assets in the plan are exempt from
the holder's Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Justice Thomas held that the § 72(t) tax penalty of 10 percent on
amounts withdrawn before age 59-1/2 makes the IRA one in which the right to receive payments
effectively limits their right to payment of the IRA balance until that age is reached.
0
The amounts in the IRA in this case were rolled over from a
qualified plan, but the Court's decision was not based on that factor.
a.
Bankruptcy Act changes on protection of IRAs. Section 224 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. § 522, protects from creditors (1) assets in qualified plans, (2) assets
in IRAs that were rolled over from qualified plans, and (3) other assets in IRAs of not more than $1
million (indexed).
2.
What a way to mess up! Coppola v. Beeson (In re: Joseph C. Coppola), 96
A.F.T.R.2d 2005-15225 (5th Cir. 7/25/05). In a per curiam opinion, the court held that a faculty
member's pledging of his § 403(b) retirement account as security for alimony payments to his ex-wife
totaling $220,000 caused that amount to be deemed distributed and no longer entitled to the exemption
from bankruptcy under Texas law.
PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
Rates
A.
1.
Section 101 of the Working Families Act of 2004 repeals the scheduled
reductions in the child tax credit, marriage penalty relief [standard deduction and the top of the 15-percent
bracket], and the 10 percent rate bracket.
a.
Section 102 continues for one more year the relief from AMT of personal
tax credits.
b.
Section 103 extends the increase in AMT exemption amount for one year
through 2005.
2.
Dividends received are to be taxed at capital gains rates. The 2003 Act added
§ 1(h)(1 1), which provides that dividends received by taxpayers other than corporations generally will be
taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gains, i.e., 15 percent for taxpayers otherwise taxable at a rate
greater than 15 percent; and five percent for taxpayers otherwise at 10 or 15 percent (with a special zero
percent rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008). This rate applies to dividends received
from domestic and qualified foreign corporations for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative
minimum tax. A dividend is treated as investment income for purposes of determining the amount of
deductible investment interest under § 163(d) only if the taxpayer elects to treat the dividend as not
eligible for the reduced rates. The provision is effective for taxable years beginning after 12/31/02, and
beginning before 1/1/09.
0
If a shareholder does not hold a share of stock for more than [60]
days during the [120]-day period beginning [60] days before the ex-dividend date (as measured under section
246(c)), dividends received on the stock are not eligible for the reduced rates. Also, the reduced rates are not
available for dividends to the extent that the taxpayer is obligated to make related payments with respect to
positions in substantially similar or related property. Note that the 60-day holding period cannot be satisfied
by stock that is acquired one day before the ex-dividend date. This anomaly is to be retroactively corrected in
the Tax Technical Corrections Bill (H.R. 3654), which was introduced by Ways & Means Committee Chair
Thomas and Ranking Minority Member Rangel. 2003 TNT 236-1.
V.

Let's pretend it has been already corrected for the Spring 2004
a.
Filing Season. IR-2004-22 (2/19/04). The IRS announced it agreed to make the provisions of § 2 of the
Tax Technical Corrections Bill of 2003, related to dividends, available to taxpayers in advance of its
passage. These include an increase of the 120-day period to 121 days, as well as permitting passthrough
entities that received dividends in fiscal years beginning in 2002 to treat as qualifying dividends those
qualifying dividends received in 2003.
b.
It is finally corrected in October. Section 402(a)(2) of the Working
Families Act of 2004 does, indeed, correct that glitch.
B.
Miscellaneous Income
Prejudgment interest in a personal injury lawsuit is not excluded from
1.
income. Chamberlain v. United States, 401 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2/18/05). Prejudgment interest recovered in
a personal injury lawsuit is not excluded from income under § 104(a)(2) because it was compensation for
the lost time value of money and is not received "on account of' the personal injury.
0
May prejudgment interest be excluded if there is a settlement?
More specifically, post-judgment interest exclusion is permitted by the exclusion of the entire amount of any
future payment received pursuant to a structured settlement. Does this create a difference between a recovery
by way of settlement and a recovery by way ofjudgment?
Annuity death benefits are IRD. Rev. Rul. 2005-30, 2005-20 1.R.B. 1015
2.
(4/28/05). If the owner-annuitant of a deferred annuity contract dies before the annuity starting date, any
amounts received by a beneficiary in excess of the owner-annuitant's investment in the contract are
includible in gross income as income in respect of a decedent under § 691. These amounts are also subject
to the rules of § 72 if the beneficiary receives an annuity rather that a lump-sum.
C.
Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
The alternative minimum tax ("AMT") trap for attorneys' fees on large
1.
recoveries will continue to be an issue despite legislation and a Supreme Court decision.
a.
Cases decided by a majority of courts in recent years sprang the
AMT trap. Attorney's fees incurred by an individual in a nonbusiness profit-seeking transaction are
[§ 212] miscellaneous itemized deductions [§67] and may not be deducted for AMT purposes. To avoid
this result, taxpayers in a number of cases in recent years have argued the portion of a taxable damage
award retained by the taxpayer-plaintiff's attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from the taxpayerplaintiff's income and treated as income earned directly by the attorney. Generally, the Tax Court and
most circuits hold that attorney's fee awards paid directly to a plaintiffs attorney [or the portion of a
damage award that is the attorney's contingent fee that is so paid] are nevertheless includable in the
litigant's gross income, and that the taxpayer then may claim a deduction, subject to any applicable
limitations, including disallowance of the deduction for AMT purposes if it is a § 212 deduction. Bagley
v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), aff'd 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997). Accord Baylin v. United
States, 43 F.3d. 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'g 30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1993); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 96-1
U.S.T.C. 50,011 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-51; Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187,
2000-1 U.S.T.C.
50,528 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-291; Benci-Woodward v.
Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,595 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-395,
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. 50,570
(7th Cir. 8/7/01), aff'g 114 T.C. 399 (5/24/00) (reviewed, 8-5); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369,
2001-1 U.S.T.C. 50,244, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-889 (4th Cir. 2/16/01), aff'g, 113 T.C. 152 (8/20/99);
Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,351 (10th Cir. 12/19/01),
aff'g T.C. Memo. 2000-180 (6/12/00), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (5/13/02); Raymond v. United States,
355 F.3d 107, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,124, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-416 (2d Cir. 1/13/04).
b.
But the Eleventh Circuit relied on state (attorneys' lien) law and
held that attorney's fees were not included in the client's recovery. Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d
1346, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,431 (4/27/00) (per curiam), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-248 (7/7/98). Willa Mae
Davis recovered $152,000 of compensatory damages and $6 million of punitive damages against two
companies that made loans to homeowners in Alabama. Her share of the recovery after legal fees and
expenses was S3,039,191. In Davis, which was appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, the Tax Court
followed Cotnam under the Golsen rule because under Bonner v. City of Prichard,Alabama, 661 F.2d
1206 (1lth Cir. 1981), Fifth Circuit decisions rendered before the Eleventh Circuit was created are
binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
•
In Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959) (2-1),
Wisdom, J. dissenting), the Fifth Circuit held that attorney's fees paid directly to a plaintiff's attorney are not

includable by the litigant. The majority reasoned that under the Alabama attorney's lien law, the ownership of
the portion of the award representing attorney's fees vested in the attorney ab initio.
0
This view was followed by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in Estate of
Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,158, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-405 (6th Cir. 1/13/00)
(Michigan law), and Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 8/27/03), rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-5
(Oregon law), rev 'dsub nom Commissionerv. Banks (U.S. 1/24/05).
(1)
Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 8/27/03),
rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-5. In a case involving attorney's fees subject to Oregon attorney's fee lien law,
the Ninth Circuit (Judge Thomas) held the portion of a taxable damage award (for wrongful discharge
from employment) retained by the attorney as a contingent fee was not includable in the taxpayerplaintiff's gross income. Judge Thomas found that the nature of the attorney's fee lien was determinative.
Examining relevant state law, he concluded that under Oregon law, the attorney's claim to the fee was
even stronger than under Alabama law. Therefore he applied the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cotnam v.
Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.1959), holding that contingent attorney's fees paid directly to an
attorney were not includable in the client's gross income because Alabama attorney's fee lien law vested
title in the attorney ab initio. Judge Thomas declined to apply the Ninth Circuit's precedents in BenciWoodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir.2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001), and
Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000), on the grounds that Oregon attorney's fee lien law
was significantly different than that of California and Alaska, which were relevant in those cases.
0
In his opinion, Judge Thomas described the Fifth Circuit as having
"reached a similar conclusion about the operation of Texas law" in Srivastava v. Commissioner,220 F.3d 353
(5th Cir.2000), and the Eleventh Circuit as "extending Cotnam's Alabama-law- based holding into the law of
the entire Eleventh Circuit" in Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2001), notwithstanding
that in Srivastava the Fifth Circuit actually reached its conclusion wholly apart from the niceties of Texas
attorney's lien law and in Foster the Eleventh Circuit was dealing with a case that arose in Alabama, for
which there was no doubt that Cotnam was the controlling precedent. [The Eleventh Circuit has not yet
decided an attorney's fees AMT trap case arising in Florida or Georgia.].
c.
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits held that attorney's fees were not
included in the client's recovery under a national standard regardless of the particulars of state
attorneys' lien law. Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,597 (5th Cir.
2000) (2-1), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1998-362. A majority of the court held that Cotnam applied to attorneys'
fees under Texas law because there is no difference in the "economic reality facing the taxpayer-plaintiff'
between Alabama and Texas attorney's liens and any distinction between them does not affect the
analysis required by the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine. A dissent by Judge Dennis
distinguished Cotnam on the ground that Alabama law gives the holders of attorney's liens greater power
than does Texas law.
(1)
And the Sixth Circuit followed the national standard in
Banks. Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6298 (6th Cir. 9/30/03). The Sixth
Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000),
and reaffirmed that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Estate of Clarks v. United Statesr, 202 F.3d 854 (6th
Cir. 2000), was based on a broader principle than the ground that state attorney's fee lien law determines
whether the taxpayer-plaintiff can exclude attorney's fees. The taxpayer, who lived in Michigan when he
filed his Tax Court petition, but who had previously been employed in California and had settled a
wrongful termination suit brought in California for taxable tort damages under California law, was
allowed to exclude the contingent attorney's fees, even though they were governed by California law and
the Ninth Circuit would have reached a contrary conclusion under Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner,
219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
d.
The Supreme Court reverses Banks and Banaitis and decides the
AMT trap issue in favor of the government, following the majority of courts that have faced this
issue. Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 2005-1 U.S.T.C.
50,155 (U.S. 1/24/05) (8-0)
(consolidated with Banaitis). Justice Kennedy's unanimous opinion held that a contingent fee agreement
should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment of income to the attorney by the client He relied on the
assignment of income doctrine cases, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) and Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940), and found this doctrine to be relevant in arm's length transactions as well as family
transactions, stating, "We hold that as a general rule, when a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the
litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee." The Court
ruled that the attorney-client relationship was governed by agency law, and not by partnership law

(although, later in the opinion, it refused to rule on the partnership argument because it was raised too
late).
*
The Court did not rule on whether attomey's fees awarded pursuant
to claims brought under federal statutes that authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs, noting that Banks
settled his discrimination case and the fee paid to his attorney was based upon the contingent fee agreement,
and was not awarded by a court.
e.
Congress grants relief for civil rights plaintiffs, but not for all clients
of plaintiffs' lawyers. AMT trap to be closed, but only prospectively and not with respect to taxable
recoveries not listed in new § 62(e). Section 703 of the Jobs Act of 2004 would add new paragraph (19)
to § 62(a) which would permit above-the-line deductibility of contingent attorneys' fees in lawsuits for
unlawful discrimination (which is defined in § 62(e) to include 18 separate categories of civil rights-type
lawsuits, but not simple defamation, consumer fraud and punitive damages). The provision applies to
judgments and settlements occurring after the date of enactment.
0
Left open are attorney's fees relating to recoveries for consumer
fraud, defamation and possibly employment contract disputes. as well as punitive damages and taxable
interest in personal injury cases.
D.
Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes
E.
Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1.
The AMT kicks New Yorkers again. Ostrow v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 21
(5/21/04). Judge Colvin held that the § 56(b)(1) disallowance for AMT purposes of taxes deductible
under § 164 extends to taxes on a cooperative housing corporation that are deductible by the shareholdertenant under § 216.
2.
We now have a uniform definition of "child"; can we now get a uniform
definition of "married"? Sections 201-208 of the Working Families Act of 2004 provides a uniform
definition of "child" for head of household, dependent care credit, child tax credit, earned income tax
credit, and dependent exemption purposes. This changes prior law by providing that Forms 8332 signed
by the custodial parent would not be required when the shifting of the dependency deduction to the noncustodial parent is provided for in the divorce decree or separation agreement.
3.
When will trust investment advisory fees get up off the § 67 floor? Rudkin
Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 19 (6/27/05) (reviewed, 18-0). The Tax Court (Judge
Wherry), in a case appealable to the Second Circuit, finds that amounts paid for investment management
advice by trusts set up by a family involved in the founding of the Pepperidge Farm food products
company (which was sold to Campbell Soup Company in the 1960s) are not subject to the § 67(e)
exception to the § 67(a) floor of 2 percent of AGI (which limits the deductibility of employee business
expenses and miscellaneous itemized deductions to amounts exceeding that floor). The court follows the
Fourth and Federal Circuits, and adheres to its earlier opinion in the O'Neill Trust case, 98 T.C. 227
(1992), which was reversed by the Sixth Circuit, 994 F.2d 302 (1993).
*
The Sixth Circuit's rationale was stated as follows:
The Tax Court reasoned that "individual investors routinely incur costs for investment
advice as an integral part of their investment activities." Nevertheless, they are not
required to consult advisors and suffer no penalties or potential liability if they act
negligently for themselves. Therefore, fiduciaries uniquely occupy a position of trust for
others and have an obligation to the beneficiaries to exercise proper skill and care with
the assets of the trust. (994 F.2d at 304)
4.
Sales tax deduction. Section 164(b)(5)(A), added in 2004, allows taxpayers to
elect to deduct state sales taxes in lieu of deducting state income taxes, in 2004 and 2005. This provision
primarily affects taxpayers living in states with a sales tax but no income tax, but it also will affect
taxpayers who itemize deductions and pay state and local sales tax that exceed state and local income
taxes. Only a "general sales tax," defined as a tax imposed at a single rate on the retail sale of a broad
range of classes of items, is deductible. Section 164(b)(5)(C) provides that exemptions or lower rates for
certain types of items are disregarded in making this determination. On the other hand, if an item (other
than a motor vehicle) is taxed a rate higher than the general rate, no deduction is allowed for taxes with
respect to that item. Taxpayers may claim deductions based on their receipts, or they may elect to claim
deductions based on tables promulgated by the Service. § 164(b)(5)(H)(i). The tables take into account
filing status, number of dependents, adjusted gross income, and state-specific sales tax rates, and provide

the amount of the deduction for sales taxes for up to $200,000 of the "total available income," defined as
AGI plus some non-taxable amounts such as tax-exempt interest, as well as deduction amounts for
taxpayers that have available income in excess of $200,000. A taxpayer who elects to use the tables, may
claim additional deduction for actual taxes paid with respect to motor vehicles, boats, and certain items
specified by the Service.
Notice 2005-31, 2005-14 I.R.B. 830, provides that in addition to the
a.
amount determined under the optional sales tax tables and amounts added for local general sales taxes,
taxpayers may deduct allowable actual state and local general sales taxes paid on the purchase of the
following items: motor vehicles (including automobiles, motorcycles, motor homes, recreational vehicles,
sport utility vehicles, off-road vehicles, vans, and trucks), boats, aircraft, homes (including mobile and
prefabricated homes), and materials to build a home.
5.
No 10-percent-of-AGI floor for the deduction of Katrina losses. Under the
Katrina Tax Act, individual taxpayers would be permitted to claim casualty or theft losses attributable to
Hurricane Katrina regardless of whether the loss exceeds $100, and in addition, these personal casualty or
theft losses attributable to Hurricane Katrina would be deductible without regard to whether the loss
exceeds 10 percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
F.
Education
1.
Education expenses for the current year only. Lodder-Beckert v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-162 (7/5/05). Amounts withdrawn from an IRA in 2001 to pay off
credit card debt deriving from the payment of tuition in previous years was subject to the 10-percent
additional tax of § 72(t)(1). Taxpayer incurred the credit card debt in 1999 and 2000 to pay education
expenses because her former employer, the State of Ohio, was in the process of significantly increasing
the amount in her retirement account, which was rolled over into the IRA in 2001. The Tax Court (Judge
Laro) held that the exception from penalty tax in § 72(t)(2)(E) applies only to withdrawals used to pay
education expenses for the current taxable year.
VI.

CORPORATIONS
A.
Entity and Formation
1.
Section 836(a) of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 362(e) to provide limitation
on the importation, or transfer in § 351 transactions, of built-in losses to corporations. The aggregate basis
of the property so received will be limited to its fair market value immediately after the transaction.
0
Section 362(e)(2) prevents taxpayers from transmuting a single
economic loss into two (or more) tax losses by taking advantage of the dual application of the substituted basis
rules in § 358 for stock received in a § 351 transaction and in § 362 for assets transferred to a corporation in a
§ 351 transaction. If the aggregate basis of the property transferred to a corporation in a § 351 transaction
exceeds the aggregate fair market value, the aggregate basis of the property must be reduced to its fair market
value. Thus, for example, if A transfers Blackacre, with a basis of $1,000 and a fair market value of $600 to
newly formed X Corporation in exchange for all of the X Corporation stock, X Corporation's $1,000 basis in
Blackacre, determined under § 362(a), will be reduced to $600 under § 362(e)(2).
*
Geriatrics should consider making an alternative election. A
and X Corporation may jointly elect to reduce A's basis in the X Corporation stock, which is otherwise an
exchanged basis of $1,000 pursuant to § 358, to its fair market value [presumably $600], with the transferee,
X Corporation, taking a normal transferred basis under § 362(a) [$1,000].
•
The operation of § 362(e)(2) is more complex where multiple assets
are involved. When a transferor also transfers some appreciated property to the corporation, § 362(e)(2) does
not necessarily result in the basis of every item of loss property being reduced to its fair market value. Section
362(e)(2)(A) requires that the aggregate basis of the transferred property be reduced by the excess of the
aggregate basis over the aggregate fair market value, and § 362(e)(2)(B) requires that the aggregate basis
reduction be allocated among the transferred properties in proportion to the built-in losses in the properties
before taking into account § 362(e)(2). Assume, for example, that B transferred three properties to newly
formed Y Corporation in exchange for all of the stock: a copyright, fair market value $4,500, basis $3,000;
land, fair market value $7,000, basis $9,000; and a machine, fair market value $4,000, basis $5,000. The
aggregate fair market value of the three properties is $15,500 and their aggregate basis is $17,000, thus
requiring a basis reduction of $1,500 ($17,000 - $15,500) with respect to the land and the machine, the two
properties with a basis that exceeds fair market value. The land has a built-in loss of $2,000 and the machine
has a built-in loss of $1,000. The $1,500 basis reduction is allocated 2/3 to the land ($2000 / ($2,000 +
$1,000)), and 1/3 to the machine ($1000 / ($2,000 + $1,000)). Thus the basis of the land is reduced by $1,000
(2/3 x $1,500), from $9,000 to $8,000, leaving an unrealized loss of $1,000 ($8,000 basis - $7,000 fair market

value) inherent in the land and the basis of the machine is reduced by $500 (1/3 x $1,500), from $5,000 to
$4,500, leaving an unrealized loss of $500 ($4,500 basis - $4,000 fair market value) inherent in the land.
See VI.C., below, for the net value requirement in § 351 transfers.
2.
Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.351-1 would add a requirement that
a.
there be both (1) a contribution of net value and (2) a receipt of net value as a prerequisite for § 351 to
apply. Prop. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(iii)(A) would provide that stock will not be treated as issued for
property if either (1) the fair market value of the transferred property does not exceed the sum of the
amount of liabilities of the transferor that are assumed by the transferee in connection with the transfer
and the amount of any money and the fair market value of any other property (other than stock permitted
to be received under § 351(a) without the recognition of gain) received by the transferor in connection
with the transfer, or (2) the fair market value of the assets of the transferee does not exceed the amount of
its liabilities immediately after the transfer. Prop. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2), Ex. 4, illustrates the rule by
concluding that a transfer of real property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage in excess of the
property's fair market value to a wholly owned corporation, which remains solvent after the transaction,
in exchange for additional stock is not subject to § 351. Although the example does not recharacterize the
transaction, it presumably is a sale on which gain must be recognized and which gives rise to a purchase
price basis under § 1012 for the corporation. Loss recognition would be subject to possible disallowance
under § 267.
B.

Distributions and Redemptions
1.
The Tax Court is bearish on Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v.

Commissioner, 120 T.C. 12 (1/15/03). In 1986 and 1987 Merrill Lynch structured several transactions to
sell certain assets of first-tier and second-tier subsidiaries and not only eliminate any tax on the gains, but
to create losses. To take advantage of the interaction of the consolidate return regulations and § 304
[before the promulgation of Reg. § 1.1502-80(b), rendering § 304 inoperative in consolidated returns],
Merrill Lynch caused the subsidiaries holding the assets to drop the assets to be retained into new lower
level subsidiaries [in § 351 transactions], following which the new subsidiaries were sold cross chain to
other Merrill Lynch subsidiaries. The sales proceeds were then distributed to its parent by the subsidiary
to be sold, and that subsidiary was then sold. The plan was that the cross-chain sale would be
recharacterized as a dividend under § 304, which would result in a basis increase under Reg. §§ 1.150232 and -33 [as then in effect] in the stock of the subsidiaries to be sold. The IRS did not contest that § 304
applied, but responded that the "distributions" coupled with the sales of the subsidiaries outside the group
were part of a firm and fixed plan by the subsidiaries that were sold outside the group to dispose of the
stock of the lower tier subsidiaries that had been sold cross chain. Therefore, even after applying § 304
the distributions were treated as amounts received in a redemption under § 302(b)(3) [applying Zenz v.
Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954)]. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that under the principles of
Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), a firm and fixed plan existed with respect to every
such sale and held for the IRS.
The record establishes that on the dates of the cross-chain sales, petitioner had agreed
upon, and had begun to implement, a firm and fixed plan to completely terminate the
target corporations' ownership interests in the issuing corporations (the subsidiaries
whose stock was sold cross-chain). The plan was carefully structured to achieve very
favorable tax basis adjustments resulting from the interplay of section 304 and the
consolidated return regulations, and the steps of the plan were described in detail in
written summaries prepared for meetings of Merrill Parent's board of directors. As
described in those written summaries, the cross-chain sales of the issuing corporations'
stock and the sales of the target corporations were part of the same seamless web of
corporate activity intended by petitioner to culminate in the sale of the target corporations
outside the consolidated group.
a.

As is the Second Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court. 386 F.3d 464

(2d Cir. 9/28/04). The Second Circuit affirms the Tax Court conclusions but remands for consideration of
a new issue advanced for the first time on appeal. This issue was that, by reason of the § 318 attribution
rules, the cross-chain sales did not terminate the interest of Merrill Lynch within the meaning of §
302(b)(3).
This case examines whether all of the individual transactions in
series of redemptions should be viewed together as a complete termination for purposes of § 302(b)(3) or
whether the preliminary transactions must be tested only under other subsections for qualification under § 302.

Because the taxpayer-shareholder in that case was a corporation, it was to the taxpayer's advantage to classify
the transactions as dividends rather than as redemptions, and Commissioner was arguing that § 302(b)(3)
applied. The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that the series of transactions should be viewed
as a single complete redemption because they were effected pursuant to a "firm and fixed plan". Both the
taxpayer and Commissioner argued that the "firm and fixed plan" test was the proper test, but they disagreed
on how the test properly should be applied to the facts. In examining the prior case law and applying it to the
facts at hand, the Second Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argument that a "firm and fixed plan" could be found
to exist only when it was "absolutely binding" on the taxpayer, concluding that a plan did not have to be in
writing, absolutely binding, and communicated to others in order to be firm and fixed. Instead, the court saw
these as factors to be assessed in determining whether a plan was firm and fixed. Because "a significant
amount of both documentary and circumstantial evidence that was available at the time of the [transactions]
suggested there was a plan in place," the Second Circuit concluded that the Tax Court correctly determined
that a firm and fixed plan existed before the sales were executed. Furthermore, the court concluded that "while
the plan was not binding in a legal sense, it certainly was binding economically," because, on the complex
facts of the case, even though they involved significant transaction costs, the earlier transactions produced no
economic benefit to the taxpayer unless the latter steps also were carried out.
2.
Pushing the envelope on complete termination. Hurst v. Commissioner, 124
T.C. No. 2 (2/3/05). This case illustrates that the "prohibited interest" test is based on a formalistic
analysis rather than the totality of the circumstances. All of the taxpayer's stock in a corporation (HMI) in
which his son continued as a 51 percent shareholder was redeemed for $2.5 million dollars payable
quarterly, with 8 percent interest, over 15 years. The payment obligation was represented by a promissory
note that was secured by all of the corporation's assets, as well as by a cross-collateralization pledge of
the son's stock and the stock of the unrelated shareholders. In addition, HMI entered into a 10-year
employment contract with the redeemed shareholder's wife, who personally had not owned any stock,
giving her a small salary and fringe benefits, including medical insurance, and pursuant to which she
performed "various administrative and clerical tasks." Finally, at time of the redemption the corporation
signed a new lease on the building owned by the redeemed shareholder, in which it conducted its
business, pursuant to which it paid rent of $8,500 per month, adjusted for inflation. Although the
Commissioner "acknowledg[ed] that each relationship between the Hursts and their old company creditor under the notes, landlord under the lease, employment of a non-owning family member - passes
muster, he argue[d] that the total number of related obligations resulting from the transaction gave the
Hursts a prohibited interest in the corporation by giving Richard Hurst a financial stake in the company's
continued success." The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected this "holistic view", examining each
obligation in turn.
*
The court first addressed the terms of the promissory notes:
Neither the amount nor the timing of payments was tied to the financial performance of
HMI. Although the notes were subordinate to HMI's obligation to its bank, they were not
subordinate to general creditors, nor was the amount or certainty of the payments under
them dependent on HMI's earnings. *** All of these contractual arrangements had crossdefault clauses and were secured by the buyers' stock. This meant that should any of the
notes go into default, Mr. Hurst would have the right to seize the stock and sell it. The
parties agree that the probable outcome of such a sale would be that Mr. Hurst would
once again be in control of HMI. ***But in Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597 (1984),
revd. on other grounds 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir.1986), we held that a security interest in
redeemed stock does not constitute a prohibited interest under section 302. We noted that
'The holding of such a security interest is common in sales agreements, and * * * not
inconsistent with the interest of a creditor.' * * * Furthermore, at trial, the Hursts offered
credible evidence from their professional advisers that these transactions, including the
grant of a security interest to Mr. Hurst, were consistent with common practice for sellerfinanced deals.
*

Second,

the lease called for a fixed rent in no way conditioned upon the financial performance of
HMI. Attorney Ron David, who was intimately familiar with the transaction, testified
convincingly that there was no relationship between the obligations of the parties and the
financial performance of HMI. The transactional documents admitted into evidence do

not indicate otherwise. There is simply no evidence that the payment terms in the lease
between the Hursts and HMI vary from those that would be reasonable if negotiated
between unrelated parties. And the Hursts point out that the IRS itself has ruled that an
arm's-length lease allowing a redeeming corporation to use property owned by a former
owner does not preclude characterization as a redemption.
Furthermore, the court did not find the fact that the subsequent to the redemption the parities modified
both the lease and the note in a transaction in which the corporation surrendered an option to purchase the
leased property in exchange for a reduction in the interest rate on the note issued for the stock indicated
that Hurst's rights under the lease were in fact a retained interest.
&
Third,
Mrs. Hurst did not own any HMI stock. Thus, she is not a "distribute" unable to have an
"interest in the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or employee), other
than an interest as a creditor." *** The Commissioner is thus forced to argue that her
employment was a 'prohibited interest' for Mr. Hurst. And he does, contending that
through her employment Mr. Hurst kept an ongoing influence in HMI's corporate affairs.
He also argues that an employee unrelated to the former owner of the business would not
continue to be paid were she to work Mrs. Hurst's admittedly minimal schedule. And he
asserts that her employment was a mere ruse to provide Mr. Hurst with his company car
and health benefits, bolstering this argument with proof that the truck used by Mrs. Hurst
was the same one that her husband had been using when he ran HMI. None of this,
though, changes the fact that her compensation and fringe benefits were fixed, and again
- like the notes and lease - not subordinated to HMI's general creditors, and not
subject to any fluctuation related to HMI's financial performance. Her duties, moreover,
were various administrative and clerical tasks - some of the same chores she had been
doing at HMI on a regular basis for many years. And there was no evidence whatsoever
that Mr. Hurst used his wife in any way as a surrogate for continuing to manage (or even
advise) HMI's new owners.
0
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the court concluded that the fact
that a default by the corporation on its obligations to Mrs. Hurst under the employment contract, as did a
default under the lease, also constituted a default on the promissory note to Mr. Hurst, thereby triggering his
right to reacquire the stock did not, under all of the facts and circumstances, constitute a prohibited retained
interest. The Commissioner argued that "intertwin[ing] substantial corporate obligations with the employment
contract of only one of 45 employees *** [was] proof that the parties to this redemption contemplated a
continuing involvement greater than that of a mere creditor." The court responded that "the proof at trial
[demonstrated] that there was a legitimate creditor's interest in the Hursts' demanding [the cross
collateralization provisions] *** They were, after all, parting with a substantial asset (the corporations), in
return for what was in essence an IOU from some business associates. Their ability to enjoy retirement in
financial security was fully contingent upon their receiving payment on the notes, lease, and employment
contract. *** The value of that security, however, depended upon the financial health of the company.
Repossessing worthless shares as security on defaulted notes would have done little to ensure the Hursts'
retirement. The cross-default provisions were their canary in the coal mine. If at any point the company failed
to meet any financial obligation to the Hursts, Mr. Hurst would have the option to retrieve his shares
immediately, thus protecting the value of his security interest instead of worrying about whether this was the
beginning of a downward spiral. This is perfectly consistent with a creditor's interest, and there was credible
trial testimony that multiple default triggers are common in commercial lending." Accordingly, the court held
that "the cross-default provisions protected the Hursts' financial interest as creditors of HMI, for a debt on
which they had received practically no downpayment, and the collection of which (though not "dependent
upon the earnings of the corporation" as that phrase is used in section 1.302-4(d), Income Tax Regs.) was
realistically contingent upon HMI's continued financial health. *** The number of legal connections between
Mr. Hurst and the buyers that continued after the deal was signed did not change their character as permissible
security interests. Even looked at all together, they were in no way contingent upon the financial performance
of the company except in the obvious sense that all creditors have in their debtors' solvency."
C.
Liquidations
1.
The transfer of something worth nothing (or less than nothing) on a net
basis is not a transfer of property for purposes of subchapter C. REG-163314-03, Transactions

Involving the Transfer of No Net Value, 70 F.R. 11903 (3/10/05). These proposed regulations deal with
the net value requirement for tax-free transactions under subchapter C, and provide that exchanges under
§§ 351, 332 and 368 do not qualify for tax-free treatment where there is no net value in the property
transferred or received, with exceptions for E,F and some D reorganizations.
0
The proposed regulations note, however, that even though a
liquidation of a subsidiary might not qualify under § 332, the transaction nevertheless might qualify as a taxfree reorganization under § 368. See Prop. Reg. § 1.332-2(e), Ex. 2. The preamble to the proposed regulations
notes that the Treasury adopted the approach in Spaulding Bakeries v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1963), aff'g 27 T.C. 684 (1957), and H. K. Porterv. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 689 (1986), because it concluded
that it is appropriate for a corporation to recognize loss when it fails to receive a liquidating distribution on a
class of its subsidiary because the parent corporation would recognize such a loss if the distribution qualified
as a reorganization under § 368.
*
The proposed regulations also provide guidance on the treatment of
creditors of an insolvent corporation will be treated as proprietors to determine whether continuity of interest
is preserved.
*
Finally, the proposed regulations provide that the requirements of
§ 332 are satisfied only if the recipient corporation receives at least partial payment for each class of stock that
it owns in the liquidating corporation. A distribution in redemption of less than all of the shares one
corporation owns in another corporation, but in which the recipient corporation receives partial payment for at
least one class of stock may qualify as a reorganization.
D.
S Corporations
1.
REG-131486-03, Adjustment To Net Unrealized Built-in Gain, 69 F.R. 35544
(6/25/04). Proposed regulations under § 1374 that provide guidance for an adjustments to net unrealized
built-in gain in certain cases in which an S corporation acquires assets from a C corporation in an
acquisition to which § 1374(d)(8) applies. Treasury rejected an approach that would provide for a single
determination of NUBIG for all of the assets of an S corporation in favor of an approach that adjusts the
NUBIG of the pool of assets that included the stock of the liquidated or acquired C corporation to reflect
the extent to which the built-in gain or loss inherent in the C corporation stock is eliminated.
2.
It just keeps gett'n tougher and tougher to be an S corporation shareholder
when bankruptcy is in the air. Williams v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 8 (7/22/04). The taxpayer
owned all of the stock of two calendar year S corporations that incurred losses for the year. He filed a
personal bankruptcy petition at the beginning of December and reported a pro rata share of the losses on
his personal return. The Commissioner disallowed the passed through losses on the grounds that § 1377
[allocating losses on a per share per day basis] did not apply and that § 1398 allocated all of the losses to
the bankruptcy estate. Judge Kroupa upheld that Commissioner's position, reasoning that under
§ 1398(0(1) "a transfer of an asset from the debtor to the bankruptcy estate when the debtor files for
bankruptcy is not a disposition triggering tax consequences, and the estate is treated as the debtor would
be treated with respect to that asset." Thus the bankruptcy estate was treated as if it had owned all of the
shares of the S corporations for the entire year and was entitled to all of the passed-through losses. [The
Tax Court reached the same conclusion with respect to a bankrupt partner in a partnership passing
through losses in Gulley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-190.] Furthermore, any passed-though
losses to which the bankruptcy estate succeeded, or losses that were passed through to the bankruptcy
estate, and which were not used to offset income realized by the bankruptcy estate, pursuant to
§ 108(b)(2) were reduced by the amount of COD income that was not recognized under § 108(a) before
being passed on to the taxpayer pursuant to § 1398(i) upon termination of the bankruptcy proceeding.
a.
Compare the situation where it is the S corporation that goes into
bankruptcy. Mourad v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 1 (7/2/03), aff'd, 387 F.3d 27, 2004-2 U.S.T.C.
50,419, 94 A.FT.R.2d 2004-6440 (1st Cir. 10/20/04) as amended, (lst Cir. 11/2/04). When an
individual's wholly-owned S corporation filed for a bankruptcy chapter 11 plan of reorganization [and an
independent trustee was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court] the individual remained liable for the tax on
any income or gain recognized by the S corporation.
3.
Rev. Rul. 2004-85, 2004-33 I.R.B. 189 (7/16/04). If an S corporation that owns a
QSub engages in an "F" reorganization, the QSub election does not terminate, but if the QSub stock is
sold or transferred in a reorganization that does not qualify as an "F" reorganization, then the election
terminates. An entity classification election described in Reg. §301.7701-3(b) does not terminate solely
because the owner transfers all of the membership interest in the eligible entity to another person.
4.
Coggin Automotive would be reversed by a proposed regulation. REG149524-03, LIFO Recapture Under Section 1363(d), 69 F.R. 50109 (8/13/04). Prop. Reg. § 1.1363-2(b)-

(d) (2004) would reverse the rule in Coggin Automotive Corp. v. Commissioner,292 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.
2002), for future years and require LIFO recapture when a corporation that conducts business through an
interest in a partnership makes an S election.
The regulation is now final. T.D. 9210, LIFO Recapture Under Section
a.
1363(d), 70 F.R. 39920 (7/12/05), with an effective date of 8/13/04.
b.
In the Tax Court, the aggregate theory of partnership taxation was
applied. Coggin Automotive Corp. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 349 (10/18/00). Taxpayer originally was a
holding company that had a number of controlled subsidiaries engaged in the retail sale of motor vehicles.
The subsidiaries maintained their inventories under the LIFO method, and all of the corporations filed a
consolidated return. In 1993, the taxpayer restructured to make an S election. Six new S corporations
were formed to become the general partners in six limited partnerships. Each subsidiary contributed its
dealership assets to a limited partnership in exchange for a limited partnership interest, following which
the subsidiaries were liquidated and the taxpayer became the limited partner in each. The Commissioner
asserted that the taxpayer's conversion to an S corporation triggered the inclusion of the affiliated group's
pre-S-election LIFO reserves (approximately $5 million) under § 1363(d). The Commissioner argued
alternatively (1) that the restructuring should be disregarded because it had no purpose independent of tax
consequences, and (2) that under the aggregate approach to partnerships, a pro rata share of the pre-Selection LIFO reserves (approximately $4.8 million) was attributable to the taxpayer as a partner. The Tax
Court (Judge Jacobs) rejected the Commissioner's first argument, holding that the restructuring was a
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance, compelled by business realities and imbued
with tax-independent considerations. But Judge Jacobs accepted the Commissioner's second argument,
holding that application of the aggregate approach [rather than the entity approach] to partnership taxation
furthered the purpose of §1363(d). Thus, the taxpayer was treated as owning a pro rata share of the
partnerships' inventories and as a result of its election it was required to include $4.8 million of LIFO
recapture.
In reaching its decision regarding Subchapter K, the Tax Court
followed Casel v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 424 (1982), applying the aggregate approach to apply § 267 to
disallow losses between related parties; Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), applying the aggregate approach for purposes of determining depreciation recapture when a
corporation distributed a partnership interest to its shareholders; and Unger v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 1316
(D.C. Cir. 1991), in determining permanent establishment. It distinguished as inapposite the entity approach
applied in P.D.B. Sports, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C, 423, (1997) (applying the entity approach for
purposes of applying § 1056); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 564 (1979), aff'd, 633
F.2d 512 (7th Cir.1980), applying the entity approach in determining whether expenditures are deductible
under § 162 or nondeductible start-up expenditures, and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Brown Group,Inc. &
Subs. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir.1996), vacating 104 T.C. 105 (1995), concluding that the entity
approach, rather than the aggregate approach, should be used in characterizing income (subpart F income)
earned by a partnership. The differences, the court found, were based on the determination of the relevant
Congressional intent in enacting the non-subchapter K provision involved in each case.
(1)
But the Eleventh Circuit sees things differently, and reverses
the Tax Court. "Plain language" requires application of the entity theory. Coggin Automotive Corp.
v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 1326, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-2826, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,448 (11 th Cir. 6/6/02).
Expressly applying the Gitlitz "plain language" principle, the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Hill) reversed the
Tax Court. The Court of Appeals held that § 1363(d) LIFO recapture is triggered only if the corporation
electing S status itself directly owned the LIFO inventory. Since the result turned on "plain language"
rather than the purpose of the statutory pattern, Judge Hill was spared the need to write a lengthy opinion.
Members of one (greatly extended) family are treated as one shareholder.
5.
Section 231 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to treat members of a family as one shareholder at
the election of any family member. Shareholders with a common ancestor going back six generations are
members of the same family.
0
This means that a shareholder and his fifth cousin are members of
the same family. This would have the effect of making the entire population of Arkansas members of the same
family. Research on this issue should most easily be done in the Mormon Church archives located in Salt Lake

City.
*
Query whether this provision could be used to capitalize an S
corporation with subscriptions from thousands of shareholders, the stock of which would be readily
marketable to members of the 100 families.

a.
The maximum number of shareholders is increased from 75 to 100.
Section 232 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to increase the number of eligible shareholders from
75 to 100.
6.
Section 233 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to permit IRAs to be
shareholders of bank S corporations.
a.
Section 237 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1362 to exclude
investment securities income from the passive income test for bank S corporations.
7.
This change is not really needed because members of the same family are
counted as a single shareholder, § 234 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to disregard unexercised
powers of appointment in determining potential current beneficiaries of an ESBT.
8.
Section 235 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1366 to permit transfers of
suspended losses between spouses incident to divorce.
9.
Section 236 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to permit use of passive
activity loss and at-risk amounts by QSST beneficiaries.
Section 238 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1362 to provide relief from
10.
inadvertently invalid Q-Sub elections and terminations.
a.
Information returns to be required for Q-Subs. Section 239 of the
Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 1361 to provide for Q-Sub treatment with respect to information returns.
11.
Section 240 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 4975 to provide that the
repayment by S corporations of loans for qualifying employer securities will not be treated as violating
employment plan rules nor will they be prohibited transactions.
12.
Governments, like ObGyns, have to collect. T.D. 9183, Modification of Check
the Box, 70 F.R. 9220 (2/25/05). These final regulations under §§ 856, 1361 and 7701 clarify that
qualified REIT subsidiaries, qualified subchapter S subsidiaries and single-owner eligible entities separate
from their owners are treated as separate entities for federal tax liability purposes.
13.
Unincorporated entities making S elections will be deemed to have checked
the box as well. T.D. 9203, Deemed Election To Be an Association Taxable as a Corporation for a
Qualified Electing S Corporation, 70 F.R. 29452 (5/23/05). Final regulations that deem eligible entities
that file timely S elections to have elected to be classified as associations taxable as corporations.
*
Those making late elections may seek relief under Rev. Proc. 200448, 2004-32 I.R.B. 172. Alternatively, they may submit a ruling request under Reg. § 301.9100-3 to file a late
classification election and under § 1362 to file a late S corporation election.
*
These provisions apply retroactively, effective back to 7/20/04.
*
Forming an LLC that will be taxed as an association in order to
make an S election is a procedure employed in order to take advantage of the greater flexibility given to LLCs
under state law (as compared with corporations).
Affiliated Corporations.
E.
Consolidated return regulations may prescribe results for corporations
1.
filing consolidated returns different from the results for corporations filing separate returns. But if
the Rite Aid holding is not changed, what does this provision mean? Section 844(a) of the Jobs Act of
2004 amends § 1502 by providing that the consolidated return regulations may contain "rules that are
different from the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if such corporations filed separate returns."
a.
Section 844(b) of the Jobs Act of 2004 provides that "[n]otwithstanding
the amendment made by subsection (a), the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be construed by treating
Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-20(c)(1)(iii) (as in effect on January 1, 2001) as being inapplicable to the
factual situation in Rite Aid Corporation and Subsidiary Corporations v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2001)."
2.
The definition of "controlled group" is expanded. Section 900 of the Jobs Act
of 2004 amends § 1563 to expand the definition of controlled group of corporations for purposes of
multiple use of the lower tax rates on the first $75,000 of taxable income.
3.
Loss limitation rules are provided in temporary and proposed regulations.
T.D. 9118, Loss Limitation Rules, 69 F.R. 12799 (3/18/04); REG-153172-03, Loss Limitation Rules, 69
F.R. 12811 (3/18/04). Temporary regulation amendments relate to the deductibility of losses under the
temporary regulations under § 337(d) and the anti-duplication temporary consolidated returns regulations
relating to the claiming of a worthless stock deduction with respect to a subsidiary's stock. The proposed
regulations cross-reference the temporary regulations.
Basis disconformity rule will be permitted. Notice 2004-58, 2004-39
a.
I.R.B. 520 (8/25/04). The IRS will permit taxpayers to use the basis disconformity method or other

methods, e.g., tracing, for determining the amount of stock loss or basis that is not attributable to the
recognition of built-in gain on the disposition of an asset; such stock loss will be allowed. Such amount of
stock loss will not be disallowed and such amount of subsidiary stock basis will not be reduced.
0
Under the basis disconformity method the loss is disallowed or the
basis reduced, as the case may be, in an amount equal to the least of (1) the "gain amount," (2) the
"disconformity amount," or (3) the "positive investment adjustment amount." For this purpose, the gain
amount is the sum of all gains (net of directly related expenses) recognized on asset dispositions of the
subsidiary that are allocable to the share while the subsidiary is a member of the group. The disconformity
amount is the excess, if any, of the share's basis over the share's proportionate interest in the subsidiary's "net
asset basis." The positive investment adjustment amount is the excess, if any, of the sum of the positive
adjustments made to the share under § 1.1502-32 over the sum of the negative adjustments made to the share
under § 1.1502-32, excluding adjustments for distributions under § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(iv).
b.
Regulations are now final. T.D. 9187, Loss Limitation Rules, 70 F.R.
10319 (3/3/05). These final regulations under §§ 337(d) and 1502 follow the rules described in Notice
2004-58.
F.
Reorganizations
Rev. Rul. 2004-78, 2004-31 I.R.B. 108 (7/13/04). Target merges into an
1.
acquiring corporation in an A reorganization, and in the merger target shareholders exchange their stock
for common stock in the acquiring corporation and holders of target securities exchange their target debt
for debt of the acquiring corporation. The debt instruments had two years remaining on their term, and
were identical except for the interest rate. Held, the debt is a security, which may be exchanged tax-free
under § 354.
Query how Reg. § 1.1001-3 applies to what would be a "significant
*
modification" were this exchange of debt within a single corporation?
2.
Rev. Rul. 2004-83, 2004-32 I.R.B. 157 (7/16/04). If, pursuant to an integrated
plan, a parent corporation sells the stock of a wholly owned subsidiary for cash to another wholly owned
subsidiary and the acquired subsidiary is completely liquidated into the acquiring subsidiary, the
transaction is treated as a "D" reorganization. As a consequence § 338 could not apply to step up the basis
in the target assets because there was no stock purchase within the meaning of § 338(h)(3)(A).
*
If the corporations are members of a consolidated group, § 304
cannot apply to the stock sale nor can § 338 apply because there is no stock purchase within the meaning of
§ 338(h)(3)(A); if they are not members of a consolidated group, the transaction would be treated as a § 332
liquidation if the steps are not integrated and as a "D" reorganization if they are.
3.
COI and COBE are not required for E and F reorganizations. REG-10688904, Reorganizations Under Section 368(a)(1)(E) or (F), 69 F.R. 49836 (8/12/04). These proposed
regulations would amend Reg. § 1.368-1(b) to provide that a continuity of interest and a continuity of
business enterprise are not required for a transaction to qualify as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(E)
[recapitalization] or (F) [mere change in form]. They also provide comprehensive definitions of E and F
reorganizations. The preamble to the proposed regulations describes the scope ofF reorganizations:
To qualify as a reorganization, a transaction must generally satisfy not only the statutory
requirements of the reorganization provisions but also certain nonstatutory requirements,
including the continuity of interest and continuity of business enterprise requirements.
See § 1.368-1(b). The purpose of the continuity requirements is to ensure that
reorganizations are limited to readjustments of continuing interests in property under
modified corporate form and to prevent transactions that resemble sales from qualifying
for nonrecognition of gain or loss available to corporate reorganizations. § 1.368- 1(d)(1)
and (e)(1); see also LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); Pinellas ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S.
462 (1933).
Despite the general rule, the courts and the Service have taken the position that the
continuity of interest and continuity of business enterprise requirements need not be
satisfied for a transaction to qualify as an E reorganization. See Hickok v. Commissioner,
32 T.C. 80 (1959); Rev. Rul. 82-34 (1982-1 C.B. 59); Rev. Rul. 77-415 (1977-2 C.B.
311). In Revenue Rulings 77-415 and 82-34, the IRS reasoned that the continuity of

interest and continuity of business enterprise requirements are necessary in an acquisitive
reorganization to ensure that the transaction does not involve an otherwise taxable
transfer of stock or assets, but that they are not necessary when the transaction involves
only a single corporation.
Although an F reorganization may involve an actual or deemed transfer of assets from
one corporation to another, such a transaction effectively involves only one corporation.
In this way, an F reorganization is much like an E reorganization, which can only involve
one corporation even in form. As a result, an F reorganization is treated for most
purposes of the Code as if the reorganized corporation were the same entity as the
corporation in existence before the reorganization. Consequently, the taxable year of the
corporation does not end on the date of the transfer, and the losses of the reorganized
corporation can be carried back to offset income of its predecessor. See [Treas. Reg. ] §
1.381(b)-l(a)(2). Nonetheless, courts have applied the continuity requirements in
determining whether a transaction qualifies as an F reorganization. See, e.g., Pridemark,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) (stating that the application of the F
reorganization statute is limited to cases where the corporate enterprise continues
uninterrupted, except perhaps for a distribution of some of its liquid assets); Yoc Heating
Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168 (1973) (holding that continuity of interest is required
for an F reorganization).
The Service and the Treasury Department have considered whether continuity of interest
and continuity of business enterprise should be requirements of an F reorganization.
Because F reorganizations involve only the slightest change in a corporation and do not
resemble sales, the Service and the Treasury Department have concluded that applying
the continuity of interest and continuity of business enterprise requirements to
transactions that would otherwise qualify as F reorganizations is not necessary to protect
the policies underlying the reorganization provisions. Therefore, these *** regulations
[Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)] provide that a continuity of interest and a continuity of
business enterprise are not required for a transaction to qualify as an F reorganization.

Consistent with section 368(a)(1)(F), the *** regulations provide that, to qualify as an F
reorganization, a transaction must result in a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization of one corporation. The *** regulations further provide that a transaction
that involves an actual or deemed transfer is a mere change only if four requirements are
satisfied. First, all the stock of the resulting corporation, including stock issued before the
transfer, must be issued in respect of stock of the transferring corporation. Second, there
must be no change in the ownership of the corporation in the transaction, except a change
that has no effect other than that of a redemption of less than all the shares of the
corporation. Third, the transferring corporation must completely liquidate in the
transaction. Fourth, the resulting corporation must not hold any property or have any tax
attributes (including those specified in section 381 (c)) immediately before the transfer.
The first two requirements reflect the Supreme Court's holding in Helvering v. Southwest
Consolidated, 315 U.S. 194 (1942), that a transaction that shifts the ownership of the
proprietary interests in a corporation cannot be a mere change. These requirements
prevent a transaction that involves the introduction of a new shareholder or new capital
into the corporation from qualifying as an F reorganization. Such an introduction may
occur, for example, when a new shareholder contributes assets to the resulting
corporation in exchange for stock before a merger of the transferring corporation into the
resulting corporation. Notwithstanding these requirements, the *** regulations permit the
resulting corporation's issuance of a nominal amount of stock not in respect of stock of
the transferring corporation to facilitate the organization of the resulting corporation. This

rule is designed to permit reincorporation in a jurisdiction that requires, for example,
minimum capitalization, two or more shareholders, or ownership of shares by directors. It
is also intended to permit a transfer of assets to certain pre-existing entities.

The second requirement allows changes of ownership that have no effect other than a
redemption of less than all the shares of the corporation to reflect the case law holding
that certain transactions qualify as F reorganizations even if shareholders are redeemed in
the transaction. See Reef Corp. v. U.S., 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that a
redemption of 48 percent of the stock of a corporation that occurred during a change in
place of incorporation did not cause the transaction to fail to qualify as an F
reorganization); cf. Casco Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 (1967) (holding
that the surviving corporation in a merger was the continuation of the merging
corporation for purposes of allowing a loss carryback, despite the forced redemption of
nine percent of the stock of the merging corporation).
The third requirement (providing for the liquidation of the transferring corporation) and
the fourth requirement (limiting the assets the resulting corporation may hold
immediately before the transfer) reflect the statutory requirement that an F reorganization
involve only one corporation. Although the *** regulations generally require that the
transferring corporation completely liquidate in the transaction, they do not require the
transferring corporation to legally dissolve, thereby facilitating preservation of the value
of the transferring corporation's charter. Further, to accommodate transactions in
jurisdictions where it is customary to preserve pre-existing entities for future use rather
than create new ones, the proposed regulations permit the retention of a nominal amount
of assets for the sole purpose of preserving the transferring corporation's legal existence.
Although the *** regulations generally require that the resulting corporation not hold
any property or have any tax attributes immediately before the transfer, they do allow the
resulting corporation to hold or to have held a nominal amount of assets to facilitate its
organization or preserve its existence, and to have tax attributes related to these assets. In
addition, to accommodate transactions involving the refinancing of debt or the leveraged
redemption of shareholders, the *** regulations provide that this requirement will not be
violated if, before the transfer, the resulting corporation holds the proceeds of borrowings
undertaken in connection with the transaction.
As described above, section 368(a)(1)(F) provides that an F reorganization includes a
mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation, however
effected. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the inclusion of the words
"however effected" in the statutory definition of an F reorganization reflects a
Congressional intent to treat as an F reorganization a series of transactions that together
result in a mere change. The *** regulations reflect this view by providing that a series of
related transactions that together result in a mere change may qualify as an F
reorganization.
The IRS and the Treasury Department also recognize that a reorganization qualifying
under section 368(a)(1)(F) may be a step in a larger transaction that effects more than a
mere change. For example, in Revenue Ruling 96-29 (1996-1 C.B. 50), the IRS ruled that
a reincorporation qualified as an F reorganization even though it was a step in a
transaction in which the reincorporated entity issued common stock in a public offering
and redeemed stock having a value of 40 percent of the aggregate value of its outstanding
stock before the offering. In the same ruling, the IRS ruled that a reincorporation of a
corporation in another state qualified as an F reorganization even though it was a step in a
transaction in which the reincorporated entity acquired the business of another entity.

Consistent with Revenue Ruling 96-29, the *** regulations provide that related events
preceding or following the transaction or series of transactions that constitute a mere
change do not cause that transaction or series of transactions to fail to qualify as an F
reorganization. The *** regulations further provide that the qualification of the mere
change as an F reorganization does not alter the treatment of the larger transaction. For
example, if a redemption of stock occurs in a transaction that qualifies as an F
reorganization and the F reorganization is part of a plan that includes a subsequent
merger, the step or series of steps constituting the F reorganization will not alter the tax
consequences of the subsequent merger.
A number of commentators have questioned whether distributions of money or other
property in an F reorganization are distributions to which section 356 applies. The IRS
and the Treasury Department believe it is appropriate to treat such distributions as
transactions separate from the F reorganization, even if they occur during the F
reorganization. See, e.g., § 1.301-1(l). Accordingly, these *** regulations provide that if
a shareholder receives money or other property (including in exchange for its shares)
from the transferring or resulting corporation in a transaction that constitutes an F
reorganization, the money or other property is treated as distributed by the transferring
corporation immediately before the transaction. The tax treatment of such distributions is
governed by sections 301 and 302, and section 356 does not apply to such distributions.
a.
T.D. 9182, Reorganizations Under Section 368(a)(1)(E) and Section
368(a)(1)(F), 70 F.R. 9219 (2/25/05). These final regulations promulgated Reg. § 1.368-2(m),
comprehensively dealing with the definition of a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(F). These regulations
had been issued in identical proposed form in 2004.
4.
See VI.C., above for the net value requirement in reorganizations.
G.
Corporate Divisions
1.
The wrath of General Utilities repeal rewritten. REG-107566-00, Notice of
Proposed Regulations, Guidance Under Section 355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain Distributions of
Stock or Securities In Connection with an Acquisition, 66 F.R. 67 (1/2/01). The Treasury revised Prop.
Reg. § 1.355-7 and withdrew proposed regulations (66 F.R. 76) issued in REG-116733-98 (64 F.R.
46155, 8/24/99). The proposed regulations provided that whether a distribution and an acquisition are part
of a plan is determined based on all the facts and circumstances. They included nonexclusive lists of facts
and circumstances to be considered in making the determination and six safe harbors.
a.
And apparently the government thinks it did a better job on the
regulations the second - or is this the third? - time around. T.D. 8960, Guidance Under Section
355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain Distributions of Stock or Securities in Connection With an
Acquisition, 66 F.R. 40590 (8/3/01). The Treasury has promulgated temporary regulations identical to the
Proposed Regulations, except that the temporary regulations reserve § 1.355-7(e)(6) (suspending the
running of any time period during which there is a substantial diminution of risk of loss under the
principles of § 355(d)(6)(B)) and Example 7 of the Proposed Regulations (interpreting the term "similar
acquisition" in the context of a situation involving multiple acquisitions).
b.
The third (fourth?) time's the charm. T.D. 8988, temporary
regulations. 67 F.R. 20632 (4/26/02), and REG-163892-01, proposed regulations, 67 F.R. 20711
(4/26/02). These regulations amend Temp. Reg. § 1.355-7T and identical Prop. Reg. § 1.355-7, and set
forth new guidelines in the anti-Morris Trust regulations. The 2002 temporary and proposed regulations
disregard the presumption of § 355(e)(2)(B) and provide that "whether a distribution and an acquisition
are part of a plan is determined based on all the facts and circumstances." However, Temp. Reg. § 1.3557T(b)(2) provides a "super-safe harbor" for an acquisition not involving a public offering that occurs
within two years following the date of a distribution - the distribution and acquisition "can be treated as
part of a plan only if there was an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or substantial negotiations
regarding the acquisition or a similar acquisition at some time during the 2-year period ending on the date
of the distribution." [italics added].
c.
Is the fifth time the charm? T.D. 9198, Guidance Under Section
355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain Distributions of Stock or Securities in Connection With an
Acquisition, 70 F.R. 20279 (4/19/05). Final anti-Morris Trust regulations under § 355(e).

0
A perceived need for certainty has spawned complicated
regulations providing guidance for identifying the presence of the prohibited plan. These regulations disregard
the presumption of § 355(e)(2)(B) and provide that "whether a distribution and an acquisition are part of a
plan is determined based on all the facts and circumstances." Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(1). In the case of an
acquisition not involving a public offering that occurs within two-years following the date of a distribution,
the distribution and acquisition "can be part of a plan only if there was an agreement, understanding,
arrangement, or substantial negotiations regarding the acquisition or a similar acquisition at some time during
the two-year period ending on the date of the distribution." Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(2) (italics added). The "super
safe harbor" implicit in this rule trumps all other facts and circumstances. The regulations add that the
existence of an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or substantial negotiations during the two-year period
tends to show that the distribution and acquisition are part of a plan, and further describe such an
understanding etc., as merely a factor among the facts and circumstances to be evaluated. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.355-7(b)(3)(i). Discussions with an investment banker regarding the acquisition is listed as a second factor
indicating the existence of a plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(ii). The regulations add that in the case of an
acquisition involving a public offering after the distribution, the absence of discussions with an investment
banker within the two-year period ending on the date of the distribution is a factor indicating the absence of a
plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(i)
•
Whether there is an agreement, understanding, or arrangement also
is a question of facts and circumstances. Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1). A binding agreement is not required, but an
agreement, understanding, or arrangement "clearly exists if a binding contract to acquire stock exists." Also,
an agreement may exist even though the parties have not reached agreement on all significant economic terms.
"Substantial negotiations" are said to "require discussions of significant economic terms . . by one or more
officers or directors acting on behalf of [the corporations], ... controlling shareholders" or "another person or
persons with the implicit or explicit permission of one or more of such officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders." Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1)(iv). A controlling shareholder is a five percent shareholder who actively
participates in the management or operation of the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(3)(i). In the case of
an acquisition involving a public offering, the existence of an agreement, etc., depends on discussions with
investment bankers by one or more officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of either the distributing or
controlled corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1)(vi).
0
Under Reg. § 1.355-7(e) the acquisition of stock pursuant to an
option will result in the option agreement being treated as an agreement to acquire the stock as of the date the
option was written, transferred, or modified if the option is more likely to be exercised as of such date.
0
In the case of an acquisition that follows the distribution, the
existence of a plan is indicated by discussions within the two-year period preceding the distribution there was
an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or substantial negotiations regarding the acquisition or a similar
acquisition. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(i). In the acquisition involves a public offering after the distribution, the
presence of discussions during the two-year period preceding the distribution with an investment banker
regarding a distribution is a factor indicating the existence of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(ii).
0
In the case of an acquisition that precedes the distribution, the
existence of a plan is indicated by discussions within the two-year period preceding the acquisition by either
the controlled or distributing corporation with the acquirer regarding a distribution. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(iii).
The absence of discussions regarding a distribution during the during the two-year period ending on the earlier
to occur of (a) the acquisition, or (b) the first public announcement regarding the distribution, is a factor
indicating that the acquisition and distribution were not part of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(iii). If the
acquisition involves a public offering before the distribution, the presence of discussions during the two-year
period preceding the acquisition with an investment banker regarding a distribution as a factor indicating the
existence of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(iv). A change in the market or business conditions after the
acquisition that results in a distribution that was otherwise unexpected is a factor that indicates that the
acquisition and distribution are not part of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(iv).
a
In the case of a distribution either before or after the acquisition, the
regulations provide that the existence of a corporate business purpose, as defined in Reg. § 1.355-2(b), other
than a business purpose to facilitate the acquisition, is a factor indicating the absence of a plan. Reg. § 1.3557(b)(4)(v). Internal discussions and discussions with outside advisors, with officers and directors of either the
distributing or controlled corporations provide an indication of a business purpose for the distribution. Reg.
§ 1.355-7(c)(1). Similarly, the absence of a plan is indicated if the distribution would have occurred at
approximately the same time and in similar form regardless of the acquisition. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(vi). Reg.
§ 1.355-7(c)(2) provides that discussions with the acquirer regarding a distribution to decrease the likelihood
of an acquisition of either the distributing or controlled corporation by separating it from the corporation that
.

is likely to be acquired will be treated as having a business purpose to facilitate acquisition of the corporation
that is likely to be acquired. Nonetheless, a distribution that facilitated trading in the stock of the distributing
or controlled corporation will not be taken into account in determining whether a distribution and acquisition
are part of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(c)(3).
§ 1.355-7(d) provides nine safe harbors from the stormy seas
f pReg.
of prohibited plans.
H.

Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1.
Sale of shares by a taxpayer to his brother in a closely held corporation
claiming a net operating loss deduction resulted in a § 382 change of control that triggered the
limitation on NOL carryovers. Garber Industries Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 1
(1/25/05). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that the family aggregation rule of § 382(1)(3)(A)(i)
applies solely from the perspective of individuals who are shareholders (as determined under the
attribution rules of § 382(1)(3)(A)) of the loss corporation. Thus, the sale of stock from one sibling to
another that resulted in a more than 50 percent increase in stock ownership by the purchasing sibling
triggered the application of § 382. The fact that each sibling and either of their parents would be viewed
as a single shareholder did not result in the siblings be treated as a single shareholder where neither of
their parents was a shareholder. The court recognized the possibility that the rule it announced might
result in arbitrary distinctions between cases in which a parent of the siblings also was a shareholder and
cases in which the parent was not a shareholder, but concluded that the announced rule was the one most
compatible with the statutory language and legislative history.
*
One of the Garber brothers (Charles) had his interest in the
corporation decreased from 68 percent to 19 percent and the other brother (Kenneth) had his interest increased
from 26 percent to 65 percent in a 1986 "D" reorganization. In 1988, Kenneth sold all of his remaining shares
to Charles, with the result that Charles's interest in the corporation increased from 19 percent to 84 percent.
The parents of Charles and Kenneth were both deceased, and, when living, never had any ownership interest
in the corporation.
*
The court refused to follow taxpayers' argument that siblings are
treated as one individual under the NOL aggregation rule, which provides that an individual and all members
of his family described in § 318(a)(1), i.e., spouses, children, grandchildren and parents, are treated as one
individual.
*
Judge Halpem also refused to follow the Commissioner's argument
that the family aggregation rule does not apply because none of the parents and grandparents of the Garber
brothers were alive at the beginning of the 3-year testing period immediately preceding the 1998 transaction.
0
Instead, he concluded that a third interpretation was correct, i.e.,
that the family aggregation rule of § 382(1)(3)(A)(i) applies from the perspective of individuals who are
shareholders of the loss corporation (as determined under the attribution rules of § 382(l)(3)(A)), and that the
brothers were unrelated under this perspective.
VII.

PARTNERSHIPS
Formation and Taxable Years
A.
B.
Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
1.
REG-128767-04, Treatment of Disregarded Entities Under Section 752, 69 F.R.
49832 (8/12/04). Proposed regulations provide that in determining the extent to which a partner bears the
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, payment obligations of a disregarded entity are taken into
account only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded entity except where the owner of the
disregarded entity is otherwise required to make a payment with respect to the obligation of the
disregarded entity.
*
In recent years an increasing number of partnership interests have
been held through limited liability companies (LLCs) that are treated as disregarded entities under Reg.
§ 301.7701-1 through Reg. § 301.7701-3. In such a situation, even though the limited liability company has an
obligation to restore a negative capital account, the owner of the limited liability company, who is treated as
the partner, has no such obligation under state partnership law. Because only the LLC's assets will be
available to satisfy its payment obligations as a partner, the owner should be treated as bearing the economic
risk of loss for a partnership liability as a result of those payment obligations only to the extent of the net value
of the disregarded entity's assets. This result can be reached through a careful reading and application of the
current regulations, but Prop. Reg. § 1.752-2(k) clarifies this treatment by providing that in determining the
extent to which a partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability under Reg. § 1.752-2,

payment obligations of a disregarded entity are taken into account only to the extent of the net value of the
disregarded entity (assets, including the disregarded entity's enforceable rights to contributions from its
owner, but excluding the disregarded entity's interest in the partnership and the fair market value of property
pledged to secure a partnership liability, minus the disregarded entity's liabilities), except to the extent the
owner of the disregarded entity is otherwise required to make a payment with respect to the disregarded
entity's obligation.
2.
No more double-counting §357(c) gains in basis. P.L. 106-36, the
Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 amended §357(c) and added new §357(d)
to limit basis increases attributable to assumption of liabilities not to exceed the fair market value of the
property transferred. Abuses had resulted where properties subject to liabilities were transferred to
different corporations, with the result that both corporations increased basis by the same liabilities. This
amendment is applicable to transfers made after 10/18/98.
a.
The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 added new §358(h),
which provides special rules for assumption of liabilities to which §358(d) does not apply and prevents
the recognition of the artificial losses allowed to be claimed in such transactions which might result in
duplication of loss through assumption of liabilities giving rise to a deduction.
0
If the basis of stock received in a § 351 transaction otherwise would
exceed its fair market value, § 358(h) requires that the basis of the stock be reduced (but not below the fair
market value) by the amount (determined as of the date of the exchange) of any § 357(c)(3) liability that was
assumed by the corporation.. For this purpose, "liability" is broadly defined to include "any fixed or
contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise taken into
account for purposes of [the income tax]." Under this definition, a liability that is not cognizable under § 357
- for example, a cash method account payable, a contingent liability, or an obligation of an accrual method
taxpayer that is not yet deductible because of the operation of the economic performance rules of § 461(h) nevertheless will be taken into account under § 358(h) to reduce the transferor shareholder's stock basis.
Section 358(h) does not apply in all instances, however. There is an exception in § 358(h)(3) that applies if, as
part of the exchange (1) "the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to the person
assuming the liability" or (2) "substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are
transferred to the person assuming the liability." Thus, the operative rule of § 358(h)(1) actually applies only
to selective transfers of assets that may bear some relationship to the liability, but that do not represent the full
scope of the trade or business, (or substantially all the assets) with which the liability is associated.
*
Section 358(h) is applicable to assumptions of liability after
October 18, 1999, or such later date as may be provided in comparable rules applicable to partnerships and S
corporations to be prescribed.
•
See Black & Decker and Coltec Industries below at VIII.A.
b.
Baby BOSS 2 is abusive, says notice! Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B.
255 (8/11/00). "Artificial" capital losses generated by baby BOSS transactions will not be allowed.
*
Strategy #1: The taxpayer purports to borrow at a premium interest
rate. For example, a lender gives the taxpayer $3,000 and the parties treat the stated principal amount of the
loan as only $2,000, with the remaining $1,000 that must be repaid representing interest. The taxpayer
contributes the loan proceeds into a partnership, which assumes the liability, and uses the proceeds to purchase
an investment asset worth $3,000. The taxpayer/partner takes the position under §§ 705(a)(2), 722, and 752(b)
that his basis in his partnership interest is $1,000 [the $3,000 cash contribution minus the $2,000 assumed
liability], even though the value of the partnership interest is zero. The taxpayer then sells the partnership
interest for a nominal amount, claiming a $1,000 capital loss. [Everyone apparently ignores the $1,000
discrepancy between the cash proceeds of the loan and the $2,000 "principal amount," which has to produce
income to someone sometime.]
•
Strategy #2: The taxpayer simultaneously purchases a call option
and writes an offsetting call option, both of which arc then contributed to a partnership. The taxpayer takes the
position that the basis of the partnership interest equals the basis of the purchased call option, unreduced by
the liability associated with the written call option, i.e., that the partnership did not assume a liability when it
took responsibility for the written call option. The taxpayer then uses this artificially high basis to claim a
capital loss on the sale of his partnership interest. [Compare Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, holding that a
partnership's short sale of securities creates a liability.]
99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, advises taxpayers that losses from "BOSS" product transactions are not properly
deductible. Baby boss is sometimes referred to as "son of Boss."
2 Notice

•
Notice 2000-44 disallows the losses [under §§ 165(a) and (c)]
produced by both of these baby BOSS transactions as artificial, citing, in the case of individuals, Fox v.
Commissioner,82 T.C. 1001 (1984), which holds that § 165(c)(2) requires a primary profit motive for a loss
from a particular transaction to be deductible. In Fox v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1988-570, the government
won a summary judgment motion that commodities straddles were shams despite the government not having
offered evidence of the taxpayers' offsetting gains. The notice also cites Reg. § 1.701-2 [the partnership antiabuse rules]. The government also is reexamining the partnership basis rules.
*
Compound indicia of criminal tax fraud? The government
believes that the Baby BOSS transactions were not being individually reported on schedule D, but instead
have been buried in grantor trusts. For example, an individual taxpayer with an unrealized capital gain
contributes both the appreciated assets and the baby BOSS partnership interest into a grantor trust, which sells
both, and the individual reports only the net gain or loss from the grantor trust's transactions on his return,
rather than breaking out gains and losses separately, as is required [by Reg. §1.671-2]. Treasury Department
officials suggest that criminal penalties might apply to this kind of reporting, which willfully conceals the
facts.
Changes coming to tax shelter disclosure rules. The recently
*
proposed corporate tax shelter disclosure rules will be changed by dropping the requirement that a shelter be
marketed to a corporation to trigger the requirement that a promoter maintain a customer list. Under the
amended regulations, a customer list would have to be maintained for a shelter that is exclusively peddled to
individuals, provided threshold amounts of fees and tax savings are met.
c.
Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses through partnerships
before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp.
Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the
duplication and acceleration of loss through the assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a
nonrecognition transaction. Under the temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as
defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner (other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721
transaction, after application of §§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not
below the adjusted value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term
"liability" includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's basis
generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to
the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are contributed
to the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of substantially all of the assets does not
apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar
transaction).
a
The temporary regulations are effective for transactions occurring
after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03.
d.
Defining the term "liability" in § 752 and fighting duplication and
acceleration of losses through partnerships after June 23, 2003. REG-106736-00, Assumption of
Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37434 (6/24/03). The Treasury has proposed extraordinarily complex, verging
on incomprehensible, regulations: (1) defining liabilities under § 752; (2) dealing with a partnership's
assumption of certain fixed and contingent obligations in exchange for a partnership interest [Prop. Reg.
§ 1.752-7]; and (3) providing rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities by corporations from
partners and partnerships [Prop. Reg. § 1.358-7]. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1)(i) would be amended to include the
principles of Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; an obligation is a liability to the extent that incurring the
obligation: (1) creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's assets (including cash); (2) gives rise
to an immediate deduction; or (3) gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in computing taxable
income and is not properly chargeable to capital. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7 deals with the assumption by a
partnership of a partner's fixed or contingent obligation to make payment that is not one of the three types
described in Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1)(i) [including accrual method liabilities the deduction for which was
deferred under § 453(h)]. Unlike Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T, the proposed regulations do not reduce the
partner's outside basis when the partnership assumes a § 1.752-7 liability. If the partnership satisfies the
liability while the partner remains in the partnership, the deduction with respect to the built-in loss
associated with the § 1.752-7 liability is allocated 'to the partner, reducing that partner's outside basis.
Alternatively, if one of three events occurs that separate the partner from the, then the partner's outside
basis is reduced immediately before the occurrence of the event. The events are: (1) a disposition (or
partial disposition) of the partnership interest by the partner, (2) a liquidation of the partner's partnership
interest, and (3) the assumption (or partial assumption) of the liability by another partner. The basis

reduction generally is the lesser of (1) the excess of the partner's basis in the partnership interest over the
adjusted value of the interest, or (2) the remaining built-in loss associated with the liability. (In the event
of a partial disposition, the reduction is pro rated.) Thereafter, to the extent of the remaining built-in loss
associated with the liability, the partnership (or the assuming partner) is not entitled to any deduction or
capital expense upon satisfaction (or economic performance) of the liability, but if the partnership notifies
the partner, the partner is entitled to a loss or deduction. If another partner assumed the liability, the
partnership must immediately reduce the basis of its assets by the built-in loss, and upon satisfaction, the
assuming partner must make certain basis adjustments to his partnership interest. There are exceptions for
(1) transfer of the trade or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to the partnership,
and (2) de minimis transactions (liabilities less that 10 percent of the partnership's assets or $1,000,000).
Unlike under the Temporary regulations, there is no exception for transactions in which substantially all
of the assets with which the liability is associated are contributed to the partnership. When finalized, the
regulations will be effective for transactions occurring after 6/24/03.
e.
Finally, final regulations. T.D. 9207, Assumption of Partner Liabilities,
70 F.R. 30334 (5/26/05). Final and temporary regulations on a partnership's assumption of certain fixed
and contingent obligations in connection with the issuance of a partnership interest, The regulations also
provide rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities by corporations from partners and partnerships.
There are also temporary regulations that provide additional rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of
liabilities in pre-6/24/03 exchanges.
0
The regulations ensure that tax losses cannot be duplicated or
accelerated by transferring contingent obligations to partnerships.
•
They also make final temporary regulations that address the "Son of
Boss" tax shelter, § 1.752-6T [which were effective 10/19/99]; these provide that the exception contained in
§ 358(h)(2)(B) [where substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are transferred to the
person assuming the liability as part of the exchange] do not apply to transactions described in Notice 200044, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
(1)
REG-106736-00, 70 F.R. 30380 (5/26/05). Proposed regulations
that are identical to the temporary regulations contained in T.D. 9207.
C.
Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
1.
Section 833 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends §§ 704(c), 734 and 743.
Section 734(b) and § 743(b) basis adjustments will be mandatory with
a.
respect to built-in losses or adjustments that exceed $250,000 at the partnership level. Such adjustments
under §§ 734 and 743 had been heretofore optional, and need not have been made in the absence of a
§ 754 election. Section 734(b) and § 743(b) basis adjustments remain elective if the aggregate reduction
to the partnership's basis would not exceed $250,000 or if the adjustment would increase the aggregate
basis of the partnership's assets. The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the duplication of losses in
a manner than allows a partner to recognize for tax purposes a loss that was not realized economically.
•
The amendment to § 743 requires adjustments under § 743(b) to the
basis of the partnership's assets whenever the aggregate basis of the partnership's assets exceeds the aggregate
fair market value of the partnership's assets by more than $250,000. Section 743(b) basis adjustments remain
elective if the aggregate reduction to the partnership's basis would not exceed $250,000 or if the adjustment
would increase the aggregate basis of the partnership's assets.
•
A special rule for certain "electing investment partnerships" permits
the partnership to avoid making the basis adjustment but limits the transferee partner's distributive share of
any losses with respect to partnership property to the amount that exceed the loss recognized by the transferor
partner from whom the partnership interest was purchased. I.R.C. § 743(e). The definition of a qualifying
"electing investment partnership" in § 743(e)(6) is very restrictive and narrowly limits the application of the
special rule. The election is made at the partnership level. See Notice 2005-32, 2005-16 I.R.B. 895. The
election requires outside basis adjustments to be made. This special rule for certain "electing investment
partnerships" permits the partnership to avoid making the basis adjustment but limits the transferee partner's
distributive share of any losses with respect to partnership property to the amount that exceed the loss
recognized by the transferor partner from whom the partnership interest was purchased. § 743(e). Section
743(f) provides an exception for "securitization partnerships."
0
The amendment to § 734 requires adjustments under § 734(b) to the
basis of the partnership's assets whenever an aggregate basis reduction in excess of $250,000 results. Section
734(b) basis adjustments remain elective if the aggregate reduction to the partnership's basis would not exceed

$250,000 or if the adjustment would result in a basis increase. Section 734(e) provides an exception for certain
"securitization partnerships" as defined in § 743(f.
(1)
Notice 2005-32, 2005-16 I.R.B. 895 (4/1/05). This Notice
provides interim procedures for partnerships and their partners to comply with changes to the mandatory
basis provisions of §§ 734 and 743 (with a couple of examples of a transfer of a partnership interest and a
distribution of partnership property). The bulk of the Notice relates to the interim procedures to be
followed for "electing investment partnerships" and their partners.
b.
Section 704(c)(1)(C), provides that built-in losses are personal to the
partner who contributed the loss property. If the contributing partner ceases to be a partner before the loss
is realized, as far as the remaining partners are concerned the basis of the property is treated as being
equal to its fair market value at the time of the contribution. This provision is intended to prevent the
transfer of built-in tax losses from one partner (a low tax bracket, tax exempt, or foreign person) to
another partner. Although the statute is silent on the point, if the property is depreciable (or amortizable)
in the hands of the partnership that fair-market-value-at-date-of -contribution basis presumably must be
adjusted for prior depreciation (or amortization) claimed by the partnership.
0
There is no time limit on the application of § 704(c)(1)(C). Assume,
for example, that A, B, and C formed the ABC Partnership with A and B each contributing cash of $1,000 and
C contributing property with a basis of $7,000 and a fair market value of $1,000. The $6,000 built-in loss with
respect to the property contributed by C can be allocated only to C. Assume further that eight years later C
withdraws from the partnership, in which A and B continue as equal partners, and the next year the AB
partnership sells the property contributed by C for any price between $1,000 and $7,000. The partnership does
not recognize any loss. If, alternatively, the partnership sold the property for $700, the partnership would
recognize a $300 loss and A and B each would be allocated a $150 loss. Note that § 704(c)(1)(C) creates an
asymmetrical basis rule. If the property were sold for more than $7,000, the partnership's gain always would
be computed with respect to the $7,000 § 723 transferred basis. Section 704(c)(1)(C) would operate similarly
if instead of C withdrawing from the partnership, which was continued by A and B, C sold the partnership
interest to D. In the case of a transferred partnership interest, the transferee partner does not "step into the
shoes" of the transferor with respect to the § 704(c) built-in loss. The built-in loss is again eliminated.
0
Note that this is the transaction involved in the Long-Term Capital
Holdings case, as well as the Santa Monica PicturesLLC case.
2.
Section 834(a) of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 755 to provide that in making
reductions to the basis of property under § 734(b), no allocation is to be made to the basis of stock of a
corporation that is a partner in the partnership. Section 755(c) provides that in applying the rules of § 755
for allocating a decrease in basis of the partnership's assets under § 734(b), the basis of stock of a partner
that is a corporation (or a person related to the corporation under §§ 267(b) or 707(b)(1)) will not be
reduced. Any decrease in basis that otherwise would have been allocated to the stock must be allocated to
other partnership assets. If the decrease in basis exceeds the basis of those other partnership assets, the
partnership must recognize gain equal to the amount of the excess.
3.
Section 83 rules prevail on transfers of partnership interests for services.
REG-105346-03, Partnership Equity for Services, 70 F.R. 29675 (5/24/05). Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) and (1)
and §1.721-1(b) will apply § 83 to all partnership interests, without distinguishing between partnership
capital interests and partnership profits interests, when the proposed regulations are finalized. These
proposed regulations would conform the subchapter K rules to the § 83 timing rules, revise the § 704(b)
regulations to take into account the possibility that allocations with respect to an unvested interest may be
forfeited, and provide that a partnership generally recognizes no gain or loss on the transfer of an interest
in the partnership in connection with the performance of services for that partnership.
•
Under Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(1), the service provider's
capital account is increased by the amount the service provider takes into income under § 83 as a result of
receiving the interest, plus any amounts paid for the interest. Under § 83, the economic benefit of receiving a
partnership interest in connection with the performance of services is the amount that is included in the
compensation income of the service provider, plus the amount paid for the interest. This is the amount by
which the service partner's capital account should be increased.
0
Section 706(d)(1) provides generally that, if, during any taxable
year of a partnership, there is a change in any partner's interest in the partnership, each partner's distributive
share of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of the partnership for such taxable year shall be
determined by the use of any method prescribed by regulations which takes into account the varying interests
of the partners in the partnership during the taxable year. This ensures that partnership deductions that are

attributable to the portion of the partnership's taxable year prior to a new partner's entry into the partnership
are allocated to the historic partners.
*
Section 83(b) allows a person who receives nonvested property in
connection with the performance of services to elect to include in gross income the difference between: (1) the
fair market value of the property at the time of transfer (determined without regard to a restriction other than a
restriction which by its terms will never lapse); and (2) the amount paid for such property. Under § 83(b)(2),
the election under § 83(b) must be made within 30 days of the date of the transfer of the property to the
service provider. Consistent with the principles of § 83, the proposed regulations provide that, if a partnership
interest is transferred in connection with the performance of services, and if an election under § 83(b) is not
made, then the holder of the partnership interest is not treated as a partner until the interest becomes
substantially vested. If a § 83(b) election is made with respect to such an interest, the service provider will be
treated as a partner. These principles differ from Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191, which provides that if
a partnership profits interest is transferred in connection with the performance of services, then the holder of
the partnership interest may be treated as a partner even if no § 83(b) election is made.
0
Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3() would also provide a safe harbor under
which a partnership interest received as compensation for services could be treated as having a fair market
value equal to its liquidation value, which in the case of a profits-only partnership interest is zero. As under
Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, the safe harbor would not apply in the following three specific situations:
(1) the partnership's profits are derived from a substantially certain and predictable stream of income, such as
from high quality debt or a net lease; (2) the partner disposes of the partnership interest within two years of its
receipt; or (3) the interest is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded limited partnership as defined in
§ 7704(b).
*
Prop. Reg. §§ 1.83-6(b) and 1.721-1(b)(2) would provide that a
partnership does not recognize any gain or loss upon the transfer of a partnership interest to a new partner in
exchange for services to the partnership (although the proposed regulations do preserve the recognition result
in McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), if the transfer of property in exchange for services creates
a partnership). In MeDougal, the property transferred was half a horse.
*
As a practical matter upon admission of a partner it generally is
necessary to revalue the partnership's property and adjust the partners' capital accounts to reflect the
revaluation. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) specifically allows the partnership to revalue its property and adjust
the existing partners' capital accounts in connection with the grant of an interest in the partnership (other than
a de minimis interest) in consideration of services to the partnership by an existing partner acting in a partner
capacity or by a new partner acting in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner.
Forfeitable interests: When a transferred partnership interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
unless an election is made under section 83(b) the holder of the partnership interest is not treated as a
partner until the interest becomes substantially vested. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1). If a section 83(b)
election is made with respect to such an interest, the service provider will be treated as a partner, even
though the interest remains forfeitable. These rule raise special problems regarding the tax treatment of
allocation of items of gain or loss to a partner during the period in which the partner's interest remains
forfeitable. If the partner who receives a forfeitalbe partnership interest in exchange for services does not
make a § 83(b) with respect to that interest, the partner cannot be allocated any portion of partnership
income or loss, and any distributions made to the service provider with respect to the partnership interest
are treated as additional compensation and not partnership distributions. But if a service partners who
receives a substantially nonvested partnership interest makes a valid § 83(b) election, the service provider
is treated as a partner with respect to such an interest, and the partnership must allocate partnership items
to the service provider as if the partnership interest were substantially vested. See Notice 2005-43, 200524 I.R.B.
•
Further complications arise if a service provider who has received a
forfeitable compensatory partnership interest makes a § 83(b) election, is allocated items of partnership
income and loss and subsequently forfeits the partnership interest. Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii) would
address these issues. The operation of the proposed regulations is described in the preamble as follows:
If an election under section 83(b) has been made with respect to a substantially nonvested
interest, the holder of the nonvested interest may be allocated partnership items that may
later be forfeited. For this reason, allocations of partnership items while the interest is
substantially nonvested cannot have economic effect. Under the proposed regulations,
such allocations will be treated as being in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership if: (a) the partnership agreement requires that the partnership make forfeiture

allocations if the interest for which the section 83(b) election is made is later forfeited;
and (b) all material allocations and capital account adjustments under the partnership
agreement not pertaining to substantially nonvested partnership interests for which a
section 83(b) election has been made are recognized under section 704(b). This safe
harbor does not apply if, at the time of the section 83(b) election, there is a plan that a
substantially nonvested interest will be forfeited. All of the facts and circumstances
(including the tax status of the holder of the substantially nonvested interest) will be
considered in determining whether there is a plan that the interest will be forfeited. In
such a case, the partners' distributive shares of partnership items shall be determined in
accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership under [Treas. Reg. §]1.7041(b)(3).
Generally, forfeiture allocations are allocations to the service provider of partnership
gross income and gain or gross deduction and loss (to the extent such items are available)
that offset prior distributions and allocations of partnership items with respect to the
forfeited partnership interest. These rules are designed to ensure that any partnership
income (or loss) that was allocated to the service provider prior to the forfeiture is offset
by allocations on the forfeiture of the interest. Also, to carry out the prohibition under
section 83(b)(1) on deductions with respect to amounts included in income under section
83(b), these rules generally cause a forfeiting partner to be allocated partnership income
to offset any distributions to the partner that reduced the partner's basis in the partnership
below the amount included in income under section 83(b).
Forfeiture allocations may be made out of the partnership's items for the entire taxable
year. In determining the gross income of the partnership in the taxable year of the
forfeiture, the rules of [Treas. Reg. §] 1.83-6(c) apply. As a result, the partnership
generally will have gross income in the taxable year of the forfeiture equal to the amount
of the allowable deduction to the service recipient partnership upon the transfer of the
interest as a result of the making of the section 83(b) election, regardless of the fair
market value of the partnership's assets at the time of forfeiture.
In certain circumstances, the partnership will not have enough income and gain to fully
offset prior allocations of loss to the forfeiting service provider. The proposed revenue
procedure includes a rule that requires the recapture of losses taken by the service
provider prior to the forfeiture of the interest to the extent that those losses are not
recaptured through forfeiture allocations of income and gain to the service provider. This
rule does not provide the other partners in the partnership with the opportunity to increase
their shares of partnership loss (or reduce their shares of partnership income) for the year
of the forfeiture by the amount of loss that was previously allocated to the forfeiting
service provider.
In other circumstances, the partnership will not have enough deductions and loss to fully
offset prior allocations of income to the forfeiting service provider. It appears that, in
such a case, section 83(b)(1) may prohibit the service provider from claiming a loss with
respect to partnership income that was previously allocated to the service provider.
However, a forfeiting partner is entitled to a loss for any basis in a partnership that is
attributable to contributions of money or property to the partnership (including amounts
paid for the interest) remaining after the forfeiture allocations have been made. See
[Treas. Reg. §] 1.83-2(a).
a.
Procedures to be followed in order to elect safe harbor treatment.
Notice 2005-43, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221 (5/20/05) The notice contains a proposed revenue procedure issued
concurrently with these proposed regulations would allow a partnership, all of its partners, and the service
provider to elect to treat the fair market value of a partnership interest as equal to the liquidation value of

that interest. If such an election is made, the capital account of a service provider receiving a partnership
interest in connection with the performance of services is increased by the liquidation value of the
partnership interest received. The notice provides additional rules that partnerships, partners, and persons
providing services to the partnership in exchange for interests in that partnership would be required to
follow when electing under Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(l) to treat the fair market value of those interests as being
equal to the liquidation value of those interests For this purpose, the liquidation value of a partnership
interest is the amount of cash that the holder of that interest would receive with respect to the interest if,
immediately after the transfer of the interest, the partnership sold all of its assets (including goodwill,
going concern value, and any other intangibles associated with the partnership's operations) for cash
equal to the fair market value of those assets, and then liquidated.
0
Section 83 generally provides that the recipient of property
transferred in connection with the performance of services recognizes income equal to the fair market value of
the property, disregarding lapse restrictions. However, some authorities have concluded that, under the
particular facts and circumstances of the case, a partnership profits interest had only a speculative value or that
the fair market value of a partnership interest should be determined by reference to the liquidation value of
that interest. See Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v); Campbell v. Commissioner,943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991); St. John
v. UnitedStates, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 9158 (C.D. Ill. 1983). But see Diamondv. Commissioner,492 F.2d 286 (7th
Cir. 1974) (holding under pre-section 83 law that the receipt of a profits interest with a determinable value at
the time of receipt resulted in immediate taxation); Campbell v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 1990-162, affd in
part and rev'd in part,943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
*
The proposed revenue procedure provides that when the
regulations are finalized, Rev. Proc. 93-27 and Rev. Proc. 2001-43, will be revoked.
•
Note: Practitioners should consider inclusion of provisions in
partnership agreements that require all partners to consent to safe harbor treatment of partnership interests
granted for services.
D.
Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
1.
Effect of partnership mergers on gain recognition under §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and
737(b). Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-18 I.R.B. 842 (4/12/04). This ruling deals with the application of
§§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737(b) in partnership mergers. The ruling holds that § 704(c)(1)(B) applies to newly
created § 704(c) gain or loss in property contributed by the transferor partnership to the continuing
partnership in an assets-over partnership merger, but does not apply to newly created reverse § 704(c)
gain or loss resulting from a revaluation of property in the continuing partnership. Similarly, for purposes
of § 737(b), net precontribution gain includes newly created § 704(c) gain or loss in property contributed
by the transferor partnership to the continuing partnership in an assets-over partnership merger, but does
not include newly created reverse § 704(c) gain or loss resulting from a revaluation of property in the
continuing partnership. Thus, a distribution of property previously held by the disappearing partnership
will trigger gain recognition if the distribution occurs within seven years after the merger.
a.
Rev. Rul. 2004-43 is revoked, and forthcoming regulations will be
effective for distributions after 1/19/05. Rev. Rul. 2005-10, 2005-7 I.R.B. 492 (1/19/05), revoking Rev.
Rul. 2004-43, 2004-18 I.R.B. 842. The IRS revoked Rev. Rul. 2004-43 and announced that it intended to
promulgate regulations implementing the principles of Rev. Rul 2004-43, which will be effective after
January 19, 2005.
2.
Continuing suit over the termination of a partnership means the partnership
hasn't terminated. Harbor Cove Marina Partners Partnership v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 4
(7/15/04). Harbor Cove Marina Partners Partnership filed a tax return indicating that its affairs had been
terminated in 1998, and all of the partners but one (Collins) reported consistently. Following a TEFRA
audit in which the IRS issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment indicating that the
"final" return was correct and that the IRS would make no changes, and the tax matters partner's
[understandable] failure to petition the Tax Court for review under § 6226(a), Collins, a notice partner
petitioned under § 6226(b) to readjust partnership items relating to the FPAA. Judge Laro held that the
partnership did not terminate under § 708(b)(1)(A) when (1) its managing general partner purportedly
wound up the affairs of the partnership's business operation using procedures apparently contrary to those
stated in the partnership agreement, (2) another partner filed a lawsuit to compel the use of the procedures
stated in the agreement, and (3) a resolution of that lawsuit could reasonably lead to the partnership's
reporting in a subsequent year of significant income, credit, gain, loss, or deduction.
3.
"Partnership interest for debt" is to be treated in the same way as "stock for
debt." Section 896 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 108(e)(8) to require recognition of cancellation of
indebtedness income realized on the satisfaction of debt with a partnership interest.

Mas One Limited Partnership v. United States, 390 F.3d 427, 2004-2 U.S.T.C.
4.
50,413 (6th Cir. 11/19/04), held that the payment of a partnership's debt to a creditor by a withdrawing
partner, one day after the partner's withdrawal, for the purpose of obtaining a discharge from the partner's
guarantee or certain partnership obligations was gross income to the partnership, not a § 721 contribution.
The court reasoned that the former partner's payment of the partnership's obligation was governed by Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), holding that a third party's payment of the
taxpayer's debt results in gross income.
5.
REG-149519-03, Section 707 Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 69 F.R.
68838 (11/26/04). The Treasury Department has published proposed regulations that would deal
comprehensively with disguised sales of partnership interests. The proposed regulations apply regardless
of whether the partner receives the distribution in complete liquidation of his partnership interest or as a
current distribution that merely reduces his partnership interest, and regardless of whether the related
contribution is made by existing partners or new partners.
Inside Basis Adjustments
E.
1.
Rev. Rul. 2004-49, 2004-21 I.R.B. 939. When a partnership revalues a § 197
intangible pursuant to Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(t, the partnership may allocate amortization with respect
to the intangible so as to take into account the built-in gain or loss from the revaluation provided that the
intangible is amortizable in the hands of the partnership. In that event, the partnership may make
remedial, but not traditional or curative allocations of amortization.
Partnership Audit Rules
F.
1.
Rev. Rul 2004-88, 2004-32 I.R.B. 165. A partnership that has a disregarded
entity as a partner cannot qualify for the "small partnership" exclusion from the §§ 6221-6234 unified
partnership and audit provisions because the disregarded entity is a pass-thru partner under § 6231 (a)(9).
The disregarded entity may, however, be designated the tax matters partner.
Miscellaneous
G.
TAX SHELTERS
A.
Tax Shelter Cases
Significant government victory in tax shelter case! Partnership's in-house
1.
tax counsel should have taken Nancy Reagan's advice when Don Turlington pitched him a tax
planning idea. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 2004-2 U.S.T.C.
50,351 (D. Conn. 8/27/04). Judge Janet Bond Arterton poured out taxpayers by holding that the tax
shelter transaction [under which preferred stock with an inflated basis was contributed to a partnership in
a carryover basis transaction] lacked economic substance (or, in the alternative, that the step transaction
doctrine required that it be recast into a direct sale of preferred stocks to taxpayers with the result that the
basis was equal to the amount they paid) and by upholding the imposition of (in the alternative) both the
40-percent gross valuation misstatement and the 20-percent substantial understatement penalties. After
that introductory statement, the remainder of the 198-page opinion was all downhill for taxpayers and
their lawyers.
*
The inflated basis was the result of several cross-border leasestripping transactions which left a foreign entity holding several million dollars worth of preferred stocks at a
basis $385 million greater than value. The lease-stripping transactions were supported by "should" tax
opinions issued by Shearman & Sterling when they were entered into.
0
Taxpayers' in-house tax counsel became interested in the possible
utilization of the losses when approached by Don Turlington, who suggested that the foreign entity contribute
the preferred stock to one of taxpayers' related partnerships, after which the foreign entity would have its
partnership interest redeemed. King & Spalding agreed to famish a "should" tax opinion that taxpayers could
utilize the foreign entity's losses, but did not actually provide the opinion until almost a year after the
partnership filed the return that took the losses.
Holdings included: (1) the burden of proof did not shift to the
0
government under § 7491 because taxpayers failed to provide a PowerPoint presentation and accompanying
handout for a presentation of Myron Scholes to the other eleven of taxpayers' principals and taxpayers' net
worth was not unambiguously shown to be under $7 million; (2) the transaction lacked economic substance
because the reasonably expected return on it could not have resulted in a profit (with the court calling into
question the credibility of the former King & Spalding lawyer who was the primary drafter of the opinion); (3)
the "end result" variety of the step transaction doctrine - the most liberal of the three varieties- was applied
to conclude that taxpayers acquired the preferred stocks by purchase at a fair market value basis; (4) the gross
VIII.

valuation misstatement resulted from the claimed adjusted basis of the preferred stocks being more than 400
percent of the adjusted basis that was found by the court to equal fair market value; (5) the substantial
understatement penalty was applied based upon taxpayers' failure to show any authority that held a
transaction devoid of economic substance could produce deductible losses; (6) the § 6664(c) "reasonable
cause ... and ... good faith" exception did not apply because taxpayers failed to prove that the King &
Spalding oral advice provided to it before 4/15/98 [the day it filed the relevant partnership return] satisfied the
"reasonable cause" defense because of the vagueness and lack of credibility of testimony as to the content of
the oral advice; and (7) the 1/27/99 written King & Spalding opinion did not provide reasonable cause because
its facts were unsubstantiated and its legal analysis unsatisfactory in that it failed to discuss Second Circuit
cases. Judge Arterton summarized the opinion as follows:
Finally, no other evidence such as companion memoranda discussing the application of
the Second Circuit's decisions in Goldstein, Gilman, Grove, Blake, and Grove, or the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Associated to the actual facts of the [foreign entity]
transaction was offered to show research for King & Spalding's legal analysis and
opinions. Such background research does not involve obscure or inaccessible caselaw
references, is basic to a sound legal product, especially for "should" level opinion and a
premium of $400,000. With hourly billing totals exceeding $100,000 there could not
have been research time constraints.
In essence, the testimony and evidence offered by Long Term regarding the advice
received from King & Spalding amounted to general superficial pronouncements asking
the Court to "trust us; we looked into all pertinent facts; we were involved; we researched
all applicable authorities; we made no unreasonable assumptions; Long Term gave us all
information." The Court's role as factfinder is more searching and with specifics,
analysis, and explanations in such short supply, the King & Spalding effort is insufficient
to carry Long Term's burden to demonstrate that the legal advice satisfies the threshold
requirements of reasonable good faith reliance on advice of counsel."
0
Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, who shared the 1997 Nobel
prize in Economics were two of taxpayers' twelve principals. Taxpayers were the component parts of one of
the highest-flying hedge funds until it had to be rescued from collapse by 14 banks [acting at the instigation of
the Federal Reserve] providing $3.65 billion to take the hedge fund over.
0
Query about where the substantial authority penalty fits when you
have told all to a tax professional and he tells you that you have substantial authority - but the court finds
that the underlying facts are different from the facts that both you and the tax professional believe to be true?
•
Is there a duty on a client to read and understand a tax opinion
beyond checking that the facts upon which the opinion is based are correct?"
a.
On the appeal of the imposition of penalties, the Second Circuit
affirms in an unpublished summary order. Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 20988 (2d Cir. 9/27/05) (unpublished). The court states that taxpayer was not required
to "second-guess the advice of its tax experts" but instead that it did not receive relevant tax advice upon
which it relied in reporting the $106 million loss, and - even if it had received such advice - it could not
have relied upon the opinion's assumptions of (1) "valid and substantial business purpose independent of
federal income tax considerations, (2) reasonable expectation of a material pre-tax profit, and (3) no
preexisting agreement on the part of Onslow Trading Company to sell its partnership interest to the LongTerm Capital Management partnership. The court upheld the 40 percent penalty based upon a basis
misstatement [specifically covered by the statute, but different from the typical valuation misstatement to
which the penalty has been applied in the past] and held that a misstatement resulting from a legal dispute
[as opposed to a factual dispute] was also covered by the penalty and that the 40 percent penalty applied
where a transaction is "recast" for tax purposes under the economic substance doctrine.
2.
After Long-Term Capital Holdings, the IRS takes a few victory laps.
a.
Penalties may no longer be bargained away in Appeals. Chief
Counsel Notice CC-2004-036 (9/22/04). The notice includes a memorandum from the Chief of Appeals
stating, "Effective immediately we will no longer trade penalty issues in appeals. Penalties can and should

still be settled, but the settlement should be based on the merits and the hazards surrounding each penalty
issue standing alone." b.
IRS takes a tougher stand on tax shelters.
IR-2004-128 (10/20/04).
The IRS announced that it was sending letters to taxpayers involved in three listed transactions, (1) losses
and deductions from lease strips, (2) inflated-basis assets derived from lease strips, and (3) intermediary
transactions, that it would tighten its settlement guidelines to require concession of 100 percent of the
claimed losses or deductions, reduced only by the amount of transaction costs up to 10 percent of the
claimed losses or deductions. Additionally, taxpayer would have to concede 50 percent of the accuracyrelated penalty at issue.
3.
Significant taxpayer victory when its summary judgment motion was
granted; the contingent liability transaction was upheld despite its being a listed transaction under
Notice 2001-17. Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 10/20/04, revised,
10/22/04). Government appeal pending. Judge Quarles held that the transaction could not be disregarded
as a sham because it had economic implications for the parties to the transaction as well as to the
beneficiaries of taxpayer's health plans.
0
Under the Fourth Circuit test in Rice's Toyota World v.
Commissioner,752 F.2d 89 (1985), a transaction will be treated as a sham only if "the taxpayer was motivated
by no business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction
has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists." Taxpayer conceded for
purposes of its motion "that tax avoidance was its sole motivation." The court held that "[a] corporation and its
transactions are objectively reasonable, despite any tax-avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages
in bona fide economically-based business transactions."
*
Note how Judge Quarles shifted the second prong of the test from
"reasonable possibility of profit" to "bona fide business transaction."
*
The transaction was a listed tax shelter under Notice 2001-17,
2001-9 I.R.B. 730.
*
In 1998, Black & Decker sold three of its businesses and realized
significant capital gains. That same year, Black & Decker created Black & Decker Healthcare Management
Inc. (BDHMI), to which it transferred approximately $561 million dollars, with BDI-MI assuming $560
million dollars in contingent employee healthcare claims against Black & Decker. Black & Decker then sold
the BDHMI. stock to a third-party for $1 million dollars, and claimed a $560 million loss on the grounds that
its basis in the BDHMI stock was $561 million dollars. The court concluded that §§ 357(c)(3) and 358(d)(2)
applied and that Black & Decker's basis in the BDHMI stock properly was not reduced by the amount of the
contingent employee healthcare claims. It rejected the IRS contention that the claims had to be deductible by
the transferee (BDHMI), and, based upon the legislative history of § 357(c)(3), concluded that there was no
reduction in basis because the contingent claims were liabilities that would have been deductible by the
transferor shareholder had it paid the claims.
a.
Government's summary judgment motion had been denied earlier
on a pro-taxpayer rationale. Black & Decker Cop. v. United States, 2004-2 U.S.T.C. 50,359 (D. Md.
8/3/04). As the facts were stated in the opinion,
In 1998, B & D sold three of its businesses. As a result of these sales, B & D generated
significant capital gains. Id. That same year, B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare
Management Inc. ("BDHMI"). B & D transferred approximately $ 561 million dollars to
BDHMI along with $ 560 million dollars in contingent employee healthcare claims in
exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI. B & D sold its stock in BDHMI to an
independent third-party for $ 1 million dollars. Because B & D believed that its basis in
the BDHMI stock was $ 561 million dollars, the value of the property it had transferred
to BDHMI, B & D claimed approximately $ 560 million dollars in capital loss on the
sale, which it reported on its 1998 federal tax return. B & D applied a portion of the
capital loss to offset its capital gains from selling the three businesses, and carried back
and carried forward the remaining capital loss to offset gains in prior and future tax years.
(citations omitted)
*
The court went on to analyze and conclude that §§ 357(c)(3) and
358(d) applied so the basis of the subsidiary's stock is not reduced by the amount of the contingent employee
healthcare claims. It rejected the IRS contention that the claims had to be deductible by the transferee [the

subsidiary], and held that (based upon the 1978 legislative history to § 357(c)(3)) the only requirement is that
the claims must be deductible by taxpayer [the transferor corporation].
0
Section 358(h), added in 2000 and amended in 2002, would
preclude this result for assumptions of liability after its 10/18/99 effective date. If the basis of stock received in
a § 351 transaction otherwise would exceed its fair market value, § 358(h) requires that the basis of the stock
be reduced (but not below the fair market value) by the amount (determined as of the date of the exchange) of
any § 357(c)(3) liability that was assumed by the corporation. For this purpose, "liability" is broadly defined
to include "any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the obligation is
otherwise taken into account for purposes of [the income tax]."
4.
A second taxpayer victory in a listed contingent liability transaction. Coltec
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (Fed. Cl. 10/29/04), Government appeal pending.
Taxpayer transferred its asbestos liabilities to an asbestos case management entity ["Garrison"], which
was existing shell subsidiary that had no assets, together with a related party note for $375 million and
some other miscellaneous assets. It sold about 6.67 percent of the Garrison stock to two banks for a total
of $500,000 and reported a multimillion dollar loss that saved it over $82 million in taxes. Judge Susan G.
Braden found that this transaction satisfied all the requirements of existing law.
0
Judge Braden rejected the concept of a court applying the economic
substance doctrine to tax cases on the ground that
The public must be able to rely on clear and understandable rules established by
Congress to ascertain their federal tax obligations. If federal tax laws are applied in an
unpredictable and arbitrary manner, albeit by federal judges for the "right" reasons in the
"right case," public confidence in the Code and tax enforcement system surely will be
further eroded. See John F. Coverdale, Text As Limit: A Plea For A Decent Respect For
The Tax Code, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1501, 1507 (May 1997) ("A decision rule that prohibits
courts from adopting antitextual interpretations reflects the proper role of the legislature
and the courts under our democratic constitutional system, it respects the distinctive
characteristics of the Code, and it promotes the values of certainty and predictability that
are very important when dealing with tax statutes."). Moreover, as a legal scholar cited
by the Government, observed:
The economic substance test is dizzyingly complex.... This complexity
arises from a number of interrelated factors. First, the test is best seen as
a technique of statutory interpretation, which poses open-ended and
unanswerable questions. Second, the test must be applied to a nearinfinite variety of economic activities and transactions. Third, the present
treatment of capital is inconsistent and to some extent incoherent.
Taxpayers can exploit this incoherence by structuring transactions that
produce tax benefits out of thin air. And conflicting rules make it
difficult, sometimes, to determine the "correct" treatment of a particular
transaction. Finally, only a few cases have been decided under the
economic substance test, leaving open multiple interpretations of the
doctrine.
Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 29 (2000-01);
see Gov't Post-Trial Memorandum at 38, 40 (citing Bankman). This candid assessment of
the deficiencies of "economic substance" doctrine certainly does not suggest a
compelling case for the court to jump into to "fill in some of the lacunae and resolve
some of the [doctrine's] ambiguities." Bankman, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 29. Instead, as
Professor Bankman advises, "Congress may have no choice but to engage in substantive
law reform. Some shelter activity will take place under even the most utopian tax
structure. However, the current tax treatment of capital needlessly multiplies shelter
opportunities and provides a fertile breeding ground for shelter development." Id. at 2930.. The court agrees.
After Professor Bankman's article was published, Congress debated several proposals to
codify the "economic substance" doctrine and declined to do so. See, e.g., CARE Act. S.

476, 108th Cong. § 701 (2003); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, S. 1054,
108th Cong. § 301 (2003); Abusive Tax Shelter Shut Down and Taxpayer Accountability
Act, H.R. 1555, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003). In fact, a few days ago Congress passed a
major federal tax bill, but again declined to codify the "economic substance doctrine."
See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004).
Under our time-tested system of separation of powers, it is Congress, not the court, that
should determine how the federal tax laws should be used to promote economic welfare.
See, e.g., Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206, 220 (2000) ("Because the Code's plain
text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address . . policy
concerns."); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972) ("When a principle of
taxation requires reexamination, Congress is better equipped than a court to define
precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When courts readily
undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with assurance on what appear to be
established rules[.]"); see alsoAmerican Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reminding the judiciary that their role "is to say what the
law is, not to prescribe what it shall be."). Accordingly, the court has determined that
where a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress, as
Coltec did in this case, the use of the "economic substance" doctrine to trump "mere
compliance with the Code" would violate the separation of powers.
0
As illustrated by Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, § 357(c)(3)
applies not only to cash method accounts payable, but also to liabilities of accrual method transferors that have
not yet been allowed as a deduction under the economic performance rules of § 461 (h) or because the liability
is too contingent. As a result, § 358(d)(2) applies and the transferor shareholder's basis in the stock received in
the exchange is not reduced by the liability. Aggressive tax planners took advantage of this pattern of the
interaction of the various statutory provisions to create artificial double deductions. Here, in a transaction
subject to § 351 one corporation, Garlock, contributed to another corporation, Garrison, cash, a $375 million
promissory note to Garlock from a related corporation, and certain other property. In connection with the
transfer Garrison assumed $371.2 million of Garlock's contingent liabilities for asbestos product liability
damage claims (neither of the events necessary to establish the fact of the liability had occurred, i.e., the filing
of a lawsuit asserting a claim and an adjudication of liability). Shortly thereafter, Garlock sold a significant
number of the shares of Garrison and claimed approximately $370 million of losses, having determined the
basis of the Garrison stock with reference to an exchanged basis under § 358 that was not reduced to reflect
the assumption of the contingent asbestos liabilities. Since the liabilities were contingent and the liabilities
would have been deductible by the transferor upon payment, the court held that the liabilities were within
those described in §§ 357(c)(3)(A) and 358(d)(2), and thus neither § 357(c)(1), requiring the recognition of
gain to the extent that the amount of liabilities exceed the basis of the contributed assets, nor § 358(d)(1),
requiring the reduction of the transferred basis assigned to the stock, applied. Therefore, Garlock's basis in
Garrison properly was the exchanged based of the transferred property, unreduced by the amount of liabilities
assumed by Garrison, and the loss was allowed.
5.
The third taxpayer victory in 13 days, in a self-liquidating partnership note
transaction in which the lion's share of income was allocated to a tax-indifferent party. Satisfaction
of the mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b) transcends both an intent to avoid tax and
the avoidance of significant tax through agreed upon partnership allocations So far, this lease
stripping transaction works for a burned-out tax shelter. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States 342 F.
Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 11/1/04), Government appeal pending. This case involved a tax shelter partnership
in which 2 percent of both operating and taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States partner,
and 98 percent of both book and taxable income was allocated to partners who were Dutch banks, foreign
partners who were not liable for United States taxes and thus were indifferent to the U.S. tax
consequences of their participation in the partnership. Because the partnership had very large book
depreciation deductions and no tax depreciation, most of the partnership's taxable operating income,
which was substantially in excess of book income, was allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners,
even though a large portion of the cash receipts reflected in that income was devoted to repaying the
principal of loans secured by property that GECC had contributed to the partnership. The overall
partnership transaction saved GECC approximately $62 million in income taxes, and the court found that
"it appears likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction - though

certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden." The court understood the
effects of the allocations and concluded that "by allocating 98% of the income from fully tax-depreciated
aircraft to the Dutch Banks, GECC avoided an enormous tax burden, while shifting very little book
income. Put another way, by allocating income less depreciation to tax-neutral parties, GECC was able to
're-depreciate' the assets for tax purposes. The tax-neutrals absorbed the tax consequences of all the
income allocated to them, but actually received only the income in excess of book depreciation."
Nevertheless, the court upheld the allocations. "
The tax benefits of the *** transaction were the result of the allocation of large amounts
of book income to a tax-neutral entity, offset by a large depreciation expense, with a
corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable income, but no corresponding
allocation of depreciation deductions. This resulted in an enormous tax savings, but the
simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The government does
not - and cannot - dispute that partners may allocate their partnership's income as they
choose. Neither does the government dispute that the taxable income allocated to the
Dutch Banks could not be offset by the allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions
to the banks. And * * * the bare allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the
overall tax effect rule.
0
The court found that the creation of Castle Harbour, a Nevada LLC,
by General Electric Capital Corp. subsidiaries was not designed solely to avoid taxes, but to spread the risk of
their investment in fully-depreciated commercial airplanes used in their leasing operations. GECC subsidiaries
put the following assets into Castle Harbor: $530 million worth of fully-depreciated aircraft subject to a $258
million non-recourse debt, $22 million of rents receivable, $296 million of cash, and all the stock of another
GECC subsidiary that had a value of $0. Two tax-indifferent Dutch Banks invested $117.5 million in Castle
Harbour Under the LLC agreement, the tax-indifferent partner was allocated 98 percent of the book income
and 98 percent of the tax income.
*
The book income was net of depreciation and the tax income did
not take depreciation into account [because the airplanes were fully depreciated]. Depreciation deductions for
book purposes were on the order of 60 percent of the rental income for any given year.
*
Query whether § 704(b) was properly applied to this transaction?
*
The court (Judge Underhill) held that satisfaction of the mechanical
rules of the regulations under § 704(b) transcended both an intent to avoid tax and the avoidance of significant
tax through agreed upon partnership allocations. In this partnership, 2 percent of both operating and taxable
income was allocated to GECC, a United States partner, and 98 percent of both book and taxable income was
allocated to partners who were Dutch banks. The Dutch banks were foreign partners who were not liable for
United States taxes and thus were indifferent to the U.S. tax consequences of their participation in the
partnership.
*
Judge Underhill concluded:
The government is understandably concerned that the Castle Harbour transaction
deprived the public fisc of some $ 62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears likely
that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction - though
certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden. Nevertheless,
the Castle Harbour transaction was an economically real transaction, undertaken, at least
in part, for a non-tax business purpose; the transaction resulted in the creation of a true
partnership with all participants holding valid partnership interests; and the income was
allocated among the partners in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury
Regulations. In short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of income from
taxes, was legally permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its
concerns to those who write the tax laws.
6.
Despite its two losses on contingent liability tax shelters, the IRS is hanging
tough. Did taxpayer have something else in its closet, or has it become a believer? "Hercules!
Hercules! Hercules!",3 IR-2004-151 (12/16/04). The IRS announced that Hercules Incorporated settled a
3 See footnote in write-up of the Stepnowski case at IV.B., above.

contingent liability transaction case pending in the Tax Court by conceding 100 percent of the capital loss
and the 20-percent accuracy-related penalty [and waiving taxpayer privacy and disclosure rules] in order
to avoid the 40-percent gross valuation understatement penalty.4 The IRS Chief Counsel has stated that
the two recent taxpayer victories in Black & Decker and Coltec would be reversed on appeal, and that the
IRS would pay no attention to them.
7.
Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104 (5/11/05).
The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that an LLC formed to purchase the high-basis, low-value assets of
the former parent company of MGM, was not entitled to capital losses on the order of $380 million
because the transactions it undertook lacked economic substance and cannot be respected for Federal tax
purposes, and that the LLC lacked basis in any of the assets it sold. Judge Thornton also imposed the 40percent gross valuation misstatement and the 20-percent substantial understatement penalties.
B.
Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1.
SILO transactions. Interestingly enough, sale-in, lease-out (SILO) deals [under
which a tax-exempt or foreign entity sells property to the taxpayer and leases it back, with the lessee
depositing collateral in defeasance of its obligation] were not made "listed transactions," although
President Bush's budget proposal seeks a legislative remedy for this widespread perceived abuse. 2004
TNT 19-3.
a.
SILO transactions were closed retroactive to 3/12/04. Section 848 of
the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 470 to disallow losses on leases of property for tax-exempt use that
were entered into after 3/12/04. The disallowed losses would be carried over to the following year much
as disallowed passive activity losses are carried over. There is a safe harbor provision contained in
§ 470(d).
b.
Silos are now listed transactions even though the door was closed
after 3/12/04. Notice 2005-13, 2005-9 I.R.B. 630 (2/20/05). This notice distinguishes the SILO
transaction from the one in FrankLyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
c.
Relief for partnerships and pass-thru entities who looked like they
fed from "silos" in 2004 but really didn't. Notice 2005-29, 2005-13 I.R.B. 796 (3/10/05). The Service
will not apply § 470 to partnerships and pass-thru entities described in § 168(h)(6)(E) for taxable years
that begin before 1/1/05 in order to disallow losses associated with property that is treated as tax-exempt
use property solely as a result of the application of § 168(h)(6) (describing property owned by a
partnership that has both tax-exempt and non-tax-exempt partners).
2.
Removes from the list a transaction in which expected economic profit is
insubstantial in comparison to the value of the expected foreign tax credits. Notice 2004-19, 2004-11
I.R.B. 606. Removes from the list of listed transactions those described in Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334,
which are transactions in which the expected economic profit is insubstantial in comparison to the value
of the expected foreign tax credits.
3.
PORC transactions also removed from the list so it's no longer considered
piggy to be "PORC-y." Notice 2004-65, 2004-41 I.R.B. 599 (9/24/04), modifying Notice 2002-70, 20022 C.B. 765, and Notice 2003-76, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1181. This Notice removes the producer owned
reinsurance company transaction from the list of "identified tax avoidance transactions." The rationales
for the removal are: (1) that examination of this type of transaction showed fewer abusive transactions
than anticipated; and (2) the amendment of § 501(c)(15) [to limit the gross income of organizations
exempt under that section to $600,000] by section 206 of the Pension Funding Equity Act, P.L 108-218,
as described in Notice 2004-64, 2004-41 I.R.B. 598 (9/24/04).
4.
Updated list of listed transactions minus the above two. Notice 2004-67,
2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (9/24/04), supplementing and superseding Notice 2003-76, 2003-49 I.R.B. 181, as
modified by Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 I.R.B. 606, and Notice 2004-65, 2004-41 I.R.B. 599. Updated list
of listed transactions. Notice 2003-76, 2003-49 I.R.B. (11/7/03), supplementing and superseding Notice
2001-51, 2001-34 I.R.B. 190 (8/3/01). The IRS has identified 24 listed transactions for purposes of Reg.
§§ 1.6011-4(b)(2) and 301.6111-2(b)(2). As restated and updated, the list includes: (1) Rev. Rul. 90-105,
1990-2 C.B. 69, transactions (deductions for contributions to certain pension plans attributable to future
year's compensation); (2) Notice 95-34, 1995-1 C.B. 309, certain trust arrangements (purported multiple
4 Compare

Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1041, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,194 (9th Cir. 1/17/03), remanding T.C.
Memo. 2000-116 and T.C Memo. 1999-101 (Tax Court was directed to enter judgment in favor of taxpayers on
terms equivalent to the secret settlement agreements entered into with the taxpayers who cooperated with the
government). See also, Robert Frost, "Provide, Provide" (1936) ("Better to go down dignified / With boughten
friendship at your side / Than none at all. Provide, provide!").

employer welfare benefit funds); (3) Transactions substantially similar to those at issue in ASA
Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (contingent installment sales transactions in order to
accelerate and allocate income to a tax-indifferent partner); (4) Prop. Reg. § 1.643(a)-8 transactions
involving distributions from charitable remainder trusts; (5) Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, transactions
involving the distribution of encumbered property in which taxpayers claim tax losses for capital outlays
that they have in fact recovered (the PwC so-called BOSS tax shelter); (6) Reg. § 1.7701(1)-3 fast-pay
arrangements; (7) Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-11 I.R.B. 744 certain transactions involving the acquisition of
two debt instruments the values of which are expected to change significantly at about the same time in
opposite directions; (8) Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255 transactions generating losses resulting from
artificially inflating the basis of partnership interests (the KPMG so-called BLIPS 5 tax shelter); (9) Notice
2000-60, 2000-49 I.R.B. 568, transactions involving the purchase of a parent corporation's stock by a
subsidiary, a subsequent transfer of the purchased parent stock from the subsidiary to the parent's
employees, and the eventual liquidation or sale of the subsidiary; (10) Notice 2000-61, 2000-49 I.R.B.
569, transactions purporting to apply § 935 to Guamanian trusts; (11) Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730,
intermediary sales transactions; (12) Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730, contingent liability § 351
transfer transactions; (13) Notice 2001-45, 2001-33 I.R.B. 129 (certain redemptions of stock in
transactions not subject to U.S. tax in which the basis of the redeemed stock purports to shift to a U.S.
taxpayer); (14) Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730, transactions involving the use of a loan assumption
agreement to inflate basis in assets acquired from another party in order to claim losses; (15) Notice 200235, 2002-1 C.B. 992, transactions involving the use of a notional principal contract to claim current
deductions for periodic payments made by a taxpayer while disregarding the accrual of a right to receive
offsetting future payments; (16) Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98 (transactions involving the use of a
straddle, a tiered partnership structure, a transitory partner and the absence of a § 754 election to claim a
permanent non-economic loss), and similar transactions identified in Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690,
and Notice 2003-54, 2003-33 I.R.B. 363; (17) Rev. Rul 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760, modifying and
superseding Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-1 C.B. 835, lease-in/lease-out [LILO] transactions); (18) Rev. Rul.
2003-6, 2003-3 I.R.B. 286, arrangements involving the transfer of ESOPs that hold stock in an S
corporation for the purpose of claiming eligibility for the delayed effective date of § 409(p); (19) Notice
2003-22, 2003-18 I.R.B. 851, arrangements involving foreign leasing companies used to evade or avoid
federal income and employment taxes; (20) Notice 2003-24, 2003-18 I.R.B. 853, arrangements that
purportedly qualify as collectively bargained welfare benefit funds excepted from the account limits of
§§ 419 and 419A; (21) Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132, transactions involving compensatory stock
options and related persons to avoid or evade federal income and employment taxes; (22) Notice 2003-55,
2003-34 I.R.B. 395, modifying and superseding Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334, transactions in which one
participant claims to realize rental income and another participant claims the deductions related to that
income (often referred to as "lease strips"); (23) Notice 2003-77, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1182, transactions that
use contested liability trusts improperly to accelerate deductions under § 461(f); (24) Notice 2003-81,
2003-51 I.R.B. 1223, transactions in which a taxpayer claims a loss upon the assignment of a section
1256 contract to a charity but fails to report the recognition of gain when the taxpayer's obligation under
an offsetting non-section 1256 contract terminates; (25) Notice 2004-8, 2004-4 I.R.B. 333, transactions
designed to avoid the limitations on contributions to Roth IRAs; (26) Rev. Rul. 2004-4, 2004-6 I.R.B.
414, transactions that involve segregating the profits of an ESOP-owned S corporation in a QSST so that
rank-and-file employees do not benefit from participation in the ESOP; (27) Transactions similar to those
described in Rev. Rul. 2004-20, 2004-10 I.R.B. 546, Situation 2, involving arrangements in which an
employer deducts contributions to a qualified plan for life insurance premiums that provide death benefits
in excess of the participant's death benefit; (28) Notice 2004-20, 2004-11 I.R.B. 608, transactions in
which a domestic corporation purports to acquire stock in a foreign target corporation in a preplanned
transaction that generates gain under a 338 election that is not taxable for U.S. purposes; (29) Notice
2004-30, 2004-17 I.R.B. 828, transactions in which S corporation shareholders attempt to transfer the
incidence of taxation by purportedly donating S corporation nonvoting stock to an exempt organization
while retaining the economic benefits associated with that stock; and (30) Notice 2004-31, 2004-17 I.R.B.
830, transactions in which corporations claim inappropriate deductions for payments made through a
partnership.
C.
Disclosure and Settlement

5 See 2003 TNT 112-12.

1.
The Big Four settle with the IRS on tax shelters. Deloitte settled with the IRS
and agreed to a penalty to be determined after the IRS settled with the other three.
a.
The PwC deal. IR-2002-82 (6/27/02). The IRS announced in a news
release that it cut a deal with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) "to resolve tax shelter registration and list
maintenance issues. The IRS news release, which is similar to one issued last August regarding Merrill
Lynch, says that without admitting or denying liability, PwC has agreed to make a 'substantial payment'
to the IRS to resolve issues in connection with advice rendered to clients dating back to 1995. Under the
agreement, PwC will provide to the IRS certain client information in response to summonses. It will also
work with the IRS to develop processes to ensure ongoing compliance with the shelter registration and
investor list maintenance requirements, according to the release."
b.
The EY deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). The IRS announced in a news
release that it has settled Ernst & Young's potential liability under the tax shelter registration and list
maintenance penalty provisions for a nondeductible payment of $15 million. See 2003 TNT 128-1.
c.
The KPMG deal: the price of settling goes up dramatically. IR-200583 (8/29/05). The IRS and the Justice Department announced in a news release that KPMG LLP has
admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution and penalties as part
of an agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Nine individuals, including six former KPMG partners
and the former deputy chairman of the firm [Jeffrey Stein] and a New York lawyer [R.J. Ruble] were
indicted in the Southern District of New York in relation to the "multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud
conspiracy"; three of those indicted [Richard Smith, Philip Wiesner and Mark Watson] were partners in
KPMG's Washington National Tax group. Additional defendants are expected to be added to the
indictment before the court's 10/17/05 deadline.
2.
Proposed revisions to Circular 230 related to tax shelters require disclosures
in tax shelter opinions of relationship between practitioner and promoter, etc. REG-122379-02,
Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 F.R. 75186 (12/30/03). New
proposed amendments, which differ from the 1/12/01 proposed amendments in several ways: (1) § 10.33
prescribes best practices for all tax advisors; (2) § 10.35 combines and modifies the standards applicable
to "marketed" and "more likely than not" tax shelter opinions from former §§ 10.33 and 10.35; (3)
§ 10.36 contains the revised procedures for ensuring compliance with §§ 10.33 and 10.35; and (4) new
§ 10.37 contains provisions relating to advisory committees to the Office of Professional Responsibility.
*
Under § 10.33 "best practices" include: (1) communicating clearly
with the client regarding the terms of the engagement and the form and scope of the advice or assistance to be
rendered; (2) establishing the relevant facts, including evaluating the reasonableness of any assumptions or
representations; (3) relating applicable law, including potentially applicable judicial doctrines, to the relevant
facts; (4) arriving at a conclusion supported by the law and the facts; (5) advising the client regarding the
import of the conclusions reached; and (6) acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS.
*
Tax shelter opinions covered by § 10.35 are more-likely-than-not
and marketed tax shelter opinions; they, however, do not include preliminary advice provided pursuant to an
engagement in which the practitioner is expected subsequently to provide an opinion that satisfies § 10.35.
The definition of "tax shelter," tracking the one found in § 6662 which was contained in the 2001 proposed
regulations, remains the same. The requirements for tax shelter opinions include: (1) identifying and
considering all relevant facts and not relying on any unreasonable factual assumptions or representations; (2)
relating the applicable law to the relevant facts in a reasonable manner; (3) considering all material Federal tax
issues and reaching a conclusion supported by the facts and the law with respect to each issue; and (4)
providing an overall conclusion as to the Federal tax treatment of each tax shelter item, and the reasons for
that conclusion and providing an overall conclusion as to the Federal tax treatment of each tax shelter item and
the reasons for that conclusion.
*
Under § 10.35(d), a practitioner must disclose any compensation
arrangement he may have with any person (other than the client for whom the opinion is prepared) with
respect to the tax shelter discussed in the opinion, as well as any other referral arrangement relating thereto.
The practitioner must also disclose that a marketed opinion may not be sufficient for a taxpayer to use for the
purpose of avoiding penalties under § 6662(d), and must also state that taxpayers should seek advice from
their own tax advisors. A limited scope opinion must also disclose that additional issues may exist and that the
opinion cannot be used for penalty-avoidance purposes.
•
Under § 10.36 procedures to ensure compliance are required to be
followed by tax advisors with responsibility for overseeing a firm's practice before the IRS. These include
ensuring that the firm has adequate procedures in effect for purposes of complying with § 10.35.

*
Under § 10.37 the Director of the Office of Professional
Responsibility is authorized to establish advisory committees to review and make recommendations regarding
professional standards or best practices for tax advisors. They may also, more particularly, advise the Director
whether a practitioner may have violated §§ 10.35 or 10.36.
a.
Extended statutory authority granted to Treasury with respect to
Circular 230. Section 822 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) to permit the imposition
of censures and monetary penalties for Circular 230 violations. It also clarifies Treasury's authority to
impose standards applicable to written tax shelter opinions.
b.
Tax shelter revisions to Circular 230 are made final. To paraphrase
President Clinton, oral opinions are not real opinions. T.D. 9165, Regulations Governing Practice
Before the Internal Review Service, 69 F.R. 75839 (12/20/04).
(1)
Best practices for tax advisors. As to final § 10.33, the
preamble states:
The final regulations adopt the best practices set forth in the proposed regulations with
modifications. These best practices are aspirational. A practitioner who fails to comply
with best practices will not be subject to discipline under these regulations. Similarly, the
provision relating to steps to ensure that a firm's procedures are consistent with best
practices, now set forth in § 10.33(b), is aspirational. Although best practices are solely
aspirational, tax professionals are expected to observe these practices to preserve public
confidence in the tax system.
0
These best practices are (1) communicating clearly with the client
regarding the terms of the engagement; (2) establishing the facts, determining which facts are relevant,
evaluating the reasonableness of any assumptions or representations, relating the applicable law (including
potentially applicable judicial doctrines) to the relevant facts, and arriving at a conclusion supported by the
law and the facts; (3) advising the client regarding the import of the conclusions reached, including, e.g.,
whether the client may avoid accuracy-related penalties; and (4) acting fairly and with integrity in practice
before the IRS. Practitioners responsible for overseeing a firm's tax practice must take reasonable steps to
ensure that firm's procedures applicable to all personnel in the firms are consistent with these best practices.
(2)
Requirements for covered opinions. As to final § 10.35, the
preamble states:
Under the final regulations, the definition of a covered opinion [i.e., one subject to
§ 10.35] includes written advice (including electronic communications) that concerns one
or more Federal tax issue(s) arising from: (1) a listed transaction; (2) any plan or
arrangement, the principal purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax; or (3)
any plan or arrangement, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of
tax if the written advice (A) is a reliance opinion, (B) is a marketed opinion, (C) is
subject to conditions of confidentiality, or (D) is subject to contractual protection. A
reliance opinion is written advice that concludes at a confidence level of at least more
likely than not that one or more significant Federal tax issues would be resolved in the
taxpayer's favor.
Written advice will not be treated as a reliance opinion if the practitioner prominently
discloses in the written advice that it was not written to be used and cannot be used for
the purpose of avoiding penalties. Similarly, written advice generally will not be treated
as a marketed opinion if it does not concern a listed transaction or a plan or arrangement
having the principal purpose of avoidance or evasion of tax and the written advice
contains this disclosure. The Treasury Department and the IRS intend to amend 26 CFR
1.6664-4 to clarify that a taxpayer may not rely upon written advice that contains this
disclosure to establish the reasonable cause and good faith defense to the accuracy-related
penalties.
Written advice regarding a plan or arrangement having a significant purpose of tax
avoidance or evasion is excluded from the definition of a covered opinion if the written

advice concerns the qualification of a qualified plan or is included in documents required
to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The final regulations also
adopt an exclusion for preliminary advice if the practitioner is reasonably expected to
provide subsequent advice that satisfies the requirements of the regulations.
Written advice that is not a covered opinion for purposes of
standards set forth in new § 10.37.

§ 10.35 is subject to the

6
There are substantial due diligence requirements for covered
opinions. 6 All written opinions at the more-likely-than-not (or higher) level for listed transactions or
transactions with a principal purpose of tax avoidance or evasion are covered opinions. For other nonexcluded tax shelter opinions, the requirements of § 10.35 can be avoided with a statement that the opinion
cannot be relied upon to avoid penalties- prominently disclosed "in a separate section at the beginning of the
written advice in a bolded typeface that is larger than any other typeface used in the written advice."

To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, we inform you that any tax advice contained in this
communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to be
used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of (1) avoiding taxrelated penalties under the U.. Internal Revenue Code or (2) promoting.
marketin2 or recommending to another party any transaction or lax-related
matters adldressed herein.
(3)

Procedures to ensure compliance. As to final § 10.36, the

preamble was silent.
0
Practitioners responsible for overseeing a firm's tax practice must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate procedures in effect for all personnel to comply with
§ 10.35.
(4)
Requirements for other written advice. As to final § 10.37, the
preamble states:
The final regulations also set forth requirements for written advice that is not a covered
opinion. Under § 10.37 a practitioner must not give written advice if the practitioner: (1)
Bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions; (2) unreasonably
relies upon representations, statements, findings or agreements of the taxpayer or any
other person; (3) fails to consider all relevant facts; or (4) takes into account the
possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or
that an issue will be settled. Section 10.37, unlike § 10.35, does not require that the
practitioner describe in the written advice the relevant facts (including assumptions and
representations), the application of the law to those facts, or the practitioner's conclusion
with respect to the law and the facts. The scope of the engagement and the type and
specificity of the advice sought by the client, in addition to all other facts and
circumstances, will be considered in determining whether a practitioner has failed to
comply with the requirements of § 10.37.
0
Practitioners may not give written advice based on (1) unreasonable
factual or legal assumptions; (2) unreasonably reliance upon representations of the client or any other person;
(3) consideration of less than all relevant facts; or (4) the possibility that a return may not be audited, that an
issue is not raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved through settlement.

6 If

you have to ask the requirements for a covered opinion, then you probably shouldn't be writing one. Cf, "J.P.
Morgan famously said that if you have to ask the cost of a yacht, you probably can't afford one." David Taylor in
"A Strange Downeaster," Forbes, 6/20/05.
7 In other words, nothing in this outline may be used to save taxes for any of your clients,

(5)
Establishment of advisory committees. As to final § 10.38
[§ 10.37 in the proposed regulations], the preamble states:
Newly designated § 10.38, formerly § 10.37 in the proposed regulations, is adopted as
proposed with the following modifications. Section 10.38 is modified to clarify that an
advisory committee may not make recommendations about actual practitioner cases, or
have access to information pertaining to actual cases. The section also is modified to
clarify that the Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility should ensure that
membership of these committees is balanced among those individuals who practice as
attorneys, accountants and enrolled agents.
The provisions contained in the final regulations will generally
(6)
become applicable on 6/21/05.
c.
Announcement 2005-31; 2005-18 IRB 996 (5/2/05). Minor corrections to
§ 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(B) and § 10.35(b)(4)(i).
d.
Pre-summer solstice changes to § 10.35 expand the definition of
"excluded advice," modify the definition of "prominently disclosed" and revise the definition of
"the principal purpose [of tax avoidance]." T.D. 9201, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Review Service. 70 T.R. 28824 (5/19/05).
0
Post-return advice. Excludes from the definition of a covered
opinion advice given after a tax return is filed - unless the practitioner knows or has reason to know that the
taxpayer will rely on the advice to claim benefits in a subsequently-filed amended return.
*
In-house advice. Excludes from the definition of a covered opinion
written advice provided to an employer in the practitioner's capacity as an employee solely for the purposes of
determining the tax liability of the employer.
*
How about "almost more likely than not"? Excludes from the
definition of a covered opinion negative advice unless the written advice also reaches a conclusion favorable
to the taxpayer at any confidence level, e.g., not frivolous, realistic possibility of success, reasonable basis or
substantial authority.
•
Need not come first to be "prominently disclosed." Modifies the
definition of "prominently disclosed" to a subjective facts-and-circumstances test of whether the item is
"readily apparent" to the particular taxpayer in the context of the opinion. The item must be set forth in a
separate section (and not in a footnote) in a typeface that is the same size or larger than the typeface of any
discussion of the facts or law.
a
When is a tax avoidance purpose "consistent with the statute
and Congressional purpose"? Revises the definition of "principal purpose" to be similar to that of Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii), i.e., that the purpose is not to avoid or evade Federal tax if the purpose is "the claiming of
tax benefits in a manner consistent with the statute and Congressional purpose."
3.
Making it harder for taxpayers to 'fess up in order to avoid penalties. Notice
2004-38, 2004-21 I.R.B 949 (4/30/04). Treasury will issue temporary and proposed regulations that will
modify the definition of "qualified amended return" in Reg. § 1.6664-2(c)(3) to provide that the period
for filing is terminated when the IRS contacts a promoter, organizer or material advisor concerning a
listed transaction for which the taxpayer has claimed a tax benefit (or when the taxpayer is contacted for
examination concerning the activity. This will deprive a taxpayer who knows he is in the Service's sights
of the right to file a qualified amended return to avoid penalties.
*
Previously, the right to file such a return ended at the earliest of a
taxpayer receiving a notice of deficiency or the promoter receiving a § 6700 notice.
*
The IRS is also contending that the filing of a qualified amended
return retroactively revokes the interest holiday under § 6404(g)(2)(C) that begins 18 months after the filing of
the original return because the interest holiday does not apply to tax shown on a return.
4.
Son-of-Boss settlement terms are announced. Announcement 2004-46, 200421 I.R.B. 964 (5/5/04). Settlement initiative for taxpayers to resolve "Son of Boss" transactions described
in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, and substantially similar transactions. Taxpayers will be required to
concede all claimed tax benefits and attributes, including basis adjustments with a sliding scale of
penalties [none, if disclosed under Announcement 2002-2; 2001-1 C.B. 304; 10 percent if this was the
taxpayer's only listed transaction; and 20 percent otherwise]. Net out-of-pocket costs and fees will be

allowed as a long term capital loss (or half of these as an ordinary deduction) in the year these items were
paid or accrued. The settlement initiative was open through 6/21/04.
IRS settlement terms for executive stock option shelters. Announcement
5.
2005-19, 2005-11 I.R.B. 744 (2/22/05). Executive Stock Options Settlement Initiative. The offer, which
extends until 5/23/05. is for payment of tax on the full amount of compensation received, plus interest and
a 10 percent penalty (which is half of the 20 percent penalty). The parties must pay employment taxes,
but they will be allowed to deduct their out of pocket transaction costs; the corporations will be permitted
a deduction for the compensation expense when reported by the executive. Employment taxes are also
due. The IRS has identified 42 corporations, close to 200 executives and more than $700 million of
unreported income involved in the scheme, and will ask that the matter be referred to the audit committee
of the board of directors for appropriate review. This transaction was listed in Notice 2003-47, 2003-30
I.R.B. 132.
*
In IR-2005-17 (2/22/05). the transaction is described as follows:
The transaction first involves the transfer of stock options by the executive to a related
entity, such as a family limited partnership, under terms of an agreement to defer
payment to the executive. Next, the partnership exercises the options and sells the stock
in the marketplace. The executive then takes the position that tax is not owed until the
date of the deferred payment, typically 15 to 30 years later, although the executive has
access to the partnership assets undiminished by taxes. Tax laws require executives to
include in income and pay tax on the difference between the amount they pay for the
stock and its value when the option is exercised. Corporations are entitled to a deduction
for the compensation when the options are exercised.
Tax Shelter Penalties, etc.
1..
A non-reviewable penalty for failure to disclose a reportable transaction that
applies even if the courts uphold taxpayer's position. Section 811 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new
§ 6707A which provides a new penalty for any taxpayer who fails to include on his tax return any
required information on a reportable transaction "of a type which the Secretary determines as having a
potential for tax avoidance or evasion." The penalty would apply regardless of whether there is an
understatement of tax and would apply in addition to any accuracy related penalty. The penalty would be
$10,000 for a natural person and $50,000 for other taxpayers; for a listed transaction the penalty would
increase to $100,000 for a natural person and $200,000 for other taxpayers.
The Commissioner could rescind any portion of the penalty if it did
*
not involve a listed transaction and rescinding would promote compliance and effective tax administration. A
decision not to rescind may not be reviewed in any judicial proceeding.
Doesn't the Commissioner trust his own Appeals Officers? Notice
a.
2005-11, 2005-7 I.R.B. 493 (1/19/05). This notice provides guidance on § 6707A, including a statement
that the Commissioner's determination whether to rescind a § 6707A penalty "is not reviewable by the
IRS Appeals Division or any court."
Modified accuracy-related penalty for reportable transactions. Section 812
2.
of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 6662A which would provide a modified accuracy related penalty on
understatements with respect to reportable transactions, It would replace the § 6662 accuracy related
penalty for tax shelters and would be in the amount of 20 percent - 30 percent if the transaction is not
properly disclosed. Taxpayers could not rely on an opinion of a tax advisor to establish reasonable cause
under new § 6664(d) [applicable to reportable transaction understatements] for any opinion: (a) provided
by a "disqualified tax advisor" or (b) which is a "disqualified opinion."
Notice 2005-12, 2005-7 I.R.B. 494 (1/19/05). This notice provides
a.
further guidance, including a statement that the new § 6664(d) defense is not available for the 30 percent
penalty. It also provides guidance on when a material tax advisor participates in a transaction:
D.

Consistent with the legislative history, a tax advisor, including a material advisor, will
not be treated as participating in the organization, management, promotion or sale of a
transaction if the tax advisor's only involvement is rendering an opinion regarding the tax
consequences of the transaction. In the course of preparing a tax opinion, a tax advisor is
permitted to suggest modifications to the transaction, but the tax advisor may not suggest
material modifications to the transaction that assist the taxpayer in obtaining the
anticipated tax benefits. Merely performing support services or ministerial functions such

as typing, photocopying, or printing will not be considered participation in the
organization, management, promotion or sale of a transaction.
3.
Section 813 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 7525(b) to make the current
exception to the federally authorized tax practitioner privilege for "corporate tax shelters" applicable to
all tax shelters.
4.
The audit lottery that can never be won and taxpayer can never get repose!
The statute of limitations never expires on listed transactions that are not disclosed. Section 814 of
the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 6501(c)(10) to extend the statute of limitations for listed transactions
which a taxpayer fails to disclose until one year after the transaction is disclosed by the taxpayer or by a
material advisor's satisfying the list maintenance requirement in connection with a request from Treasury.
a.
Rev. Proc. 2005-26, 2005-17 I.R.B. 965 (4/8/05). Guidance on the
procedures to be followed by taxpayers and material advisors to disclose previously unreported listed
transactions for purposes of the extended statute of limitations.
5.
Material advisors are subject to increased disclosure. Section 815 of the Jobs
Act of 2004 amends §§ 6111 and 6112 to require increased disclosure on an information return for each
reportable transaction by any material advisor [in lieu of tax shelter registration]. "Material advisor" is
defined more broadly to encompass any person who "provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with
respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any
reportable transaction" and derives fees in excess of $50,000 for tax shelters for natural persons
($250,000 for tax shelters for other taxpayers).
a.
Section 816 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends §§ 6707 and 6708 to
increase the penalty for failure to file a return under § 6111 to $50,000 - for listed transactions, the
greater of $200,000 or 50 percent of the gross income derived by the person required to file the return [75
percent if the failure was intentional].
b.
Section 817 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 6708 to provide a penalty
of $10,000 per day on any material advisor for failure to make available to the IRS within 20 business
days any investor list required to be maintained under the provisions of § 6112.
C.
Section 818 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 6707 to increase the
penalty on tax shelter promoters to 50 percent of the gross income to be derived from the activity on
which the penalty is imposed.
d.
Section 820 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 7408 to allow injunctions
(a) against material advisors for violating reporting requirements and (b) for violating any of the Circular
230 rules.
e.
Interim guidance for material advisors. Notice 2004-80, 2004-50
I.R.B. 963 (11/16/04). Interim guidance for the disclosure requirements for material advisors under
§ 6111 by defining the terms "reportable transaction" and "material advisor," and specifying the
applicable forms and filing dates. The form is Form 8264, as modified by instructions in the notice.
(1)
Several revenue procedures were issued on 10/16/04 to give
"angels' lists" of transactions that need not be reported. They are Rev. Proc. 2004-65 [transactions with
contractual protection], Rev. Proc. 2005-66 [loss transactions], Rev Proc. 2004-67 [transactions with
book-tax differences], and Rev. Proc. 2005-68 [transactions with brief asset holding periods]. They may
be found at 2004-50 I.R.B. 965, 966, 967 and 969, respectively.
(2)
Notice 2005-17, 2005-8 I.R.B. 606 (1/28/05). Extension for
compliance with the reporting provisions to 3/1/05.
(3)
Notice 2005-22, 2005-12 I.R.B. 756 (2/24/05). Additional
guidance, and a further extension for compliance with the reporting provisions to 4/30/05.
6.
Section 819 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 6662(d) provide that a
corporation's understatement of tax in excess of $10 million is subject to the substantial understatement
penalty even if it does not exceed 10 percent of the correct tax.
7.
A penalty for non-willful failure, and increased penalties for willful failure,
to answer the two questions about foreign bank accounts. Section 821 of the Jobs Act of 2004
amends 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) to provide a penalty of up to $10,000 for non-willful failure to report
interests in foreign financial accounts. The penalties for willful violations are increased to the greater of
$100,000 or 50 percent of the amount of the transaction [or 50 percent of the balance in the account at the
time of the violation].
8.
No interest deductions for underpayments related to reportable transactions
that are not disclosed. Section 838 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 163(m) [former § 163(m) is

redesignated as § 163(n)] to deny interest deductions for any underpayments attributable to nondisclosed
reportable transactions.
9.
Rev. Proc. 2005-51, 2005-33 I.R.B. 296 (8/15/05). Guidance for persons required
to pay penalties under §§ 6662(h), 6662A or 6707A, who are required under § 6707A(e) to disclose those
penalties on reports filed with the SEC. A failure to disclose shall be treated as a failure to disclose a
listed transaction and will be subject to an additional penalty.
E.
Tax Shelters Miscellaneous
1.
United States v. Gleason, 94 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-6344 (M.D. Tenn. 8/25/04). Tax
shelter promoter permanently enjoined under § 7408 from selling the so-called "Tax Toolbox" which
would permit the deduction of personal expenses by falsely characterizing them as business expenses.
2.
Public companies are further restricted in obtaining tax services from the
accounting firm that audits their books. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
adopted rules on 7/26/05 under which auditors would be banned from providing aggressive tax service to
their clients, i.e., listed transactions or confidential transactions [Rule 3522]; would no longer be allowed
to enter into contingent fee arrangements [Rule 3521]; and would no longer be allowed to provide tax
services for executives of their clients who are in financial reporting oversight roles [Rule 3523]. Auditors
would continue to be allowed to provide routine tax services, such as return preparation and tax
compliance, general tax planning and advice, international assignment tax services, and employee
personal tax services.
IX.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A.
Exempt Organizations
B.
Charitable Giving
Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d 881, 2004-2 U.S.T.C. 50,291, 94 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-5134 (9th Cir.
7/8/04). Judge Noonan holds that the substantiation rule of § 170(f)(8) bars deduction of contribution of
amounts donated in 1997 and 1998 to the National Heritage Foundation to pay premiums on charitable
split-dollar life insurance. The NHF gave taxpayers receipts that stated they received no consideration.
Under the arrangement, the NHF was to pay $36,000 per year for twelve years (90 percent of the $40,000
annual premium) in return for 56 percent of the initial death benefit; the Addis Trust was to pay $4,000
per year in return for 44 percent of the initial death benefit plus projected increases in the death benefit.
Of course, the reason NHF entered into this arrangement is the taxpayers contributed $36,000 per year to
it. The court of appeals concluded its opinion as follows: "The deterrence value of section 170(f)(8)'s
total denial of a deduction comports with the effective administration of a self-assessment and selfreporting system."
*
In 1999, § 170(f)(10) was added to the Code, which disallows
deductions for funds transferred to charities which are used to pay premiums on life insurance with respect to
the transferor, and levies a 100 percent excise tax on the premium payments to boot.
1.
Section 882 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends §§ 170(e)(1) and 6050L which
limits the amount of the deduction to the lesser of fair market value or the donor's basis in the property.
This limitation was enacted because Congress was concerned that "taxpayers with intellectual property
are taking advantage of the inherent difficulties in valuing such property and are preparing or obtaining
erroneous valuations. In such cases, the charity receives an asset of questionable value, while the taxpayer
receives a significant tax benefit." H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. 1, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (2004).
0
Because intellectual property often has no basis in the hands of its
creator, to retain an incentive for donations of valuable intellectual property, Congress added new § 170(m),
which allows the donor an additional deduction equal to a portion of the income recognized by the donee with
respect to the donated intellectual property, reduced by the amount allowable as a deduction in the year the
property was donated. The amount of the additional deduction is based on a sliding scale that allows a
tentative deduction equal to 100 percent of the income attributable to the donated property in the first two
years after the contribution. In the third year and every year thereafter the percentage of the income eligible for
the additional deduction is reduced by 10 percent each year, but remains at 10 percent for the twelfth taxable
ending after the contribution. However, § 170(m)(4) provides that no additional deduction is allowed with
respect to income received or accrued by the donee after the tenth anniversary of the donation, which renders
the additional deduction for the twelfth taxable year illusory except in very narrow circumstances in which the
donor and donee have different taxable years. The additional deduction based on the donee's income from the
property is allowed only to the extent the aggregate tentative deductions calculated under the formula exceed
the amount of the initial deduction claimed in the year the property was contributed. Assume that the donor
properly claimed a deduction of $500,000 with respect to a contribution of intellectual property, and the

property generates $400,000 of income in the first year. The donor's deduction will be limited to the $500,000
basis and no additional deduction attributable to the income generated by the property will be allowed. If in
the second year the property generates $300,000 of income, the donor will be able to deduct an additional
$200,000 as a result of that income, because $200,000 is the amount by which the total income generated by
the property ($700,000) exceeds the amount the donor previously deducted ($500,000). As a result of the
sliding scale, if in the third year the property generates income of $100,000, the donor will be able to deduct
only an additional $90,000 (90 percent).
a
The intellectual property with respect to which the additional
deduction under § 170(m) is allowed generally includes patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, trade names,
trade secrets, know-how, some software and applications or registrations for such property but excludes
property donated to many private foundations. The donor must inform the donee at the time of the
contribution that she intends to use this provision.
a.
T.D. 9206, 70 F.R. 29450 (5/23/05). Temporary regulations on qualified
intellectual property contributions. REG-158138-04, 70 F.R. 29460 provides identical proposed
regulations.
(1)
Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1203. Related guidance
including notification requirements.
2.
Section 883 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 170(f) by adding new paragraph
11 that codifies reporting requirements for contributions of property valued at more than $5,000 and
includes contributors that are C corporations in these reporting requirements. Section 170(f)(1 1) applies a
series of increasingly stringent substantiation requirements to contributions of property, excluding motor
vehicles, which are subject to the even more stringent requirements of new § 170(f)(12), and readily
valued property such as cash, publicly traded stock, and inventory. If the claimed deduction is between
$501 and $5,000, the taxpayer's return (other than certain corporate returns) must include a description of
the property and such other information as is required by regulations. If the claimed deduction is between
$5,001 and $500,000 the taxpayer must also obtain a qualified appraisal of the property and attach to the
return whatever information is required by regulations. If the claimed deduction is more than $500,000
the qualified appraisal must also be attached to the return. To prevent taxpayers from dividing property
into component parts in an attempt to avoid the dollar thresholds, § 170(f)(I )(F) provides that similar
items of property donated to one or more donees are treated as one property.
3.
Does new § 170(f)(12) close the door to inflated deductions for motor vehicle
contributions? Or, is the door left open wide enough to drive a truck [or other vehicle] through it?
Section 884 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 170(f) by adding new paragraph 12 that requires written
acknowledgment of contributions of motor vehicles, boats and airplanes that include the amount of the
gross proceeds from any arm's length sale and a statement that the deduction may not exceed such
amount. Its enactment was prompted by congressional concern that taxpayers who were donating used
cars to charities were claiming deductions that far exceeded the amounts that the charities were receiving
following the sale, often at auction, of the cars. Section 170(d)(12) applies if the claimed deduction is
more than $500 and provides different rules depending on what the donee charity does with the vehicle. If
the donee uses the vehicle or materially improves it, the taxpayer must obtain from the donee, and include
with the tax return, a contemporaneous written acknowledgment that provides certain identifying
information and certifies the intended use or material improvement of the vehicle, states the intended
duration of the use, and certifies that the vehicle will not be transferred or exchanged for money before
the termination of such use or improvement. In this case the amount of the deduction is not affected.
However, if the donee sells the vehicle without any significant intervening use or material improvement,
the deduction cannot be more than the gross proceeds received from the sale, and other substantiation
requirements apply. In addition to the other requirements, the donee's contemporaneous written
acknowledgment must certify that the vehicle was sold in an arms-length transaction to unrelated parties,
state the gross proceeds from the sale, and inform the donor taxpayer that the deductible amount may not
exceed the gross proceeds.
0
Donees that fail to furnish the required acknowledgment or furnish
a false or fraudulent acknowledgment are subject to a penalty under § 6720, which was also added in 2004.
For vehicles sold without intervening use or improvement the penalty is at least the gross proceeds from the
sale but could be as much as the sales price on the acknowledgment multiplied by the highest marginal rate
under §I if that is higher. For other vehicles the penalty is the greater of $5,000 or the claimed value of the
vehicle multiplied by the highest marginal rate under § 1
a.
How much use is "substantial" when a charity uses a donated vehicle
in its own endeavors? Notice 2005-44, 2005-25 I.R.B. 1287 (6/20/05). The Notice provides interim

guidance under the new rules for motor vehicle charitable contribution deductions. The most interesting
examples are those where the charity puts the vehicle to use in delivering meals on wheels, where the
question is whether the use is a "significant intervening use." Example 6 says use of the vehicle to deliver
meals only a few times is not. Example 7 says that use of the vehicle to deliver meals every day for one
year is. Example 8 says that driving the vehicle to deliver meals a total of 10,000 miles over a one-year
period is.
4.
Glass v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 16 (5/25/05), held that the contribution of a
perpetual conservation easement that restricted development of certain portions of the taxpayers'
lakefront residential lot, but which did not otherwise affect the taxpayers' use or enjoyment of the
property, was a qualified conservation contribution under § 170(h) because it protected a relatively
natural habitat of specifically identified wildlife, including bald eagles, and plants.
5.
Eight revenue procedures that contain sample CRUT declarations of various
sorts make it just a little bit easier to give. Revenue Procedures 2005-52 through 2005-59, 2005-34
I.R.B. 326, 339, 353, 367, 383, 392, 402 & 412, respectively (8/22/05). Sample charitable remainder
unitrust declarations that meet the requirements of § 664.
Glass v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 16 (2005), held that the contribution of a perpetual
conservation easement that restricted development of certain portions of the taxpayers' lakefront
residential lot, but which did not otherwise affect the taxpayers' use or enjoyment of the
property, was a qualified conservation contribution under § 170(h) because it protected a
relatively natural habitat of specifically identified wildlife, including bald eagles, and plants.
6.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, "qualified disaster contributions" made between
8/28/05 and 12/31/05 will be deductible without regard to the 50-percent-of-AGI limit.
7.
Under the Katrina Tax Act, charitable deductions for contributions of food
inventory would be permitted up to the lesser of (i) fair market value or (ii) twice basis; the same
permitted deduction would apply to contribution of book inventory to public schools. Effective for
contributions made between 8/28/05 and 12/31/05.
X.

TAX PROCEDURE
A.
Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1.
More Tax Court jurisdiction over interest calculations despite §§ 6512(b)(2)
and 6402. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 2 (7/13/04). After the Tax Court had
determined the amount by which the taxpayer had "overpaid" estate tax, in making the refund the
Commissioner offset asserted assessed but unpaid underpayment interest. The majority, in a reviewed
opinion by Judge Ruwe, held that for purposes of determining an overpayment of tax pursuant to
§ 6512(b), the proper tax includes underpayment interest and that the amount of an overpayment is the
amount by which payments exceed the tax, including any underpayment interest. As a matter of law, the
Tax Court's prior decision that the estate overpaid its estate tax by $238,847.24 took into account
underpayment interest as part of the calculation in arriving at the amount of an overpayment.
Accordingly, the Tax Court had jurisdiction over the taxpayer's motion to enforce its order that the IRS
refund $238,847.24. Section 6512(b)(2) does not apply to bar Tax Court jurisdiction over interest
determinations where a final decision in the same case precludes the existence of the interest liabilities to
which the Commissioner attempts to apply the overpayment. There were a number of overlapping
concurrences and five dissents. The dissents were based on the proposition that the majority's holding
exceeded the Tax Court's statutory jurisdiction because the Tax Court's prior order had merely approved
Rule 155 computations that, as is customary, did not include underpayment interest owed.
2.
The "common law" rule that one country does not prosecute for violation of
another country's tax law was not violated here. Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766
(4/26/05) (5-4). Criminal convictions for wire fraud in connection with the transportation of liquor from
the U.S. into Canada without paying Canadian excise taxes were affirmed. The majority opinion by
Justice Thomas held that the "common law revenue rule" [as it existed when the wire fraud statute was
enacted in 1952] under which the tax liabilities of one sovereign will not be enforced by those of another
sovereign, i.e. the rule bars "collection of tax obligations of foreign nations," is not violated by this
prosecution for wire fraud because the dominant characteristic of the case was the prosecution of fraud,
and not foreign tax collection.
3.
Rev. Proc. 2005-34, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1233 (5/20/05). This revenue procedure sets
forth procedures for appeals of proposed trust fund recovery penalty assessments arising under § 6672,

updated to reflect amendments made by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, P.L. 104-168. Effective for penalties
proposed on or after 5/20/05.
But will he be a "survivor" in the U.S. Court for the District of Rhode
4.
Island? www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr,/2005iSeptcmber/05 tax 463.htm published a Justice Department news
release, dated 9/8/05, announcing that Richard Hatch was indicted on charges of tax evasion for failing to
report about $1,037,000 dollars of income from the television reality series and about $391,000 of income
from other sources.
Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
B.
Honi soit qui mal y pense. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 2005-1
1.
3/30/05). The district court ruled that only one of 267 documents withheld
U.S.T.C. 50,264 (N.D. Ill.
from IRS scrutiny by the intervenors were unprotected by privilege or work produce, or both. 8 In ruling
that the crime-fraud exception did not apply, Judge Holderman found that neither the existence of cookiecutter tax opinions nor the IRS listing of substantially similar transactions as abusive tax shelters by the
IRS was determinative because "the tax code and underlying regulations is [sic] full of complexities and
uncertainties." He further stated that "just because one of BDO's consulting agreements has been found to
have [been] fraudulent does not mean that all consulting agreements entered into by BDO were
fraudulent."
*
Judge Holderman found the test for the § 7525(b) tax shelter
exception to be the same as for the crime-fraud exception.
*
Footnote 2 of the opinion sets forth the categories of information
contained in the privilege log. Inasmuch as the adequacy of another privilege log in this litigation was
questioned, the categories in this privilege log might be a useful guide.
a.
Subsequently, at 2005-2 U.S.T.C. 50,447; 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2835
(N.D. I1l. 5/17/05), Judge Holderman found the remaining document examined in camera presented a
prima facie case for being not privileged by reason of the crime-fraud exception, and the intervenors
failed to present sufficient explanation to rebut that presumption. The document involved an investment
in distressed debt with the sole motive of obtaining a loss for tax purposes.
0
The government had argued that "document A-40 is not part of
legitimate year-end tax planning, but instead is part of the overall abusive sham tax shelter transaction
perpetrated by BDO and invested in by Intervenor Cullio and others."
2.
Jade Trading LLC v. United States, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,320 (Fed. Cl. 4/22/05).
The court (Judge Williams) held that any claim of executive privilege for background materials relating to
the IRS's publication of Notice 2000-44 on 8/13/00 (relating to the son-of-Boss transaction) and relating
to Treasury's publication of Reg. § 1.701-2 on 5/17/94 (in proposed form) and on 12/29/94 (in final form)
had to be asserted only after personal consideration by the Commissioner and the Secretary, respectively.
*
Note that Judge Williams uses the appellation "IRS Code" in her
opinion.
a.
In another opinion on the same date, Judge Williams denied BDO
Seidman's motion to quash a subpoena requesting "all Form 1040 cover pages, Schedule D and Schedule
K-1 for the years 1999-2000" for 46 BDO clients who are not parties to the Jade Trading case [in order to
ascertain the amount of capital gains and losses claimed by these taxpayers and the dates on which they
were incurred] because § 6103 only prohibits disclosure of taxpayer return information "filed with" or
"received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by" Treasury and the IRS, and also
because courts in tax cases have required brokers to produce records of other customers who used the
same broker. Copies of tax returns given to BDO by its clients do not fall within the prohibition of
§ 6103,
Litigation Costs
C.
1.
The Commissioner concedes the substantive issue and that a § 7430 award is
proper, but the taxpayer still loses because of the fee structure. Grigoraci v. Commissioner, 122 T.C.
No. 14 (3/25/04). The taxpayer prevailed in an earlier case involving the same issue [employment taxes]
for an earlier year. On the basis of that decision, the Commissioner conceded the substantive issue in the
instant case and that the taxpayer was entitled to recover costs. However, Judge Thornton denied the
taxpayer's claim for amounts in excess of the filing fee on two grounds: (1) the taxpayer's obligation to
pay any fees that had been billed to him was contingent on receiving a fee award, and § 7430 does not
authorize an award of contingent fees); and (2) the fees related to the first Tax Court case involving the
8 The unprotected document was an e-mail sent by a BDO employee.

taxpayer, § 7430 does not authorize awarding fees that relate to an earlier case involving the taxpayer,
even if the earlier case involved the same issue for a different year.
0
Query whether an attorney's fee award under § 7430 constitutes
income to the taxpayer.
D.
Statutory Notice
1.
A notice of determination gives the Tax Court jurisdiction, even if the notice
is invalid. Myong Soo Kim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-96 (5/3/05). The IRS erroneously issued
an invalid notice of determination on a collection action under § 6330, when it should have issued a
decision letter. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) denied the Commissioner's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, but did grant the Commissioner summary judgment because the § 6330 hearing request was
not made within the 30-day period following the issuance of the notice of intent to levy.
E.
Statute of Limitations
1.
The statute of limitations when taxpayers litigate identity privilege issues in
lawsuits against their tax advisers. John Doe 1 v. KPMG LLP, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,270, 93
A.F.T.R.2d 2004-1808 (N.D. Tex. 4/2/04). Judge Barefoot Sanders denied the government's motion to
require the John Doe taxpayers to sign consents to extend the statute of limitations, but found instead that
the statute was suspended.
*
Query why the court did not dismiss taxpayers' lawsuit unless they
filed consents to extend the statute of limitations.
a.
United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 2004-1 U.S.T.C.
50,281; 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004- 2106 (D. D.C. 5/4/04), Judge Hogan adopts the rationale of KMPG (N.D.
Texas), and finds that the statute of limitations was similarly suspended during the pendency of the
action.
b.
John Doe 1 reversed on appeal by the Fifth Circuit; equitable tolling
is inapplicable as an exception to the statute of limitations. John Doe 1 v. United States, 398 F.3d 686
(5th Cir. 1/26/05). Judge Jones held that equitable tolling is unavailable to extend the § 6501statute of
limitations. She further held that the general jurisdiction granted by § 7402(a) to district courts to issue
appropriate orders to enforce the internal revenue laws does not "authorize[] a court to inject an equitable
tolling provision into a detailed, highly specific provision (Section 6501)."
2.
Another tax procedure song from the Supremes. United States v. Galletti, 124
S. Ct. 1548, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-1425, 2004-1 U.S.T.C.
50,204 (3/23/04). A unanimous Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that a valid assessment of an employment tax deficiency
against a partnership extends the 10-year statute of limitation on judicially colleting the tax against the
general partners individually, even thought here had been no individual assessments against the partners
within three years.
3.
No refund of paid but unassessed taxes. Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc. v.
United States, 371 F.3d 1350, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-2543, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,266 (11th Cir. 6/7/04).
The court of appeals, Judge Edenfield, held that the statue of limitation on refunds [on employment taxes
in this case] under § 6511 runs from the later of payment or the due date of return even if IRS fails to
make a timely assessment of taxes. A payment due, owning, and made is not an "overpayment" under
§ 6401(a) merely because the IRS failed to formally assess the tax after it was paid.
4.
Why did the IRS contest this one? The statutory language is clear. Zarky v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 6 (7/20/04). The taxpayer failed to file a return, received a deficiency notice,
and filed a Tax Court petition within three years after the return due date. The Tax Court determined that
the taxpayer had overpaid his taxes by the amount that had been withheld [$270]. Normally, under
§ 6511 (b)(2) and § 6512(b) where a refund claim has not been field within three years of filing a return,
the refund is limited to amounts paid within two years prior to filing the claim. The second paragraph of
flush language of § 6512(b)(2), added in 1997 provides a special limitation if a taxpayer who fails to file a
return receives a deficiency notice and files a Tax Court petition within three years after the due date of
the return; in this case the taxpayer may obtain a refund of an overpayment for the year of the asserted
deficiency if the overpayment was made within three years prior to the date of the deficiency notice. In
this case, Judge Laro applied the special rules to order refund of overpaid withholding taxes for the year
of the asserted deficiency because the withholding was deemed paid on April 15, which was within three
years prior to the date of the deficiency notice.
F.
Liens and Collections
1.
Tax Court review of collection due process hearings is not perfunctory.
Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-163 (7/13/04). In reviewing the IRS's rejection of the

taxpayer's offer in compromise in a collection due process hearing, Judge Gerber held that the rejection
was an abuse of discretion because in considering whether the taxpayer could make installment payments
the Appeals Officer relied solely on national average statistics to determine living expenses rather than
taking taxpayer's actual expenses into account.
2.
Tax Court makes it easier to find abuse of discretion in collection due
process hearings. Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 TC. No. 5 (7/20/04). In 1995, the taxpayer had
entered into an offer in compromise (based on doubts as to collectibility) relating to years prior to 1992,
which required that he file timely returns for 1995 through 1999. The returns for 1995 through 1997 were
timely filed, but the 1998 return was never received. The taxpayer and his accountant claimed that on the
day the 1998 return was due, his accountant prepared it, the taxpayer signed it, and the accountant mailed
it using a private postage meter [Uh-oh]. The IRS declared the compromise in default. After a due process
hearing in which the taxpayer claimed good faith compliance and offered alternative proof of mailing,
including a copy of the 1998 return, the Appeals Officer issued a notice of determination to proceed with
collection, because the Appeals Officer would accept only a certified or registered mail receipt as proof of
mailing. Even though the Tax Court's review of collection due process hearings is for abuse of discretion,
in a reviewed opinion by Judge Vasquez (in which 5 judges joined), the Tax Court held that it may
consider evidence presented at trial that was not in the administrative record (but not new issues). The
court held that the Administrative Procedures Act review provisions do not apply to § 6330(d)
proceedings, and admitted taxpayer's testimony that he signed and delivered returns to his accountant for
mailing, the accountant's testimony regarding the procedures used to mail the return, and other evidence
not in the administrative record indicating that the return was mailed. Although the testimony was
admitted, it did not prove timely mailing because the accountant used a private meter and the return was
not received, until several years later when the copy was delivered to Appeals. Nevertheless, the court
held that the taxpayer did not materially breach the offer in compromise and that the Appeals Officer
abused his discretion in declaring the compromise in default. There were an indescribable number of
overlapping concurrences by an additional nine judges, in some of which the five "majority" judges
joined, and one of which concurring opinions was supported by more judges than supported the
"majority" opinion; there were three dissents.
a.
Chief Counsel's response. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2004-031 (9/1/04).
Deborah Butler provides guidance to Chief Counsel attorneys as to how to handle Collection Due Process
cases in light of Robinette. The recommended course of action when such evidence is presented to the
court is to ask for a remand of the case to Appeals for a supplemental determination.
3.
Tithes are allowed for people in the pulpit, but not for those in the pews.
Unless it is a requirement of ministerial employment, tithes to the church are disallowed in an offer
in compromise computation of ability to pay. Pixley v.Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 15 (9/15/04).
Ordained Baptist minister was not entitled to claim tithes to the church as expenses on an offer in
compromise in Appeals where he was not currently employed as a minister and such tithes were therefore
not required as "a condition of employment."
4.
A trap for the unwary deprives Tax Court of jurisdiction with respect to a
petition for lien or levy action. Prevo v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 326 (12/14/04). The Tax Court held it
lacked jurisdiction with respect to a petition for lien or levy action filed by taxpayer after she filed a
voluntary bankruptcy petition because the Tax Court petition for lien or levy action was filed in violation
of the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic stay. Judge Gerber stated
Unfortunately here, where the petition in bankruptcy was voluntary, petitioner has fallen
victim to a trap for the unwary. As the notice of determination was issued to petitioner on
February 23, 2004, petitioner normally would have had 30 days -- until March 24, 2004 to file a timely petition for lien or levy action with the Court. However, upon the filing
of the bankruptcy petition on March 1, 2004, the automatic stay was invoked, and
petitioner was barred from commencing a proceeding in this Court. n4 Further, the
automatic stay remained in effect until March 31, 2004 -- 7 days after the 30-day
statutory filing period under sections 6320(c) and 6330(d) expired. Thus, but for the
provisions of section 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) and the lack of a tolling provision
analogous to section 6213(f), this Court would have jurisdiction over this case. n5
n4 Had petitioner first filed a petition with this Court and then filed a
bankruptcy petition, the proceeding before this Court would have been

active and then stayed, thereby preserving petitioner's ability to contest
respondent's determination.
n5 See, however, sec. 6330(d), which provides in part: "If a court
determines that the appeal was to an incorrect court, a person shall have
30 days after the court determination to file such appeal with the correct
court". We do not decide herein whether our determination in this
opinion that we lacked jurisdiction over the petition filed during the
pendency of petitioner's bankruptcy case means that we are or are not the
"incorrect" court for purposes of the above-quoted flush language. If we
were the "incorrect" court, petitioner would have 30 days from the date
decision is entered in this case to refile in the "correct" court. That issue,
however, is not currently before the Court and was not briefed by the
parties.
But the trap does not exist where the IRS issued its notices after the
a.
taxpayer filed a bankruptcy petition. Smith v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 3 (2/8/05). Judge Gerber
distinguished the Prevo case, and held the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because the IRS notices were
void because they violated the automatic stay under bankruptcy law.
Judge Wherry places limits on the use of CDP hearings for delay by
5.
permitting continued collection and imposing a penalty under § 6673. Burke v. Commissioner, 124
T.C. No. 11 (4/12/05). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) holds that the IRS may continue collecting by levy
an individual's unpaid taxes during the pendency of his hearings and appeals. This is possible when the
IRS shows good cause, which is satisfied because taxpayer's liability was determined in previous
litigation and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, and he used the collection review procedure to espouse
frivolous and groundless arguments to delay collection. Judge Wherry also imposed a $2,500 penalty
under § 6673 for delay.
Innocent Spouse
G.
Well, the former spouses weren't totally antagonistic. He supported her
1.
innocent spouse claim. Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. No. 7 (7/22/04). The taxpayer filed a
stand-alone Tax Court petition seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of innocent spouse relief
under § 6015(f). The IRS issued her former husband a notice of filing petition and right to intervene that
stated that his right to intervene was limited to intervening solely for the purpose of challenging the
taxpayer's right to innocent spouse relief. Her former husband intervened to support her claim. Judge
Panuthos held that neither § 6015 nor Tax Court Rule 325 precludes a nonelecting spouse from
intervening for the purpose of supporting the electing spouse's claim for relief.
The Commissioner cannot hide the ball in a notice of offset, and then claim
2.
that the notice starts the two-year period within which innocent spouse relief must be sought.
McGee v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 314 (10/18/04). Section 6015(b)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(B) provides that
requests for relief under each of these two subsections must be made not later than 2 years after "the
Secretary has begun collection activities." The Commissioner sent notices to the taxpayer that refunds
were being offset against the joint tax liability, but such notices did not advise the taxpayer of her right to
seek relief under § 6015, and the taxpayer did not learn of such rights until the statutory period expired
for seeking such relief after a collection activity. The Commissioner contended that the notices of offset
constituted collection activity which began the running of the limitations period, but the offset notices
were not collection-related and thus did not require an advisement of § 6015 rights. The Tax Court (Judge
Cohen) held that the denial of innocent spouse relief as time-barred was an abuse of discretion since the
application of the time limitation was based on the Commissioner's inconsistent meanings of collection.
The offset was clearly a collection action, and thus the notices of offset were collection-related notices
which required an advisement of the taxpayer's rights under § 6015. The Commissioner's failure to
provide the required notice therefore precluded any finding that the limitations period began to run from
the date of the offsets.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2005-010 (5/20/05). The IRS should not
a.
defend cases similar to McGee pending the issuance of procedures to ensure that future refund offsets will
include notice to the taxpayer of the right to claim § 6015 relief.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2005-011 (5/20/05). FAQs related to litigating
b.
§ 6015 cases. Five topics are covered: (1) the nonpetitioning spouse; (2) the suspension of the collection
statute when the taxpayer files a § 6015 claim; (3) the effect of agreements between the IRS and the

requesting spouse; (4) the actual knowledge defense to a § 6015(c) claim; and (5) procedures under Chief
Counsel Notice CC-2004-026.
H.
Miscellaneous
1.
Burton Kanter in trouble again. Investment Research Associates, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407 (12/15/99). In a 600-page opinion Burton Kanter was held liable
for the §6653 fraud penalty by reason of his being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate
scheme with respect to the kickback income payments .... In our view, what we have here, purely and
simply, is a concerted effort by an experienced tax lawyer [Kanter] and two corporate executives [Claude
Ballard and Robert Lisle] to defeat and evade the payments of taxes and to cover up their illegal acts so
that the corporations [employing the two corporate executives] and the Federal Government would be
unable to discover them."
a.
So far, he is unable to wriggle out, the way he did 25 years ago when
he was acquitted by a jury.9 The taxpayers subsequently moved to have access to the special trial
judge's "reports, draft opinions, or similar documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They
based their motion on conversations with two unnamed' 0 Tax Court judges that the original draft opinion
from the special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he adopted it. They were turned down
because the Tax Court held that the documents were related to its internal deliberative processes. See, Tax
Court Order denying motion, 2001 TNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on reconsideration) 2001 TNT 23-30
(8/30/00). Taxpayers sought mandamus from the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, but were
unsuccessful.
b.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d
1037, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,246, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-928 (1 1th Cir. 2/13/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1999407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that
changes allegedly made by the Tax Court Special Trial Judge were improper. Judge Fay stated:
Even assuming Dick's [taxpayers' lawyer's] affidavit to be true and affording PetitionersAppellants all reasonable inferences, the process utilized in this case does not give rise to
due process concern. While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be unique to that
court, there is nothing unusual about judges conferring with one another about cases
assigned to them. These conferences are an essential part of the judicial process when, by
statute, more than one judge is charged with the responsibility of deciding the case. And,
as a result of such conferences, judges sometimes change their original position or
thoughts. Whether Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is without import insofar as our analysis of the
alleged due process violation pertaining to the application of [Tax Court] Rule 183 is
concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will simply not interfere with another court's
deliberative process.
The record reveals, and we accept as true, that the underlying report adopted by the Tax
Court is Special Trial Judge Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have not demonstrated
that the Order of August 30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any manner. Therefore, we
conclude that the application of Rule 183 in this case did not violate PetitionersAppellants' due process rights. Accordingly, we deny the request for relief and save for
another day the more troubling question of what would have occurred had Special Trial
Judge Couvillion not indicated that the report adopted by the Tax Court accurately
reflected his findings and opinion.
E.

And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer

Kanter's Estate" loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit Estate of Kanter v.
9 His partner (and son-in-law) was convicted and imprisoned. See United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).
10 Kanter's attorney revealed the names of the two judges when asked at oral argument to the Seventh Circuit as
Tax Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at footnote I of Judge
Cudahy's dissent in the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.
I Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.

Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 2003 U.S.T.C. 50,605, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5459 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per
curiam) (2-1), aff'g in part and rev 'g in part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The court finds the nondisclosure of
the special trial judge's original report to be proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballardopinion. It
affirms the findings on deficiencies, fraud and penalties, but reverses on the issue of the deductibility of
Kanter's expenses for his involvement in the aborted sale of a purported John Trumball painting of
George Washington because "Kanter has shown a distinct proclivity to seek income and profit through
activities similar to the failed sale of the painting."
d.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but taxpayer Lisle's
Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341
F.3d 364, 2003 U.S.T.C. 50,606, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5566 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), aff'g in part andrev'g in
part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits on the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original report by the Tax Court. It affirms the
findings of deficiencies, except for the deficiency in a closed year because the government's proof of
Lisle's fraud did not rise to the level of "clear and convincing evidence."
e.
Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges: "You Article I judges don't
understand your own rules, so let me tell you what you meant when you adopted them in 1983."
Ballard v. Commissioner, 2005 TNT 44-12, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2403 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and
remanding 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice Ginsburg held
that the Tax Court may not exclude from the record on appeal nor conceal from the taxpayers the original
draft reports of Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b). Justice Ginsburg so held because no
statute authorizes the concealment and the rule's "current text" does not warrant it. Her reading of Tax
Court Rule 183 is that it does not authorize the Tax Court to treat the special trial judge's Rule 183(b)
report as a draft subject to collaborative revision. She held that it is particularly important that the process
be transparent in fraud cases such as this one.
9
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice
Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we should defer to
the interpretation of that court." He concludes that "Seminole Rock deference" [Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)] should extend to an Article I court's interpretation of its own rules as well as
to an executive agency's interpretation of its rules. He further notes that the issue of compliance with Rule 183
was not presented to the Supreme Court, and that under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) the "Court does not
consider claims that are not included within a petitioner's questions presented." He notes, "Only by failing to
abide by our own Rules can the Court hold that the Tax Court failed to follow its Rules."
f.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit remands
the case to the Tax Court. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 5/9/05).
g.
... while the Eleventh Circuit orders that the Special Trial Judge's
report be added to the record. Ballard v. Commissioner, 2005 TNT 99-26 (11th Cir. 5/17/05). The 300page report may be found at 2005 TNT 107-16.
h.
Tax Court proposes new rule on Special Trial Judges' reports. On
July 7 Tax Court Chief Judge Joel Gerber announced that the court proposes to amend its rules to provide
(in proposed Rule 183) substantially the same procedure it had before the 1983 change, which would
allow parties to review and file objections to a special trial judge's recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law before the case is reassigned to a presidentially appointed judge for decision.
i.
Tax Court releases judges' statements. In an order dated 7/19/05,
Chief Judge Gerber of the Tax Court released statements from Chief Judge Cohen, Judge Dawson and
Special Trial Judge Couvillion outlining the procedures followed in the submission, review and adoption
of the memorandum opinion in Investment Research Associates, Ltd.. The statements were that the
proposed report submitted by the Special Trial Judge was deemed unsatisfactory by Judge Dawson and
then-Chief Judge Cohen in that the facts found did not support the proposed opinion. After the Chief
Judge's request that Judge Jacobs take charge of the matter was declined because Kanter's lawyer was a
close friend, Judge Couvillion withdrew the proposed report the day before a scheduled meeting with
Judge Dawson and Chief Judge Cohen. Following the withdrawal, Judge Dawson and Special Trial Judge
Couvillion collaborated on the report.
j.
More fallout from the Ballard decision. The Tax Court identified and
located 117 initial opinions submitted by Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b). 2005 TNT
175-2 (9/8/05). Four of the opinions were changed (other than that in Ballard), with the changes resulting
in taxpayer-favorable holdings in three of the four. There is a dispute as to what happened in Johnson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-369, with taxpayer's attorney recalling that Special Trial Judge
Goldberg congratulated him at the Tax Court's November 1992 on his win in the case, and seemed

surprised when taxpayer's attorney responded that he had lost the case; Special Trial Judge Goldberg
disputes that the conversation took place.
2.
To the IRS, he was never a window. Payne v. United States, 2005-1 U.S.T.C.
50,327 (5th Cir. 9/8/04) (unpublished per curiam opinion), aff'g 290 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
Affirms district court denial of damages for alleged unlawful disclosure of confidential tax return
information during an IRS criminal investigation because the disclosures resulted from the IRS agent's
good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
3.
Proposed regulations reject the mailbox rule and hold that - absent actual
delivery - only registered or certified mail will suffice as proof. REG-138176-02, proposed
regulations under § 7502 to provide that a registered or certified mail receipt is the only prima facie
evidence of delivery of documents that have a filing deadline prescribed by the internal revenue laws other than direct proof of actual delivery, 69 F.R. 56377 (9/21/04).
a.
But taxpayers can still prevail based upon the mailbox rule. Why did
taxpayers' lawyer play games with love by not taking the petition to the post office? Grossman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-164 (7/5/05). The envelope sent by certified mail that contained
taxpayer's petition to the Tax Court was timely postmarked by a private postage meter but was received
by the court after the 90-day period for filing prescribed by § 6213(a). Taxpayer submitted evidence of a
delay in delivery of this letter by reason of misdirection and irradiation to eliminate anthrax spores, as
well as the testimony of their lawyer's office manager that she mailed the petition on the date it was
postmarked by the private postage meter. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that taxpayers met their
burden of proof that their mailing was timely.
4.
Section 842 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 6603 to codify the existing
treatment of deposits made to suspend the running of interest on potential underpayments. These deposits
had been governed by Rev. Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 C.B. 501.
5.
Section 881 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new §§ 6306 and 7433A to permit
"qualified tax collection contracts" to be entered into with persons who are not IRS employees, and to
provide damages for certain unauthorized collection actions by such persons.
6.
You have a choice of forum for review of the Commissioner's refusal to
abate interest. Beall v. United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5001 (5th Cir. 6/27/03). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Garwood) held that a district court has jurisdiction in a refund suit to review for abuse of
discretion the Commissioner's refusal to abate interest. Judge Garwood reasoned that the grant of
jurisdiction to the Tax Court in § 6404(h) was not exclusive.
a.
But not in the Court of Federal Claims, which holds that Beall is not
the "be all and end all" on this issue. Hinck v. United States, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,270 (Fed. Cl.
2/3/05). Judge Allegra held that the 1996 amendments to § 6404 gave the Tax Court jurisdiction to review
the failure to abate interest under the "abuse of discretion" standard. Before 1996 the Federal courts did
not have jurisdiction to review abatement decisions, and the 1996 amendments to § 6404 did not do so.
The Court of Federal Claims disagrees with, and refuses to follow, the Beall case.
7.
At least the embezzler died in prison. ILM 200519081, 2005 TNT 93-51
(1/28/05). The victim of an embezzler who used the money to make estimated tax payments towards his
own income tax liability cannot recover the money from the IRS. The victim's only remedy is from the
embezzler's estate, assuming that it prevails in a tax refund suit.
8.
"It is an ill wind...." Notice 2005-66, 2005-40 I.R.B. (9/9/05). The IRS has
postponed until 1/3/06 tax return filing and payment deadlines for taxpayers affected by Hurricane
Katrina, i.e., taxpayers in three counties in Florida, six counties in Alabama, 52 counties in Mississippi
and 64 parishes in Louisiana. the postponement was granted pursuant to § 7508A, which grants the IRS
authority to postpone for a period of up to one year the time for performance of the acts listed in
§ 7508(a) by taxpayers affected by a Presidentially-declared disaster.
a.
IR-2005-112 (8/28/05) and Notice 2005-73; 2005 IRB LEXIS 374;
2005-42 I.R.B. (9/21/05). Pursuant to the Katrina Tax Act, the deadlines to file tax returns, pay taxes,
and perform other time-sensitive acts is postponed until 2/28/06 for taxpayer affected by Hurricane
Katrina. 2005 TNT 188-13.
XI.

WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A.
Employment Taxes
1.
Section 251 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends various Code sections to provide
that employment taxes (including withholding) are not required with respect to the spread on the exercise
of incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plan stock options. This spread is includable for
AMT purposes, but not for regular income tax purposes.

*
There has been for the past several years a freeze in effect on the
collection of employment taxes on the exercise of qualified options.
Although the exercise of a statutory stock option does not result in
a.
taxable income, it does result in wages for FICA /FUTA purposes - but not until 2003. REG142686-01, Application of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and
Collection of Income Tax at Source to Statutory Stock Options, 66 F.R. 57023 (11/14/01), issued as
provided in Notice 2001-14, 2001-6 I.R.B. 516. Prop. Regs. §§ 31.3121(a)-1(k), 31.3306(b)-1(/), and
31.3401(a)-1 (b)(15) would provide that the holder of a statutory stock option [§ 422 ISO or § 423 ESPP]
receives wages for FICA and FUTA purposes upon exercise of the option, but no withholding is required
because no gross income has been received. The amount of the wages received is the excess of the fair
market value of the stock over the amount paid. The IRS will develop "rules of administrative
convenience" permitting employers to deem the wages to have been paid on a specific date or over a
specific period of time.
b.
Notice 2001-73, 2001-49 I.R.B. 549 (12/3/01). The IRS announced and
requested comments on proposed "rules of administrative convenience" permitting employers to deem the
wages to have been paid on a specific date for FICA and FUTA purposes. FICA and FUTA wages could
be treated as paid on a pay period, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, or on another basis.
Notice 2001-72, 2001-49 I.R.B. 548 (12/3/01). The IRS announced and
c.
requested comments on proposed rules regarding the employer's income tax withholding and reporting
obligations on the sale by an employee of stock received pursuant to exercise of a statutory stock option.
The employer is not required to withhold, but is required to report if the amount is at least $600, unless
the employer has made reasonable efforts to determine if reporting is necessary and has been unable to do
so.
IRS extends moratorium on assessment of employment taxes on
d.
stock options for two more years. Notice 2002-47, 2002-28 I.R.B. 97 (6/25/02). Pending the completion
of its review and the issuance of further guidance, the IRS will not assess FICA or FUTA taxes (nor will
it seek federal income tax withholding) upon the exercise of a statutory stock option or disposition of
stock acquired by an employee pursuant to the exercise of a statutory stock option. The notice further
provides that it is contemplated that any final guidance that would apply employment taxes to statutory
stock options will not apply to exercises of statutory stock options that occur before the January 1 of the
year that follows the second anniversary of the publication of the final guidance.
e.
Congress makes the world safe for ISOs and ESPP stock options
(except for the AMT). Section 251 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends various Code sections to provide
that employment taxes (including withholding) are not required with respect to the spread on the exercise
of incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plan stock options. This spread is includable for
AMT purposes, but not for regular income tax purposes.
When it's over, it should be over completely. Withdrawal of Notice of
f.
Proposed Rulemaking, Application of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, Federal Unemployment
Tax Act, and Collection of Income Tax at Source to Statutory Stock Options, 70 F.R. 38057 (7/1/05). The
IRS has withdrawn proposed regulations on that would have required FICA, FUTA and income tax
withholding on incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plan stock options in view of the
statutory amendment eliminating such requirements that is applicable to stock options exercised after
10/22/04.
Self-employment
B.
Excise Taxes
C.
Clear statutory language cannot be changed by an interpretive regulation.
1.
Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1209, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 70,215, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-463
(11 th Cir. 1/20/04). Horton purchased vehicles, known as "toters," to transport manufactured homes. The
IRS asserted the 12-percent excise tax levied in § 4051 because it contended that the toters were
"[t]ractors of the kind chiefly used ...in combination with a trailer or semitrailer." The statute had not
changed since 1938, but in 1983, temporary regulations that expanded the definition of "tractor" to
include "a highway vehicle primarily designed to tow a vehicle, such as a trailer or semitrailer," and
further provided that a vehicle "equipped with air brakes and/or towing package will be presumed to be
primarily designed as a tractor." The court held that the regulation could not change the clear statutory
language, and decided for Horton.
Rev. Rul. 2004-80, 2004-32 I.R.B. 164 (7/28/04). A chassis cab with a
a.
gross vehicle weight rating of 23,000 and a gross combination weight rating of 43,000 pounds [when it is
towing a 20,000 pound trailer], with hydraulic disc brakes with a four-wheel automatic braking system, a

300 horsepower engine, and a six-speed automatic transmission [as well as a removable ball gooseneck
hitch, a fifth wheel hitch, and a heavy duty trailer receiver hitch - all of which maximize towing
capacity at the expense of carrying capacity. Held that pursuant to the 1983 temporary regulations
referred to in Horton Homes, the vehicle is a tractor for purposes of § 4051.
2.
Telephone excise tax inapplicable to charges that do not vary by distance,
says the Eleventh Circuit in its latest pronouncement on the "plain meaning" of the tax statutes.
American Bankers Insurance Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 5/10/05). The long
distance services provided by AT&T to taxpayer were not within the "toll telephone service" to which
§ 4252(b)(1) applies because the rates do not vary by "distance and elapsed transmission time" and the
unambiguous statute uses these terms conjunctively; the "plain meaning" of the statute requires both the
time and the distance to vary. Even though there are separate charges for calls depending upon where they
fall within one of three toll bands used (intrastate, interstate and international), the rates do not vary by
distance per se because calls between places closer to one another often cost more than calls between
places further apart. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
government.
XII.

TAX LEGISLATION
A.
Enacted
1.
The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 ("Working Families Act of
2004"), P.L. 108-311, was signed into law by President Bush on 10/4/04.
2.
Fire your lobbyist if you didn't get relief in this act. The American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 ("Jobs Act of 2004"), P.L. 108-357, was signed by President Bush on 10/22/04.
3.
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("Bankruptcy Act of 2005"), P.L. 109-8, was signed by President Bush on 4/20/05.
4.
H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, was signed by President
Bush on 8/8/05.
5.
H.R. 3, the Highway Reauthorization and Excise Tax Simplification Act of
2005, was signed by President Bush on 8/10/05.
6.
Kiss Me Kate. 12 Or, is it the powerful Katrin(k)a? 13 The Katrina Emergency
Tax Relief Act of 2005 ("Katrina Tax Act"), P.L. 109-73, was signed by President Bush on 9/23/05.
B.
Pending
1.
H.R. 3376, the Tax Technical Corrections Bill of 2005 was introduced on
7/21/05.

12
13

For Cole Porter devotees.
For readers of the old Toonerville Trolley comic strip.

